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SURVEY

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THE NATION-STATE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Pierre Hassner

NEVER have theoretical concepts penetrated general discussion as widely as in contemporary international relations: bipolarity, balance of power, deterrence, nuclear age, polycentrism—this is the daily bread of editorials and speeches. But never have these concepts been so ambiguous, never has their use run such a risk of hiding certain aspects of a complex reality by the very process of stressing their equally valid counterparts.

To think about the fate of the nation-state today, even if one abstracts from its formation and its disintegration, from the numerous cases of nations in search of a state and of states devoid of a national basis, leads us immediately to a series of diverging trends and of contradictory conclusions: obviously in some respects the nation-state is flourishing and in others it is dying; it can no longer fulfil some of the most important of its traditional functions, yet it constantly assumes new ones which it alone seems able to fulfil. But what is significant is that the relative importance of these features and the balance between them varies from case to case. Although some features are declining and others growing in all nation-states, the fact is that some nation-states are more obsolete and others more obstinate than others. Indeed, the irony is that, as Horst Mendershausen has observed, 'the state that is eroded by ungovernable trans-national involvements is often not the dog-in-the-manger state, but the peaceful, civilized, orderly state, not East Germany but Belgium or Canada'.[1] The existence of contradictory trends towards integration and disintegration, independence and interdependence, paralysis and freedom of action, leads both to an increase in the number of possible distinctions and hierarchies between states, and to a change in the meaning of the existing ones. Not only is it difficult to talk about the nation-state as such, but any assessment based upon a strict definition of great, small, and middle powers, of allied, neutral, and non-aligned, of nuclear, conventional, and potentially nuclear, not to speak of status quo and revisionist, or growing and declining powers, will be sometimes contradictory, often ambiguous, and always provisional.

However, if nation-states have at least a superficially recognisable (even if ultimately deceptive) identity, can one say the same of the

[1] H. Mendershausen, *Trans-national society, sovereignty and leadership: the environment of foreign policy*. Rand paper, August 1967.

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balance of power? One need not go into esoteric discussions about the nature of power and the mechanisms of the balance system to recognise that no obvious answer is available to the simple immediate question: is there such a thing as *a* world balance of power, and if so, who balances whom, or what balances what, and how? The many dimensions of the states reflect the many dimensions of power; the existence of various types and hierarchies among both would seem to lead quite naturally to several balances, differing along both regional and functional lines, rather than to a single one; if that is so, how are they related? Do they obey the same rules? Obviously the answers to these questions will differ if by balance one simply understands distribution, or the massive fact that power stops power, or the delicate mechanism through which a system of several independent states is kept in existence.

The last words in our title would seem at least to provide some limits to our questions and some focus to our answers by pointing to a given period and a given problem: the nuclear age. But here again the comfort is slight, for the simplicity is deceptive. Even within the revolution in military technology, are we so certain that we live in the nuclear age rather than, say, in the missile or the space age? Obviously the differences between nation-states and the role of each vary if one considers the weapons or their delivery vehicles, and this is enough to indicate that any generalisation here has to be qualified by our awareness both of alternative criteria and of conceivable technological changes. Still more important is our suspicion that the expression 'the nuclear age' implies an assumption on the decisive relevance of military technology (or, if one wishes, of the global strategic balance) which may be justified but is certainly not self-evident. The relevance of nuclear weapons to, say, guerrilla warfare, and the respective importance of these two levels and of the intermediary, conventional one, for the nature of our age and the fate of the nation-state, are open questions from the military point of view alone. They point to the wider problems of the relationship between the military and the political, between arms and influence, between the nation-state's ability to defend itself and its other roles.

WE shall start with the relationship between the two relatively well-defined terms—nation-states and nuclear weapons.

When analysing the fate of the nation-state, especially in a context in which we are interested both in the problem of nationalism and in that of nuclear weapons, we must be careful not to confuse what belongs to the nature of the territorial, of the national, and of the nationalist state. In other words, we must distinguish between the material and institutional basis of the state (in terms of territorial dimensions, resources, and organisation), and the political, psychological, or ideological ties on which the unity of the population and the authority of the rulers are based (the modern nation as opposed both to

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traditional dynastic or religious states, and to universalist and ideological ties); and we must also distinguish between the types of attitude and behaviour towards the outside world (such as stressing one's own independence or freedom of action more than desiring to limit that of others, or stressing those objectives which necessarily presuppose conflict, such as prestige or conquest, rather than those potentially more cooperative, like peace or prosperity).[2]

If we go from the first aspect to the third, we find the same problems and dilemmas in a more and more acute or exaggerated form; the appeals, the troubles, and the dangers of nationalism are those of the modern state writ large.

If we define the latter as a centralised area unit, composed of an organised group of men occupying a territory under a sovereign government endowed with the monopoly of legitimate force, we see that some elements of this definition seem hard to reconcile with the new realities of the nuclear age (this goes, above all, for the material elements, the size of the territory and the volume of resources), while others (the organisational ones like centralisation and unity of command, and the moral ones like patriotism), seem to be made more necessary or at least more important by these new conditions.

If we remember that the nation-state is only one form of territorial state, we see that in most cases it amplifies both the problems of scale (the dimensions and the resources of the nuclear age being those of continents or of the world rather than those of the great majority of nations), and the advantages of unity and solidarity (which appear decisively more solid in the case of nations than of alliances, of camps and of blocs).

Finally, if we look at the objectives of foreign policy, at the ideology which inspires them, and at the action which seeks to achieve them, a new reality appears: nuclear weapons seem to encourage the defensive nationalism of separateness, distrust, and self-reliance; they seem to discourage the offensive nationalism of conquest and expansion. To use Stanley Hoffmann's expression, they tend to protect the nation-state both from merger and from madness. A less charitable way of expressing the same situation would be that modern conditions help nations to preserve their independence but prevent them from using it, that they make nations more jealous of their sovereignty but make this sovereignty less meaningful.

While these formulations differ only by their emphasis, the search for the ultimate meaning of the situation they describe can lead to two completely opposite views. 'Nuclear nationalism' can be seen either as defensive nationalism, a nationalism purified at long last of its

[2] This distinction is close both to Hoffmann's three notions of national situation, national consciousness, and nationalist ideology (cf. his 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe' (*Daedalus*, Summer 1965), and to Rosecrance's distinction of resources, control, and direction in *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston, 1963), p. 279.

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adventurous and imperialistic aspects and made compatible with the international stability upon which it is based; or it can be seen as an absolute illusion which can only be either meaningless or suicidal, since, precisely, the only freedom on which it is based is that of suicide, while interdependence carries the day both in the hypothetical world of nuclear defence and in the real world of non-nuclear activities.

To decide between these two extreme and simplified views one would have to undertake a complex weighing of psychological versus quantitative data. From admittedly intangible hypotheses about degrees of credibility and of reality, the only certitude which would emerge is that nuclear weapons do not justify the sweeping generalisations of those twin 'great simplifiers', the small-power nationalist and the great-power globalist.

Their excuse is that, if one isolates it from its historical and political context, the atom is itself the great simplifier. Through the immensity of their destructive power and the improbability of their effective use, nuclear weapons are a permanent invitation to reason in 'all or nothing' terms, hence to visualise the dissolution of more complex and ambiguous wholes like alliances or like the international system itself, either by fusion or by fission: either by total integration into one community, or by total disintegration into a multiplicity of isolated nations.

The most extreme theories of peace through universalism and of peace through nationalism current today start from the nuclear fact which, by making the classical game of diplomacy and war impossible because it makes it too dangerous, must lead, according to the first, to its total suppression through disarmament or world government, or, according to the second, to its stabilisation through nuclear proliferation and multilateral deterrence. If, narrowing the points of the compass, one looks at the debate on nuclear control and sharing within alliances, it is no less striking that the crisis of both the western and the eastern alliance should have had the atom, if not as a cause, at least as a starting point or a pretext. In both cases the deep roots are probably elsewhere, in the conflict of ambitions involving a complex and unconscious mixture of ideological preconceptions and national interests. But in both cases the existence of the nuclear factor has considerably sharpened the problems of independence and solidarity by increasing the leader's claim to centralised control and his distrust of his adventurous allies, and by the claim of the latter to sovereignty and their distrust of their too prudent protector.

Both in the universalism versus nationalism and in the integration versus multinationalism debate, one is struck by the deep intellectual resemblance between the opposite theories.

THE case for the demise of the nation-state through nuclear weapons is an amplification of the case for the demise of the territorial state through air power. It has been made most forcefully

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by John Herz and Kenneth Boulding.[3] For Herz, "what accounted for the peculiar unity, coherence, or compactness of the modern nation-state, setting it off from other nation-states as a separate unit and permitting us to characterise it as 'independent', 'sovereign', 'a power', was its 'impermeability' or 'impenetrability'; so did the territoriality of the modern state, surrounded as it was by what may be called its 'hard shell' which protected it from foreign penetration. It is this factor which made it defensible and, at least to some extent, secure in its relations with other units. It thus made the state the ultimate unit of protection for those living within its boundaries. Today, on the other hand, the impenetrability of the political atom, the nation-state, is giving way to a permeability which tends to obliterate the very meaning of unit and unity, power and power relations, sovereignty and independence. The possibility of 'hydrogenisation' represents merely the continuation of a development which has rendered the 'hard shell', the traditional defence structure of nations, obsolete through the power to by-pass the shell protecting a two-dimensional 'territory' and thus to destroy—vertically as it were—even the most powerful ones." Successive developments in warfare, from economic blockade through ideological penetration to air war and atomic power, have increasingly overpassed this hard-shell defence. In particular, since the advent of air warfare, which makes it possible to destroy a country before disarming its armies and occupying its territory, the roof has blown off the territorial state. This in turn means a change from distinctness and separateness to pervasion, to 'absolute permeability of each by each of the others'. Potentially at least, the power of everyone is present 'everywhere'.

Other authors have given the same idea a more formalised and economically oriented formulation, which makes it easier to test its validity. For Kenneth Boulding, the nation-state is doomed because its unconditional viability (i.e. its power to withstand any attack) has been replaced by conditional viability (i.e. its survival is dependent on the decision of others not to attack it, as distinct from their inability to do so). The reason for this is that states were protected by the existence of the LSG (or loss of strength gradient), which favoured the defensive: power tended to decrease with the distance from its home base. Today, aircraft and missiles have reduced the loss of strength gradient almost to vanishing point, thus favouring the offensive, since power can be applied from anywhere, distance involving almost no loss in time and cost. This is what Professor Modelski calls a 'perfect market' in security, transportation costs being a basic cause of imperfect competition. But while Boulding, like Herz, draws from this situation the conclusion that the world has become too small for the existence of separate nation-states, Modelski sees in it a greater chance for the

[3] John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York, 1959); K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York, 1962).

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survival of small nation-states: they can protect themselves and be protected by great powers against any threat regardless of geography, without the delay which was crucial in other times.[4]

This leads us to the view which constitutes the perfect mirror-image of the Boulding-Herz one. Like the latter and unlike Modelski, right-wing proliferationists like General Pierre Gallois and left-wing ones like Mr John Burton,[5] believe that nuclear weapons act as the great equaliser, making differences in power between states meaningless; but while for the first school all states are equal because none is able to defend itself, for the second all are equal because each is able to protect itself. If everybody can destroy everybody, one may conclude either that everybody can be destroyed or that nobody will. The unconditional viability once enjoyed by some may be over, but conditional viability, if it is universal and reciprocal, may yet provide the greatest security for the greatest number of states. The model these authors outline is one of generalised armed neutrality (as General Gallois would put it and as the French Chief of Staff, General Ailleret, would seem to imply in an authoritative article),[6] or (as in Mr John Burton's approach, which combines faith in the Afro-Asian world with faith in the bomb), of generalised non-alignment, based on what Morton Kaplan has called the unity veto system: every state being able to destroy, in retaliation, every other one, or, in a more extreme version, to destroy the whole world.[7] Obviously we encounter here the ambiguity of the 'nuclear age' idea. Neither school claims that the conditions of its favourite model are anything but foreshadowed by the situation of the nuclear powers in the present world; but both maintain that they are implicit in present trends.

For all states to be equally vulnerable thanks to the eclipse of distance, every state would have to have the weapons and the means of delivery to inflict unacceptable damage on every other one; for all states to be equally protected, each should, in addition, have an invulnerable retaliatory force. In other words, the situation described is a generalisation to the whole planet of the nature of the present nuclear balance between the two super-powers. It holds between states which have achieved a condition of stable deterrence, characterised by the mutual invulnerability of their forces and the mutual vulnerability of their societies.[8] This condition is created by the extreme concentration of explosive power characteristic of nuclear weapons, but it is by no means universally given nor, in all likelihood, universally and permanently accessible. At one extreme, the existence of an insufficiently

[4] G. Modelski, 'The International System', *World Politics*, October 1961, pp. 133, 143.

[5] P. Gallois, *The Balance of Terror* (New York, 1961); J. Burton, *International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1965).

[6] 'Défense dirigée ou défense tous azimuths?' *Revue de Défense Nationale*, December 1967.

[7] Cf. his *System and Process in International Politics*.

[8] Cf. the seminal article by A. L. Burns, 'From Balance to Deterrence: a theoretical analysis', *World Politics*, 1957, ix.

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powerful or protected nuclear force, at the other technological breakthroughs like progress in anti-missile systems or in civil defence, can make a nation's forces vulnerable or her cities invulnerable; neither the equalisation of states nor the stabilisation of deterrence would then keep their validity. General Gallois admits as much, since in his latest book he distinguishes three categories of states: those which, besides securing their protection through nuclear weapons, can keep conventional forces which enable them to put military means at the service of an active foreign policy directed at influence or conquest against non-nuclear states; those which can only afford a nuclear posture and enjoy the same security as the first but not the same active influence; and finally the non-nuclear states, which can hardly be called states at all since they cannot protect themselves against the nuclear ones. In the same book, Gallois recognises that automatically stabilised deterrence on his model is likely to be a transitory one.[9] However, he would maintain as permanently valid the bias of nuclear weapons in favour of the nation-state, due to their apocalyptic destructive power. Their use meaning suicide, this can be credible only as a last resort threat, meant to defend one's ultimate honour or one's very existence and based on ultimate solidarity and either on automaticity or on 'irrational' values; this rules out protection and alliances. On the other hand, 'proportionate deterrence' and the blurring of quantitative differences after a threshold of destruction which he puts relatively low, give this deterrent capacity to relatively small forces.

OBVIOUSLY, technological presuppositions (on the ease of securing to one's retaliatory force both sufficient protection and sufficient penetration) are mingled with psychological ones, but the stress is on the latter. While the case of the 'nuclear pessimists' is based on the physical difficulties of defence, the case of the 'nuclear optimists' is based on the psychological possibilities of deterrence. Of course, if deterrence does not fail, defence will not be put to the test; but the point about deterrence is that it may fail, that in order not to fail it must be credible, which means that if not defence, at least retaliation, must be both psychologically conceivable and physically feasible. In both respects one is up against psychological assumptions which, by the nature of deterrence, cannot be verified unless deterrence fails. Whatever the wisdom of thinking about defence if deterrence fails, obviously the first consideration is to prevent it from failing. The best formulation of the two positions, then, is based on Glenn Snyder's distinction between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.[10] Nuclear weapons make deterrence by denial more difficult and deterrence by punishment more easy. Deterrence by denial, as against deterrence by punishment, may always have been less prevalent in the past than the theorists of territoriality or

[9] P. Gallois, *Les Paradoxes de la paix* (Paris, 1967), pp. 184-189, 275.
[10] G. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, 1961), p. 14.

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unconditional viability assume; at any rate, deterrence by punishment seems to have been more effective in keeping the peace since 1945. On the other hand the crucial point is that 'deterrence by punishment' is more correctly named deterrence by *threat* of punishment. Contrary to deterrence by denial, it has to be believed in order to work and it leads to suicide if it doesn't. Hence, while today the possibility of deterrence by punishment plays a greater role than the impossibility of deterrence by denial, we are more certain about the latter than about the former. The difficulty of deterrence by denial is possibly irrelevant but certainly solid; the feasibility of deterrence by punishment is certainly relevant but possibly shaky.

We find a similar opposition between the psychological strength and the physical weakness of the nation-state in the second dialogue, which sets nuclear nationalists not against world disarmers but against alliance centralisers. Again, both approaches look like mirror images of each other. Both conceive of deterrence in an essentially bilateral setting, with power A deterring a potential aggressor B. Both insist upon the necessity, for retaliation to be effective and hence for deterrence to be credible, of having one finger on the trigger, and a political one; they are, then, equally hostile to decision by committee and by delegation to military commanders.

They are unquestionably right from the point of view of the strategic optimum. What forces them to oppose each other is the fact that political reality makes this strategic optimum inapplicable, since the reality is made up of a plurality of states which are close enough to be allied against a common enemy, but both too distinct to constitute a single community under a single authority, overcoming disagreements and suspicions, and too unequal in dimensions and strength for each to be able to secure his own protection by himself. The tendency of American strategists is to dismiss the first difficulty and to consider the whole zone covered by the Atlantic alliance as a single area, whose protection and defence, placed under the authority of the American President, should be conceived and whose forces should be distributed according to the strategic requirements of maximum security and efficiency.

A theorist like General Gallois answers that if the Atlantic community or Europe actually constituted a single country, the ultimate decision on which deterrence relies could and should be entrusted to its president, but since this single country does not exist, national solidarity can only be that of existing nations, each of which had to secure its own protection since all are too vulnerable to protect each other.

The Americans in their turn answer that, to secure one's own protection, national existence is not enough; the unequal distribution of dimensions and resources does not allow most countries to deter the possible aggression of a great power with any kind of credibility. General Gallois answers with his theory of proportional deterrence; a

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kind of pre-established harmony enables every small power, if it wants to pay the price, to inflict on every great power an amount of destruction corresponding to the stakes it represents itself.

At this point it becomes clear that the reasoning leads to a postulate which is just as obviously contrary to reality as the 'American' point of view postulating the negligible nature of national differences within the alliance. The coherence and simplicity of the two extreme positions are obtained only by leaving aside political reality in one case, psychological, physical, and technological reality in the other.

In real life, one cannot help having to deal with both aspects—and hence with a complex reality where states unequal in power are both linked by common interests and separated by diverging ones. One must envisage various unsatisfactory compromises between protection and independence, self-reliance and interdependence, commitment and flexibility. If it does not lead to compromise, the uneven and contradictory distribution of power as physical strength, of power as freedom of action, and of power as influence, can lead to mutual paralysis or destruction.

One finds an enlightening reflection of the same dilemmas if one looks at the non-nuclear level, and at the debate raging in the United States between globalists for whom modern communications and strategic mobility have made spheres of influence and geographical limitations obsolete, and 'neo-isolationists' for whom modern nationalism and revolutionary warfare have made great-power intervention self-defeating. The horns of the dilemma are less far apart than in the nuclear case. The 'loss of strength gradient' and the favourable or unfavourable characteristics of the battleground for intervention from a distance, exist to a greater degree for local war; David cannot protect himself against Goliath by threatening to destroy him in retaliation. Nevertheless the same technology versus psychology debate does take place, and perhaps in a more relevant and realistic way than in the abstract world of nuclear deterrents.

Strategists have argued (most brilliantly and thoroughly in the case of Albert Wohlstetter [10a]) that geo-political distances tend to become irrelevant not only for nuclear but also for non-nuclear combat. Long-distance lift capacity is easier to achieve for a country like the United States than short-distance lift capacity within the military theatre. If distance is measured not in miles but in time and cost of transportation, the United States is closer to Vietnam than is China, since it can more easily transport troops into the country.

On the other hand, psychological, sociological, ideological, cultural, and historical distances reassert themselves with a vengeance, and more so in the confused and diffuse world of conventional and sub-conventional war than in the rarefied dialogue of nuclear crisis. North Vietnam or the NLF cannot deter the United States by punishment, but they are

[10a] A. Wohlstetter, 'Illusions of Distance', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968.

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themselves less vulnerable to 'compellence'[11] or to 'deterrence by punishment' than the Soviet Union would be, precisely because they can benefit both from their weakness and from the inability of their opponents to ascertain to what extent they understand his messages and to what extent they would, if willing, be able to comply. More important, they can practise denial and reaffirm, if not the impermeability of the territorial nation-state, at least the unconquerability of the nationalist territory, in a more convincing way than both modern nuclear mini-deterrence and traditional resistance to conquest. The costs of transportation have declined but the costs of intervention in human, psychological, and ultimately in financial terms, have increased. The appeal and the legitimacy of conquest, of an imperial mission, go against the ethos of a modern democratic society; the urge and ability to resist are encouraged in the developing nations by increasing political mobilisation and organisation, made possible by modernisation itself; smallness, underdevelopment, and new nationhood being advantages in cohesion, solidarity, austerity, and fanaticism, which increase the credibility of protracted resistance even more than some of the same features do the credibility of nuclear retaliation.[12]

THE fact that the case against the nation-state has been linked to the case against geographical distance should not, however, make us identify the two issues completely. Among American globalists, the more serious ones (the strategists as opposed to the ideologists) may be up less against nationalism than against regionalism. They can—as Wohlstetter does—acknowledge the resistance of revolutions to technology, yet point out that this might apply to Latin America no less than to Asia. That nationalist peoples are obstinate does not make spheres of influence any less obsolete, nor regional divisions any less irrelevant—so long as they are based on geography. This is certainly true, from a military point of view, as against critics like Walter Lippmann or Hans Morgenthau who are imprudent enough to put their case against American over-extension in terms of physical resources and proximity. But it is more valid for capabilities than interests, and more for the capability to move troops and to inflict destruction than for that to win friends and influence people. The point is that there is more to regionalism than geopolitics or, put another way, that political geography is made of history, anthropology, and psychology, as much as of physical geography. There is nothing sacred about distance which cannot be made obsolete by changes in transportation time and cost; but the racial and cultural differences, and centuries of shared (whether hostile or friendly, usually both) experiences as neighbours are another matter.

[11] Cf. T. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–71.
[12] Cf. R. Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, (Paris, 1962), p. 368; K. Knorr, *On the use of military power in the nuclear age*, pp. 17–80; K. Deutsch, 'The future of world politics', *Political Quarterly*, January 1966.

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Militarily the United States may be closer to Vietnam than is China, just as, physically, Europe is closer to China than the United States; but psychologically and politically the United States is an Asian power in a way Germany is not, and China's presence in South-East Asia is of a different nature again: she does not have to establish the credibility of her long-term presence, whereas the United States, in order to do so, must commit itself psychologically and materially to an extent which then drastically limits its freedom of action. Oceans may no longer constitute a physical barrier, nor is the same colour of skin a guarantee of understanding and racial difference one of hostility; but—just as for the perceived difference between land conquest and colonisation by sea—they constitute points of salience, in Schelling's sense, which emerge out of history and leave their mark on psychology. They are crucially important, as both Schelling's observations on the relation between degrees of bloc-cohesion and territorial contiguity, and the experience of the different kind of protection extended by the Soviet Union and respected by the United States in the case of North Vietnam and of eastern Europe have shown, in the case of deterrence itself; how much more so in the case of political relationship! The fact that, more often than not, one hates one's neighbour and enters into alliance with a more distant protector only reinforces this. This ally is valued *qua* distant and different, and the eclipse of distance may make him lose this quality without gaining an intimacy which the traditional foe has never lost. From the relations between Greek city states and the Persian Empire to those of South-East Asian states with China and the United States, or of France and Germany, the history of Asia and Europe is full of these ambiguous and ambivalent relations, where different degrees and phases of enmity and cooperation, suzerainty and conquest, of presence and absence, affect the ways in which states can understand, influence, protect, and deter each other. Another relevant consideration is that of size or of position in the power balance: again, medium states will both be more jealous of other neighbouring medium states than of a distant protector, and at the same time share a common experience as against his which a too direct confrontation (in which, precisely, the difference in size and power appears as the decisive factor), may help to revive and strengthen. Here again, the strategist and the economist will find ideas of continental solidarity or self-assertion irrelevant only if they are prepared to maintain that strategy has nothing to do with psychology nor economics with politics.

In short, the brave new one world of universalists and globalists and the brave new fragmented world of nationalists and isolationists, both supposedly based on the lessons of technology, are both abstract and one-dimensional worlds which neglect, at their peril, the complex network of solidarities, hostilities, misunderstandings, of commitments and balances which centuries of conflict and alliance, as well as new common interests and new rivalries, have woven among nations. The

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political map of the world, with its mountains and its hills, its canyons and its oceans, as well as its roads and passes, is neither a series of islands nor one continuous bloc or flat surface. None of the generalisations of any of the two sides in each of our three dialogues really holds true.

It is false that in earlier times nobody could be conquered, thanks to impenetrability, or that any state could defend itself: at any time many states have had to rely on their lack of appeal, on alliances, on the workings of the international system itself for their viability. It is equally false that today any state can be conquered or that no state can defend itself: the roof may have blown off, but being bombed is not being conquered, nor does domination of the air guarantee political domination.

Similarly, it is false to say that any state, even nuclear, can deter any attack upon itself. And it is equally false that no state can deter any attack on another state. Nor would the opposite statements be any more true. Obviously, while the optimum situation is that of a great nuclear power, endowed with an invulnerable force and an assured destruction capability against any opponent, deterring an attack on its own territory, some residual deterrence against some threats is available both to a small nuclear power, however limited and vulnerable its retaliatory force may be, against attacks directed against itself, and to a great nuclear power, even lacking a 'credible first strike' capability, which wants to deter an attack on one of its allies. Weighing the degree of deterrence secured by a greater probability of retaliation as against a less acceptable damage can be done only by the potential aggressor. Precisely because degrees of credibility are involved, the nature of the political relationship within the relevant triangle would obviously be decisive.

Finally, it would be equally ludicrous to assert that all powers are equal because none can exert influence or balance power outside its borders, and that great powers can do so everywhere and in the same way, regardless of variations not only in regional balances but in the nature of the power involved or required.

TO say, then, that the international world is full of changing differences in the hierarchy of powers, in the nature of power, in the nature of links and of balances between states, that one type of power is related to another type, but not immediately convertible into it and may sometimes be counterproductive for it, that, even militarily, no state can exert any kind of deterrence and of compellence, of defence and of conquest, against any other state, that no state is totally devoid of all four of these possibilities against every other state, and that the favourable conditions for each of these functions vary with the relationships among various states, is simply to advance a series of platitudes, amounting to the idea that no state is either all-powerful or completely powerless, and that the degrees and nature of the power

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of all vary from case to case. It is sometimes hard to resist the impression that beyond these platitudes lies either philosophic speculation on the nature of the nation-state or empirical analysis of the various political situations in a given area at a given time.

This impression, however excusable, would be misleading. Once one accepts the idea that it is not very fruitful to talk about *the* nation-state, and even less about *the* balance of power, there remains a broad field of inquiry about the changing and complex nature and distribution of power in the world today. Both the debate about the changing meaning and results of the use of force, and the debate about trends towards dominance by one power, bipolarity, multipolarity, or polycentrism in the international system, are genuine debates which have been abundantly illustrated by such writers as Raymond Aron, Thomas Schelling, Robert Osgood, Klaus Knorr, Stanley Hoffmann, Kenneth Waltz, C. E. Zoppo, George Liska, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and many others. This is not the place either to summarise these debates or to add to their contributions. One general point, however, seems worth making because it would seem to indicate the direction in which the conditions and limits of national independence, of military sovereignty, and of diplomatic freedom of action can be meaningfully explored today for the different states.

The striking feature which recurs both within and between the various debates is a particular type of multi-dimensionality, or a particular combination of independence and of interdependence, of separation and of interaction. Dimensions which could be considered as indicators of each other because they used to be roughly inseparable in fact, or confused in analysis, must today be distinguished in a more systematic way because their discrepancy raises all kinds of paradoxes: this goes for deterrence and defence, for military force and diplomatic influence, for flexibility and security, etc. But, next to confusing them, the most dangerous error is to think that because they must be distinguished they are not related, or that because they do not automatically reinforce each other they are automatically contradictory.

A central illustration of this is the relation between the nature of power (or its different kinds), its hierarchical distribution (or the structure of the international system), and its geographical distribution (or the relation between the global system and the partial, regional ones). The dialogues which bear on the second and third problem can be understood only in relation to the first and vice-versa.

To writers like Stanley Hoffmann and Klaus Knorr, who insist on the mutual or self-paralysis of the great powers, due in the first place to the difficulty of using nuclear weapons, and to the resulting superior freedom of action open to the middle and small powers, and in the second place to the difficulty of controlling unstable societies and the possibilities of revolutionary warfare, Kenneth Waltz gives the

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same reply as Albert Wohlstetter to regionalists: these changes and limits have nothing to do with a decrease in the global power of the United States or in the bipolar nature of the international system; they have to do with the limits of military power itself, which is insufficient to control the domestic development of societies, but no more so in the case of the United States or the Soviet Union today than of other powers and at other times.[13]

But surely this argument, even though literally true, is self-defeating. While accusing his opponents of confusing military power and political control, Waltz himself comes close to identifying power with military force; he can maintain that the balance and structure of power have not changed only by giving them such an impossibly narrow definition that it leaves out the very realities which he himself is interested in understanding, namely the factors making for stability and change in international relations, and the possibility of managing them. To Coral Bell, who had written that the revolutionary guerrilla has proved the most effective means yet devised for altering the world power-balance, he replies: 'The revolutionary guerrilla wins civil wars, not international ones, and no civil war can change the balance of power in the world unless it takes place in the United States or the Soviet Union. Even in China, the most populous of states, a civil war that led to a change of allegiance in the cold war did not seriously tilt the world balance.' More than a case for bipolarity, this is a radical case for isolationism, since nothing which happens in the outside world can alter the balance of power, defined exclusively in terms of the balance between the strategic military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Surely the real problem (once we have been reminded of this basic structure which, contrary to the uncritical prophets of polycentrism and multipolarity, none of the writers mentioned had even thought of denying), is to what extent and in what way this strategic balance affects the actual course of international relations: whether, where, how, and to what extent, strategic arms can buy political influence. As Philip Windsor has written: 'Surely the history of the Cold War needs above all to be examined in terms of the changing requirements of effective power: to relate it merely as a shift in the centres of power, away from the European nations to the two great neutrals of 1940, is not only to project the conflict in a misleading dimension, but to make much of it incomprehensible, from the loss of Soviet authority in eastern Europe to the American stalemate in Vietnam.'[14]

In turn, these changing requirements of effective power lead to changes in the relative importance of the different centres. When Waltz writes: 'To say that militarily strong states are feeble because they cannot easily bring order to another state is like saying that a

[13] K. Waltz, 'International Structure, National Force and the Balance of World Power', *Journal of International Affairs*, 1967, 2, pp. 215–32.
[14] *Survival*, November 1967, p. 374.

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pneumatic hammer is weak because it is not suitable for drilling decayed teeth. It is to confuse the purpose of instruments and to confound the means of external power with the agencies of internal governance', he forgets what he himself points out a few lines later—namely that the great powers do consider the internal order of weaker states as part of their global power game, that they intervene in it, directly or indirectly, with their military force, and that while they have no guarantee of success, they still have a better chance of success than weaker states. If this is so, the obvious problem is whether or not the domestic order of states and civil wars, as opposed to conventional state-to-state conflicts or the danger of general nuclear war, are becoming more important, and whether the military force of the great powers is becoming less or more relevant to these types of situations.

The comparison of the pneumatic hammer needs to be carried not only one step further than Waltz does, but two. First, someone who has a pneumatic hammer is actually weaker than before if he finds himself in an environment where the demand for new construction works has drastically decreased, but there is a steady demand for drilling decayed teeth. But in the second place, it might still happen that he will be able to sell his pneumatic hammer at a considerable loss and buy instead, say, two dentist's drills. He might then still be stronger with the new and more relevant teeth-drilling power than someone who has always owned only one small rudimentary drill. But the difference is much less great than either that indicated by the costs involved or that which was relevant at the time when pneumatic hammers were the instrument of progress.

In other terms, the problem is that of the indirect exploitation of superior military force and, more generally, that of the exchange rate (or loss of energy) between various forms of power.

THIS, rather than the intellectual pleasure derived from proclaiming that the world is monopolar because only the United States can air-lift troops everywhere,[15] or that all states are equal because Zambia can be non-aligned, should be our main concern. Obviously, such general labels are of little use in a complex world where increases in strength may coincide with losses in political control, where the economic costs of one type of military power may be prohibitive and those of another increasingly cheap, where a given state or a given type of power may be able to deter but not to compel, or to destroy but not to build, where the use of force can be necessary for political influence here and detrimental there; where, to use Karl Deutsch's comparison, the power to knock a man down does not give us the power to teach him to play the piano, but where, to pursue the comparison further, it may still be useful (much less, admittedly, than in a boxing match) in

[15] Cf. Z. Brzezinski, 'The American Decade', *Foreign Service Journal*, January 1967, and 'The implications of change for U.S. policy', *Department of State Bulletin*, 3 July 1967.

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order to compel a great piano teacher to do the job, or again may be counter-productive by creating in the pupil a psychological resistance to musical education; where plenty of arms may buy a little influence, where good soldiers may or may not be, as Machiavelli thought, a better means to get money than vice-versa, where some do raise divisions and some do not, where small states can successfully challenge great ones most of the time and the latter may reassert their superiority in times of crisis or war, where economic giants may be political dwarfs; in short, where the strength of some can be turned into weakness and the weakness of others into strength according to the objectives, the skill, and the resources of the different states, and to their position in the various (sometimes contradictory) combinations and alignments on the international map. Much work in the social sciences, from economics, systems analysis, and strategy, to sociology and integration theory, can help us to clarify this economy of force and control, to distinguish potential power and actual influence, to see the limits of this distinction through the notion of 'anticipated reaction', to see that all exercise of power implies not only actual costs but opportunity costs, to compare various forms of power by confronting their respective costs, risks, and achievements, to glimpse the dynamics by which success in one type of power may spill over into another or, conversely, failure in one type may lead to resort to another one less difficult to use but even less likely to produce results.

Equally useful notions developed in international relations theory proper, indicate not only that the international system, in its various dimensions, has elements of monopolarity, of hostile and cooperative bipolarity, of multipolar concert and balance of power, of universal collective security and universal isolationism, but that it may be useful to distinguish different international systems according to the different patterns emerging from different issues, different levels, or different types of power.

Again, it is precisely when one distinguishes the different patterns that one can see more clearly the causal connection between them: for example nuclear bipolarity produces political polycentrism and encourages nuclear multipolarity, which in turn encourages a reassertion of bipolarity in a more cooperative, condominium form.[16] The incongruity between various coexisting patterns has been called 'structural distance', the 'degree of distance' being 'the degree to which patterns on different phenomenal levels do not overlap'.[17] The usefulness of this notion should be particularly clear in the context of an enquiry into the fate of the nation-state.

THE same multi-dimensionality which is to be found in the nature of power and in the structure of the international system appears

[16] Cf. K. F. von Weizsäcker, 'Uber Weltpolitische Prognosen', *Europa-Archiv*, 1966.
[17] W. Hanrieder, 'The International System—bipolar or multibloc?' *Journal of Conflict Resolution.*

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today in the functions of politically organised communities. The crisis of the nation-state lies less in a uniform broadening of dimensions which would lead, naturally and harmoniously, to continental units or to a world state, than in the increasing 'structural distance' or increasing discrepancy between the dimensions required for fulfilling its various functions. Both the optimal dimensions of units and the scope of the subjective feeling of solidarity or community seem to vary if one looks at the military, at the economic, the political, the ideological, or the cultural aspects. While the nation-state retains its ultimate sovereignty and the loyalty of its citizens, the Common Market may be a more relevant unit for agricultural policy, NATO for military deterrence and defence, the West or, in another sense, the developed world from an ideological or cultural point of view. A common fate may encompass provinces, states, regional and ideological blocs and alliances: that of being powerless here and sovereign there, of overlapping with their rivals and being challenged by their components. Nuclear weapons can be said to strengthen the case for great political units, since their existence seems to make a world state even more difficult to achieve and their economic and geographic preconditions seem to make the nation-state even more powerless. But at the same time, through the universal danger which their use, even against a neutral power like India, would cause to humanity, something like a collective security feeling, or the consciousness of universal common interest, seems really to be emerging for the first time, while, at the other extreme, the concentration of decision and of solidarity which nuclear weapons seem to demand, gives a new value to the national dimension. According to circumstances one dimension or the other can be decisive: one can imagine a model in which states are interdependent for actual defence and independent for the ultimate nuclear choice, or one in which they keep their freedom of action in every circumstance except precisely the ultimate one, since the choice between life and death is not really theirs.

Like the multiplicity of alignments and conflicts within the international system, this multiplicity in the size and scope of relevant territorial units makes for divided loyalties, cross-cutting cleavages, limited sovereignties. And just as with the multiplicity of roles and hierarchies for the individual in a differentiated modern society, this multi-dimensionality, if it is kept within tolerable limits, makes for healthy pluralism and for the relativisation of inequalities and conflicts; if the degree of distance is too great, if between the various levels or roles there is not only potential tension but flat opposition, it makes for neurosis, paralysis, and disintegration.

This carries an essential lesson for the fate of the national, the regional, and the global level, and of their respective roles.

The nation-state does not seem on the verge of collapse; but the essence of its original conception, that of a tight and self-contained unity between authority, community, loyalty, culture, language, defence

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and, if possible, economy, is decisively challenged and with it the basis of 'nationalist' ideology and foreign policy.

Similarly, regional federations would seem to be the ideal answer to the structural distance problem, since their function would be precisely to create units which, while having less unity than the nation-state or less space and resources than a world state or the super-powers, would have more unity than the latter and more space and resources than the former, and would be able to fulfil, more or less satisfactorily, the traditional functions of the nation-state. But it is obvious that they would mitigate the problem by reducing the degree of distance, rather than by suppressing both, since some functions would continue to be the privilege of the member states and others would be beyond the reach even of a continental one. Moreover, in the case of western Europe, we are witnessing precisely a broadening of the horizon, at least in all European directions, and a reassertion of the national objectives of the various states. But this only strengthens the case for a modified regionalism or federalising process as distinct from any rigid and self-contained formula. Precisely because the structural distance is widening, the discrepancies have to be mitigated even though they cannot and should not be suppressed. Precisely because of the potential gap and clash between national ambitions and universal problems, a third intermediary level is needed to maintain some communication and coordination. But this can be done only if this third level is conceived not as a substitute for the others but as a link between them.

Finally, the consequences for the world powers are best seen if one considers the interaction between the multiple dimensions of power and the multiple dimensions of political units. Some types of power suffer a huge 'loss of strength gradient' and some none at all. Some are effective within a political community, some with an alliance or an organisation, some within a given area of civilisation; some are much more effective on a global scale than on a more restricted one. Ultimately the mark of a world power is that it must be able to exert some kind of influence both on every level of collective activity and in every part of the world. But the point is that on many issues and in many regions the various types can exercise this influence only in an indirect and hence considerably limited or modified or watered-down way: by passing through other types of power and through other powers, by adapting themselves to the specific issues and the specific areas involved.

To try to push one's influence directly by ignoring national or regional feeling, and by forgetting that the search for unmitigated control and assurance can only lead to unmitigated loss and danger, would be to follow Pascal's definition of tyranny: to ask in one area for what one can only have in another.

The same lesson is valid for all three levels: each has a unique and indispensable role, each can play it only if it accepts, respects, and eventually learns how to influence the two others.

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THIS is, however, easier said than done. The problem of the link between forms of power, between levels of the international system, and between the states themselves is complicated by the fact that different activities and levels have not only different scopes and structures but also different functional mechanisms and requirements. The very meaning of actions like balancing, of mechanisms like stability, is different when we look at the nuclear and the conventional, the unipolar and the multipolar, the military and the diplomatic, the political and the economic, the global and the regional levels. Yesterday, under the name of the 'balance of power', one could comprehend a balance of political alignments, of military power, and of economic resources which, without in any universal or exact fashion coinciding, could still roughly serve as each other's sanction and instrument. Today there is plenty of deliberate or *de facto* balancing in the world, but the notion of one balance of power is at best descriptive, certainly imprecise, and possibly misleading.[18] Different types of balance and stability differently achieved at different levels interact and, more often than not, produce global imbalance and instability; conversely, global stability, if one must call it balance, is more often than not a balance of imbalances. This already points to what looks like the basic problem of international relations today: the relation between stability and change, or, put in more drastic terms, the frequent contradiction and necessary conciliation between security and flexibility.

Two classical dilemmas are associated with the general notion of equilibrium: should it be seen as a goal consciously and cooperatively aimed at by the various units or the automatic result of their competition, each pursuing its own interest? Should it be conceived as static and identified with a mechanism which re-establishes the status quo against disturbances, or as dynamic, as a way of promoting growth and peaceful change? The two converge into the question: should stability be the result of mutually compensating movements or of immobility, stemming either from stalemate or from satisfaction? Both are amplified in a world where the nuclear balance of terror is one, but only one, dimension of reality. They appear in this new balance itself—under the guise of the dilemmas between the search for superiority or for equality, the arms race and stabilised deterrence, the reliance on rationality and predictability or on the rationality of irrationality and the predictability of unpredictability for deterrence and crisis management. But basically the nuclear balance is biased in favour of as little movement as possible: its purpose is deterrence rather than political or military gains or adjustments. Contrary to the tactical or conventional and to the political balance of power, it is more stable if it includes a smaller number of actors, because, as stability results less from the equality of forces than from the calculus of costs and risks, allies appear more as an increase in risk than in strength, and because the maintenance

[18] Cf. E. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 68–76.

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of stability, that is, the absence of attack, relies more on intentions and less on capabilities, hence more on communications and on finding a common language and common ground rules which are endangered by the shifts and moves of a greater number of more heterogeneous powers.[19] At the pre-nuclear and non-nuclear level, the possibility of using war as an instrument of policy made for flexibility tempered by caution; states could shift allegiances but knew that these shifts could result in war; when war occurred, it was the great factor for change and was often followed by territorial changes and settlements. Today, the existence of nuclear weapons tends to separate war and diplomacy, and while they increase the destructive power of arms and the freedom of manoeuvre of diplomacy, to sterilise both as factors of change. Great powers have increasing strength, small and medium powers have increasing freedom of action, but the former tend to have *only* strength and the latter *only* freedom of action. Neither the number of Soviet or American missiles nor the number of French or Rumanian initiatives or speeches can do very much to solve the German problem or to change the territorial status quo in Europe. The nuclear balance seems characterised by the acceptance of stalemate, the diplomatic one by the search for flexibility; but the gap between the two is narrowed by the fact that both remain abstract, the diplomatic combinations which re-emerge look like the ghosts of yesterday's realities; everybody can play with combinations reminiscent of old alignments precisely because they do not affect reality. Or rather, as with the nuclear weapons of the great powers, the power of the diplomatic activity of small and medium powers appears essentially negative, a new proof of what Stanley Hoffmann has called the prevalence of denials over gains: everybody can block everyone else's design but not promote his own. Just as the Soviet Union and the United States have, in turn, discovered the great difficulty of compellence as compared to deterrence, so the most revisionist of European statesmen discover how much more effective their veto power against the leaders of their alliance is than their positive influence.

Actual changes, then, seem to occur neither under the influence of nuclear weapons nor under that of diplomacy, but either under the impact of the direct use of force in places where conventional war is still possible, or under that of sub-and transnational forces, going from ideological evolution under the impact of social and economic change to civil war and revolutionary violence. But whether slow and subterranean or sudden and explosive, these changes are least easy to understand in terms of balances or to regulate by diplomatic or strategic calculations. Hence the problem of the contradiction and interaction between these various trends.

[19] For comparisons between the balance of terror and the balance of power, see in particular A. Lee Burns, loc. cit., Snyder, op. cit., and R. Aron, *Le Grand Débat*, ch. 6; Zoppo, 'Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity and International Stability', *World Politics*, July 1966; Osgood and Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore, 1967), ch. 2.

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To the three well-known levels of violence, nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional, correspond three types of politics—the nuclear dialogue between great powers, meant to maximise the security of deterrence, the classical diplomacy associated with the prevention and settlement of conventional wars, and the domestic or transnational politics concerned with the peaceful or violent transformation of the social order. Since, however, contrary to the classical relationship on the conventional level, the foreign policies of middle powers, in a situation dominated by the nuclear balance of the super-powers, seem to be almost unconnected with the possibility of war, and since, at the other extreme, politics and violence seem impossible to distinguish according to classical criteria, four basic types of situation and of stability and instability seem to appear: the nuclear balance of deterrence based on immobility; the diplomatic balance based on flexibility; the conventional balance based on a quantitative balance and on a mixture of flexibility and the actual use of force; the sub-national one, based on evolution and revolution, or on power transformation rather than balance.

The question, then, is whether the processes which occur at each of these levels and which, whether through immobility or flexibility, through deterrence or through violence, may produce some stability in their own area, do not prevent the successful operation of the stabilising mechanisms of the others? Stanley Hoffmann, in his forthcoming book on 'Gulliver's Troubles', calls the present system a 'stalemate system', because of the predominance of denials over gains. But at the same time he points out that at the sub-conventional level force continues to produce gains, while the negative use of force for deterrence, or its 'repellent' use to recover losses, are less successful. 'What is lost by war is gained by revolution.' The 'internalisation of politics' is partly a consequence of the stalemate system, by creating the dilemma of thwarting domestic evolution and revolution in the name of stability, or of endangering the existing balance in the name of revolution. Similarly, C. E. Zoppo points out that 'the very flexibility of alignment which brought stability to the balance-of-power system could become a serious threat to the maintenance of deterrence'.[20] A world patterned upon the requirements of nuclear deterrence could be a world in which political situations, however intolerable, would be frozen. A world which would satisfy the aspirations of nations to independent action and of social groups to revolution would be a world in which at some point, unpredictability and conflict would seriously endanger the stability of nuclear deterrence and the security of states.

TO see in which direction the winds are blowing, one need only take into account the fragmentation of the international system and the relation of the global strategic balance to the regional, political, and

[20] Zoppo, loc. cit., p. 201. Cf. also the remarks of Erasmus on 'Polycentrism and Proliferation' and of C. Gasteyger on 'Nuclear Prospects and Foreign Policy' in *Survey*, January 1966.

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military ones. Nothing is more striking than the contrast between the situation of Europe and that of other continents. In Europe there have been spectacular changes in alignment and, occasionally, the direct use of force by the Soviet Union. But basically, the use of force to modify the status quo looks increasingly impossible, with the result that the security of Europe is incomparably greater than that of other continents, and that its unsolved political problems, like the division of Germany, have been frozen in a status quo which may yet produce dangerous repercussions in terms of popular reactions. At the other extreme, in Africa, *coups d'état*, civil wars, and genocide occur without either being stopped or being really considered as a danger to world security. In the Middle East the use of force over territorial issues has repeatedly, in the most traditional fashion, modified the balance and the map, through conflicts which the great powers have managed to contain but have not been able to prevent. In Asia, one has a mixture of every possible situation, with domestic revolutions, external aggression, attempts at an inter-state balance, direct intervention by one super-power against an ally of the other, and indirect intervention of the latter.

Obviously the crucial difference in these various regional situations is their respective relation to the strategic nuclear balance. The characteristic of Europe has been that a particular regional balance has been identified with the global one by the direct confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union, due to the tightness of their commitments and the physical presence of their troops. Hence the sterilising effect of nuclear weapons and of the danger of general war have had their full effect in limiting the freedom of action of unsatisfied states and in guaranteeing their security. The freedom of action of West and East Germany is much smaller than that of Israel and Egypt, but their security is much greater. In the Middle East, too, the great powers are interested, concerned, and to a certain extent present and committed; but nobody could know before the 1967 war just how strong either their commitment to their friends or their control over them would prove to be. Obviously, in the past and in the future, the regional balance (conventional today, perhaps nuclear tomorrow) appears to be the decisive one. Much faith is needed in the stability of this regional balance to believe that the prospects for peace are as good as in Europe.

Yet it would seem that the two really secure situations are either identification with the central balance or the creation of an equally stable regional one. The worst situation is the one where the great powers are committed, but without either exercising the corresponding degree of control over their protégés, or making clear the nature and extent of their commitment. Yet this is, apparently, the trend of the times. In Asia, the United States and the Soviet Union cannot abandon active interest in the stability of the area; but nor can they establish the kind of presence they have in Europe; meanwhile, revolutionary upheavals and nationalist self-assertion are growing. Nobody can assess

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with any assurance the risks of the escalation of these conflicts to the global and nuclear level.

Any state, including neutrals, has a chance of benefiting from great power protection. No state, not even an ally, can be certain to benefit from the same degree and kind of protection as the European ones.

In Europe itself, however, the trend is towards eliminating the peculiarities of the situation. Fortunately, domestic instability and reciprocal hatreds are not those of other regions; but the desire for independent action, for flexibility, for the loosening or the suppression of alliances, for the withdrawal of foreign troops, are there. Yet the loss in control by the super-powers must inevitably result in a loss in their protection. If alliances become looser and policies become flexible, so do the commitments. It is not true that alliances, protection, commitments, and guarantees are made impossible by nuclear weapons. But it *is* true that they are made more costly and more dangerous; hence they are not really credible if, on the one hand, the protector does not keep some control over the situation which may lead to his having to act on his pledge; and if, on the other hand, there is not at least a real possibility that he may have to do so even if, faced with the event, he would like to change his mind. As Schelling has shown, the only way of proving that one's commitment is really binding is to let oneself to a certain extent be actually tied by it. Long before Schelling's work, the main basis of world security has actually been the existence of hostages. In the case of an alliance, the physical presence of troops has so far seemed its clearest and most effective form. While substitutes for troops as hostages may be found, there does not seem to be any alternative to hostages as tokens of commitment. The discussions around a non-proliferation treaty and those around a European security system must necessarily find the problem of guarantees in a nuclear age one of their most decisive ones. Yet it also seems one of the least soluble. In the nuclear age, the equivalent of the Hobbesian 'Covenants without swords are but words' might be, as we have tried to show elsewhere in some detail,[21] 'guarantees without hostages are but mirages'—and not of the kind that served the Israelis well.

NUCLEAR weapons, if they are not to destroy alliances and hence to jeopardise the security of that huge majority of states which can no longer rely exclusively upon themselves for their security, must lead to a greater interdependence, coordination, and, to a certain extent, identification of interests, policies, and strategies as a substitute for territorial identity or contiguity, than ever before. There is then a contradiction between the requirements of nuclear deterrence and the

[21] In the Adelphi paper published by the Institute for Strategic Studies. I owe the formulation in terms of 'mirages' to Miss Joan Pearce, of the Institute for Strategic Studies. For a sophisticated analysis of the problem of guarantees, cf. Stanley Hoffmann's contribution to A. Buchan, ed.: *A World of Nuclear Powers?* (1966), pp. 89–123.

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tendencies of political evolution. Nuclear weapons do not necessarily produce 'fission or fusion', but they do tend, as Leonard Beaton has pointed out, to require and produce an amplification of integrative or disruptive trends. If nuclear alliances or guarantees are to be more than a secondary supplement to a deterrence exercised by each power for itself, they require not a legal document or a traditional coalition, but a real entanglement to make commitments stick. On the other hand, international politics are evolving precisely towards disentanglement and flexibility, towards the refusal to let alliances or integrated organisations restrict freedom of exploration and of combination. States cannot be asked to sacrifice flexibility for the sake of security, to subordinate every national objective to the optimum conditions of nuclear deterrence. But while, from the super-powers to the smallest nations, every state enjoys some degree of freedom of action, the very multiplicity of alignments and conflicts which gives it this freedom of choice also limits its range if disastrous clashes and agonising reappraisals are to be avoided. The days of monolithic blocs are over just as much as those of self-sufficient nation-states. But they have been replaced neither by absolute isolation nor by absolute freedom; independence and freedom are to be found in the diversification of ties and of conflicts, in the calculation of priorities among one's interests and of their conflict or convergence with the interests of other states.

Some interests and some conflicts are, for each state, more important than others; some, like avoidance of nuclear disaster, are common to all. Every state, then, has to weigh the requirements of a 'free hand' as against those of international order, those of flexibility against those of security.

The international world, to use the expression of Osgood and Tucker, must be seen neither in 'systemic' terms, aiming at the suppression of inter-state competition, nor in 'laissez-faire' terms, letting this competition find its own equilibrium, but in 'regulatory' terms. Similarly, great powers cannot use all their strength, nor small or medium powers all their freedom of action, if they are not to endanger the very bases of the system on which their position is built. This goes especially for medium, potentially nuclear powers, and these have the greatest stake in the international system—their security depends on it even more than that of super-powers who can defend themselves, and that of small powers who may be protected by their lack of resources; their influence and their superior freedom of action are also based on the system, since these too depend on the balance between super-powers. But at the same time, by trying to act as substitutes for the super-powers, they create the illusion of an independent system of security, an illusion which might well end up by destroying the real one.

Their role should rather be to help, through alliances and regional organisations, to provide a link between the technological world of the super-powers and the emotional world of unstable nationalisms. The

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great danger of international politics lies in the twin and mutually reinforcing temptations of great-power paternalism based on superior strength, knowledge, and pretension to wisdom, and the irrational self-assertion of unstable nationalism based on negative rebellion and on the thirst for empty prestige. Just as between the state and the individual one needs voluntary groups and communities, or between the technocrat and the beatnik one needs the politician and the citizen, the most urgent need in the international world is for an organised dialogue (both on a vertical basis, involving the leaders and the led, and on a horizontal one, involving the states of comparable background, orientation, and dimensions) which can humanise the inevitable inequalities and induce everyone to accept the limits of his power. Nuclear weapons are the most powerful factor in favour of the twin nightmares of a tyrannical and of an anarchic world; by the same token, they are the most powerful incentive towards attempting to build a more tolerant and responsible one, in which nation-states would learn that cooperation is the pre-condition of independence and self-limitation the pre-condition of power.

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THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NATIONALISM IN CHINA

Joseph R. Levenson

Ming and Mao

In the sixteen-thirties and forties, the native Chinese Ming dynasty was hit by peasant rebels on the inside and aggressive Manchus on the outside. In 1644, a Ming general went over to the Manchus and helped them ruin both the dynasty and the rebels.

Three centuries later there was a similar constellation of forces. For Ming, the rebel Li, the Manchus, and the puppet Wu, read Kuomintang, Mao, the Japanese, and Wang Ching-wei. Established authority, social protest, invasion, collaboration: the analogy seemed perfect, as though China were indeed the land of eternal yesterday, with an *historia perennis*. It would be history not as development but as a vessel of fixed forms—political science teaching by example.

One of the modern protagonists seemed to see it that way. In 1933, Wang Ching-wei condemned Mao as the new 'bandit Li', tearing the nation apart in a class interest while a national foe was marshalling in the north. And Wang, defending a soft Kuomintang policy towards Japan, denounced the Ming for scorning peace with the Manchus while the divisive peasant rebels remained unconquered. The modern rebels, the communists, repaid Wang in the same coin of invective. The Kuomintang (and the puppets like Wang who later hived off from it) were said to be selling the nation, in late Ming style, rather than yield their class supremacy.

But between the Sino-Manchu and the Sino-Japanese wars there had, of course, been development, historical process, not stasis. The analogy was not perfect: paradoxically, there had to be something new in modern times, impairment of the analogy, to make the analogy plausible. The nationalist mentality, an historically new ingredient, obscured historical change. Nationalism—only in modern times—had come to have an unquestioned moral claim on the national. Hence (for the present, and anachronistically for the past), the mutual charges of monstrous ethical behaviour—splitting the nation in face of the enemy, or letting the enemy in to save a class position. To say that Mao's China is essentially communist *or* essentially nationalist, to imply that this means 'new' or 'old,' is to miss the point of the modern debate about rebels, invaders, and puppets. When the debaters, by emphasising nationalism, missed the point about the end of the Ming, they were trying to score points off each other.

In 1644 neither side was choosing between nation and class. They were choosing between dynasties, not nations. Though the Manchus were beset by anti-foreign feeling, anti-foreignism is not the same as

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nationalism. The Manchus were Chinese enough, Confucian enough, culturally, to become a Chinese dynasty, widely accepted as such within a Manchu reign or two. The issues in the seventeenth century were economic and cultural, not economic and national. If nationalism is a serious issue now, it has not been a perennial issue. Its past is the modern past, and its future lies in a 'People's China' (or in some successor regime), not in a 'People's Middle Kingdom', a perennial China, perennially self-absorbed. Now and in the foreseeable future, Chinese self-absorption or self-assertion—translated as 'nationalism'—is not just the old Adam (or the old Confucius) coming out once more.

Ch'ing and Mao

Communist China: '. . . a reviving Chinese power under a leadership driven by an ancient national-cultural chauvinism and a modern ultra-revolutionism. The first demands restoration of China's greatness and the regaining of its place at the centre of the world. The second . . . some ultimate global triumph.'[1] Let us worry about the first (plenty of people are worrying about the second). True, most recently in the eighteenth century, China was unmistakably 'great', and it saw itself at the centre of the world. Indeed, it was a world itself, a world whose values were Value, whose civilisation was Civilisation, a transnational antithesis to barbarism. Confucian 'culturalists' in China-as-a-world had traditionalism as a world-view. But Chinese nationalists, in the twentieth century, were iconoclastic.[2] Either they were avowedly new men, in the 'May Fourth' spirit,[3] or, if conservative, they transvalued old values in their very affirmations of the old. If they tried to retain Confucius, for example, in China as a nation in the world, they were traditionalistic, not traditional—they had a relativistic concept, 'national essence', not an absolute conviction.

National feeling, then, wherever it was going in the twentieth century, was going forward from the nineteenth, not backward to the eighteenth. An 'ancient national-cultural chauvinism' is not quite the spectacle that China affords today. For after 1839 and the Opium War, China's humiliations were distinctly modern. When China was beaten before, her 'place at the centre of the world' had not been jeopardised. No one had moved the centre away; the conquerors simply moved into it. They borrowed the mantle of greatness, the mandate of Heaven. Mongolia was not the centre of the world for the Yuan dynasty of Mongols (1260–1368), nor Manchuria for the Manchu Ch'ing

[1] Harold R. Isaacs, 'Old Myths and New Realities', *Diplomat*, September 1966, p. 41.

[2] For the evolution from 'culturalism' to nationalism, see J. R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (London, 1959), and *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, 3 vols. (London, 1958–65).

[3] The May Fourth Movement of 1919 politically was a surge of feeling against the Japanese expropriators of Shantung province, their World War allies, and their Chinese official creatures; and culturally, against the temper and institutions of China which had allegedly made her such helpless, easy game.

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(1644–1912). China was the prize, and China remained the centre, even among—especially among—those victims of barbarians who resented the conquests most. And resentment turned to acceptance, as the barbarians' sins were bleached (more or less) in sinification. China was still the still point, the Middle Kingdom, in the turning world.

But the Manchu conquest was the last of its kind. In the nineteenth century, the old recurrent form of Chinese weakness—a dynastic disarray that tempted the foreigners in—was complicated by new disabilities: inadequate technology and social vulnerability. China could be manipulated from a distance. Unlike the Manchus, modern Europeans had no need to assimilate to China. And the Chinese, unable to take them in, were just as unable to throw them out so long as the technological gap endured. The road to hell—and to *national* resurrection—was paved with new inventions. Thus, from the eighteen-forties on, a line of 'self-strengtheners' brought western technology more and more into their circle of acceptance, and they were drawn inexorably through merely military science to the industrial and political. The perimeter of the purely indigenous values shrank, even for bureaucratic Confucianists who longed to keep their social prominence and cultural distinction. While they defended the ever more narrowly defined 'Chinese essence', the same West which gave them the insidious tools of defence—a merely useful technology, as it was supposed to be—was transforming an old social type, the agrarian rebel, into a proto-revolutionary, and creating a new social type, the legally protected capitalist, in the treaty ports. New roads to social prominence, new content to cultural distinction began to threaten the old elite, even as the latter, in its own right, was shifting the ground of Confucianism, converting it from substance of education for life and action to symbol of China's individuality.

The agrarian rebels were the Taipings (1850–64). They flouted Confucianism with a garbled Christianity, part of the western intellectual penetration. And they were pushed over the edge of rebellion by western economic penetration, which aggravated endemic social bitterness to a new intensity. Intellectual apostasy underscored this bitterness. Literati-officials and landlords, almost unanimously loyal to the Manchu dynasty, damned the rebels as seceders from cultural China. For what the Taipings proclaimed was a national China, in which an ethnically foreign dynasty, however Confucian in its sympathies and culturally legitimate, was nationally illegitimate.

The dynasty survived for a while, the Taipings went down. But the intellectual revolution of the twentieth century was anticipated in the Taipings' fusion of cultural iconoclasm and political nationalism. And their fusion of cultural iconoclasm and rudimentary class-analysis (the Taipings' animus towards landlords being inseparable from their anti-Confucianism) foreshadowed the fate of that revolution: preemption by the communists.

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Mao and the Sense of Mission

In former days, the old Confucian fiction about 'beckoning barbarians from afar by civilised example' had covered a harsh politics of beckoning by weakness. But in the latter days the cover was stripped away, and the new conquests meant deflation of China, not inflation of the conqueror by his becoming quasi-Chinese. Ever since the early nineteenth century, foreign intrusion could nurture only resentment—against others, and against the self—not self-esteem.

From its beginnings in the May Fourth Movement, Chinese communism reflected that resentment, with both its targets. 'Anti-imperialism' struck at the foreign foes of the new or would-be nation; 'anti-feudalism' hit the domestic foes of the new culture. The combination released Chinese feeling against the Confucian past, which, though moribund, had still invited acceptance, as Chinese; and against a western present, which, though rejuvenating, had still invited rejection, as alien. To be both Chinese and fresh instead of either foreign or stale: that was the communist promise. Chinese nationalism, in both its affinities—with political self-assertion and cultural revolution—was bound to pervade communism and make China new.

Where was the novelty, really? If Chinese communism is strongly nationalist, a universal creed in a particular vessel, how does a communist China differ from a Confucian China? The latter, too, had an ecumenical spirit and a well-developed sense of Chinese selfhood. But it had no sense of *mission*, which communist China has.

Christian Europe had had it, too. In the Pauline spirit, Christian universalism was supra-cultural, trans-historical. It fostered expansion out from Christian lands to newly discovered lands of potentially Christian souls. Confucian universalism, however, was supremely cultural, invincibly historical. Its values were universal, like the Christian, but Confucian universalism was a criterion, a standpoint, not a point of departure. It applied to all the world (all 'under-Heaven': *T'ien-hsia*, both 'the Empire' and 'the world', where the 'Son of Heaven' ruled); and it was open to all. But Confucianists as pragmatists accepted cultural differences as the way of the world, always producing candidates for the title of barbarian. From the point of view of normative Confucianism, wedded to culture and history and anti-messianic to the core, the barbarians are always with us. From the point of view of normative Christianity, transcending culture and history (those marks of distinction between 'Jews and Greeks'), the pagans are not always with us: they can be sought out and converted. The Kingdom of Heaven was nowhere in the world. But the Middle Kingdom, the point of balanced perfection in the world, under-Heaven, was at home. Though Chinese left home in great numbers, no one had any Confucian pretensions to be bearing out a Word.

Now, however, the new China has a Word for the world, beginning with all its Bolivias. China commends itself as a model of revolution.

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The model applies, allegedly, because all 'peoples' (i.e. all victims of imperialists) are brothers. But the model is political and economic. *Culturally*—with reference to specific, historical Chinese culture—Mao has no message for the world. Old China claimed to be exemplary because others were different and therefore lower. New China claims to be exemplary because it identifies affinities, a common plane of victimisation and a common destiny, so that the Chinese mode of liberation should meet the needs of others.

At the end of the eighteenth century, in that other age of claims to central greatness, a (Manchu) Chinese emperor dismissed the English blandishments: rudiments of Chinese culture could hardly be transplanted to a distant barbarous land. Ch'ien-lung's edict, of course, was universalist; China's civilisation was the touchstone for the barbarousness of England. If England was a backwater, it was the distance from China, in every sense, that made it one. But this older universalism allowed for, even demanded (as the fuel for condescension), the fact of western ignorance of China. That was the traditional situation. Next, transitionally, between the Ch'ien-lung and Mao eras, China became the backwater—an object of western influence, not a source of inspiration or of Chinese condescension to the hopelessly uninspired. And now, as China seeks to be the fountain-head again, the central source of world values, there is a different world from Ch'ien-lung's and a different China. 'Substructure' (a general social system), not 'superstructure' (a special Chinese high culture), serves as model. And the world's attention, not its inattention, ministers to China's self-esteem.

Nationalism and Internationalism

Peking neglected to send George III an English version of the Confucian classics. But Peking thoughtfully broadcasts far and wide, in English, Spanish, Arabic and everything else, the 'thoughts of Mao Tse-tung'. Perhaps the balance of payments is meant to be restored, with an outflow of influence after a century of inflow. There can be nationalist satisfaction in this presumption of Chinese leadership. But it depends on an internationalist premise. Mao, quite unequivocally, represents himself not as a Chinese sage prescribing for the world, but as a world sage in a line of sages (Marx, Lenin, Stalin), bringing China—agreeably, to the nationalistic spirit—to the forefront of history, everybody's history. To the culturalistic Confucian spirit (Ch'ien-lung's), Chinese history was the only history that mattered. To the nationalistic communist (Mao), the satisfaction comes in having Chinese history matter to the world.

For 'restoration of China's greatness' required an end to a century's ravages in the confidence in Chinese continuity. 'Westernisation', the spectre since the Opium War, threatened to divert Chinese history into the western stream, as though the West, spreading over

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the world, had the only line from past to future. Mao, no Boxer xenophobe, is ready to tap the western line; but Mao, no 'rootless cosmopolitan', is not prepared to cut himself off from home. And so he arrives at a modern synthesis, not an 'ancient national-cultural chauvinism'. He sees that a considerable Marxist-Leninist ancestry might establish China's leadership, not its dependence. To restore the continuity of Chinese history, Mao insists on the continuity of Marxist history. Aspiring to a world leadership that would reflect glory on China, Mao contends that he has creatively enriched in China what he has nevertheless drawn openly from international sources. The alternatives of 'Chinese' (nationalist) or 'communist' (internationalist) are misconceived. Mao has consciously lodged himself in Chinese history by drawing materials from histories outside China. He is not Chinese in the sense of presiding over the restoration of old China. He is Chinese in wishing to extend Chinese history, not to repeat it (for one must be anti-feudal), nor to end it (for one must be anti-imperialist).

Mao, then, has meant to be Chinese nationalist and Marxist theoretician. He united the two personae in moving from a westernising to a modernising zeal. In 1919, in a westernising vein, Mao inveighed especially against the backwardness of the Chinese social system. Confucian intellectual life was stale, Confucian society unravelled and unappealing. But westernisation could hardly hold him or many of his countrymen, for what led them to disaffection was their identification with China. As modern, but not as 'western', China could still be 'theirs' without still being traditional. With the aid of a Marxist time-scale, China might own its own share of modern time—a huge share for a huge country—instead of deferring to the West. Class-analysis identified the stages of progress, class-struggle provided the motor: Marxism, especially Leninist anti-imperialism, would implement Chinese nationalism. Marxist and national fervour seemed to reinforce each other.

Today, what makes China seem so ominous to the West and the Soviet Union is Mao's last turn of the screw: Chinese nationalism has come to the fore to implement Marxism. If China could be free of 'antagonistic contradictions' internally, China would finally become what Mao's mentor, Li Ta-chao, had called it in 1920—a proletarian nation. *The* proletarian nation, with the other 'victims of imperialism' in tow? As Stuart Schram has remarked, if the Chinese people is a revolutionary class, then nationalists and revolutionaries are one and the same.[4] The Chinese, by contriving a classless society in their nation, would constitute a class, or the vanguard of a class, in the society of the world. This fancy has nothing to do with any Confucian eternal return. It derives, however eccentrically, from a world-view that compensates for Confucianism lost. Just like the modern West, old China

[4] Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (London, 1963), p. 26.

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would be laid away in history. And so would Soviet Russia, while the *new* proletariat, new China, assumed for itself the grace of the *quondam* saviour. *Caveat redemptor.*

If Russia has to beware, it is not because Imperial Russia, with the Soviets as legatees, had taken land from Imperial China. Nationalism, for communist China, cannot be reduced to an irredentist organic nation against all comers. The Kuomintang's nation (not its state) was *min-tsu*, an organic community of integral nationality, and it made for a concept of national essence—transcending individuals, but an individual itself, a folk, in its resistance to cosmopolitanism. *Min-tsu*, perhaps, is most aptly conceived with the indefinite article: *a* people, like the Chinese, set apart. The communists use the term, too. But what they conceive of as *the* people is not *min-tsu* but *jen-min* (or the Chinese *min-tsu* as *jen-min*), not organic, collective life but a collectivist abstraction—and not single and self-contained, but cosmopolitan. Kuomintang nationalists could talk unambiguously about the Chinese nation against Russians or Japanese. As we have suggested, in the nineteen-thirties they could damn the communists as anti-nationalist, anti-*min-tsu*, for allegedly following Russian orders and sundering the nation with their class animus. But the communists, in reply, added *jen-min* to *min-tsu*, and claimed that the Kuomintang (with its appeasement of Japan, its priority for 'bandit-suppression') did violence to both. As an opponent of 'the people', the masses, it betrayed 'the (Chinese) people'.

That is why, when they opposed a united front against Japan in the early thirties, or allegedly subverted it in the forties, the nationalist credit of the Kuomintang, the ostensible 'Nationalists', was impugned. They became nationally suspect in suspecting revolution. The communists pre-empted nationalism during the Sino-Japanese war, but they did not do it, really, by abandoning their call to revolution. This they only muted for a while, to establish their own nationalist credit and to drain their rivals' account. The fact of revolution was suspended, but the promise lingered, as a lever to pry the Kuomintang loose from 'the nation'. For the Nationalists, it seemed, were only a class—the wrong class—ready to squander the Chinese people's sovereignty if this would buy them protection against the people. Perhaps (in the softest insinuation), they really opposed the Japanese while China stood alone. The invaders threatened, after all, to usurp power from the Kuomintang and communists alike. But when the United States became committed to finishing off Japan, the united front was finished. One could plausibly suggest that the Americans were welcome to win the war for the Kuomintang (so that the latter could break the peace with the communists), and then to abort the people's justice that the Kuomintang deserved.

The communists still claim to stand for both *min-tsu* and *jen-min*. Soviet 'revisionists' and United States 'imperialists' call to the Chinese bourgeois remnants, who still disfigure the *jen-min* People's China. Chinese bourgeois, if they seem determinedly unaffected by 'the thought

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of Mao Tse-tung', can be denounced as denationalised. The internationalist term, *jen-min* (for there are 'the peoples of the world' on China's side), becomes the vindicator of nationalism.

Provincialism and Cosmopolitanism

An earlier generation of radicals, the leaders of the 'Chinese Renaissance' (around *New Youth*, founded 1915, certain other periodicals, and the May Fourth Movement of 1919), were avowedly nationalistic, by and large. This meant that they were, both literally and figuratively, anti-provincial, with a cosmopolitan cultural drive that distinguished their cause, as nationalist, from a Boxer anti-foreignism. They took Europe as a model for China (reversing the eighteenth-century tack of western cosmopolitans): 'Chinese Renaissance' was plotted as a counterpart to the Renaissance in Europe. Science, vernacular literature, and national identity were supposed to be the common issue of western and Chinese histories, periodised in parallel lines, ancient, medieval, renaissance modernity. But the parallel, while it had to be sought, was unconvincing—just because it had to be sought.

For the substitution of national loyalty for cultural loyalty was implicit in the young Chinese nationalism; the new cultural values did not spring from native ground. Chinese Renaissance men were taking a European line, not really coasting parallel down history. Uncomfortable in space (Chinese space, impinged upon by western), they were driven to seek comfort in time, the modern time that ticks away for everyone. But cultural evolution, the European process, was not the same as cultural transformation. There was a difference between Renaissance and Chinese Renaissance, between articulating nations out of Christendom and transmuting Confuciandom into a nation. If the analogy were valid, this would invalidate the analogy: the same process that created nations in Europe would have fragmented China into provinces. The nationalist pretext for cosmopolitan sympathies made the Chinese cosmopolitans (in the new cosmos, not the old *T'ien-hsia*) still see China as a whole. It was true of China, but not of Europe, that unity—all-inclusive nationhood—was required as compensation (and as a prescription for cure) for a cultural debacle. For China to be both culturally cut down and politically cut up was too crushing to contemplate. And the second of these conditions promised to perpetuate the first.

A cosmopolitan culture, then, for national enhancement and defence: these went together, in some few minds. Why have they been so few? The 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' suggests why, and suggests where Chinese nationalism is going.

In the nineteen-twenties, especially in Shanghai, there was a cosmopolitan Chinese fringe. It had the tinge of revolution in its obvious anti-feudalism. Yet it seemed as though it might be imperialist-puppet,

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or at least semi-colonial if not semi-feudal. Detached from 'people' as *min-tsu*, it had no saving character of 'people' as *jen-min*. It was incorrigibly bourgeois, and while for classical Marxism the bourgeoisie was nationalist, for Chinese communism, ultimately, the bourgeoisie was internationalist in a reactionary way.

How could Shanghai or Peking types be 'national', much less 'popular', when they translated Pirandello or Schnitzler, just to have the fresh air of 'advanced art' in China? What did even the western art of social and political protest have to say? Imagine Shaw's *The Devil's Disciple* as the tutor for China in 'the spirit of resistance and self-sacrifice . . . the essence of success in the American Revolution'.[5] Think of Byron as China's patriot bard, with at least five translations of The Isles of Greece: '. . . *I dreamed that Greece might yet be free*. . . .'[6] What could a Marxist revolutionary mentality make of the bourgeois 'revolutionary' mentality that offered Barrie to China, with his pink-tea *The Admirable Crichton* as the clarion call to revolt?[7] How could a Chinese radical, looking for a Pasionara, take Paula Tanqueray for his 'fearless social criticism of a conservative society'?[8]

Ibsen was stronger medicine, as well as better art. There was a translation of *A Doll's House* back in 'Renaissance' days, and it kept its relevance to the plight of Chinese women.[9] The translator of *The Lady from the Sea* let a woman friend have a look at his manuscript. 'She wrote in amazement that she discovered herself in *The Lady from the Sea*.'[10]

This was all very edifying, and even close to revolutionary. But not close enough. In the nineteen-fifties there were many translations under communist aegis that testified to a communist cosmopolitanism. Even a play of Goldoni, for example, written not in his own Italian language but in French—and to celebrate the wedding of Louis XVI!—was published in Chinese as a tribute to a 'hero of world culture', and to 'realism'.[11] 'Realism' legitimised many a foreign dramatist in the fifties, from Shakespeare down, and realism meant 'the style of the age and place'.[12] It was progressive, then, and internationalist to praise

[5] Yao K'o, tr., *Mo-kuei ti men-t'u* (The Devil's Disciple) (Shanghai, 1936), translator's preface, p. xi.

[6] Ke Lien-hsiang, 'Pai-lun Ai-Hsi-la shih Chung-i ti pi-chiao' (A Comparison of Chinese Translations of Byron's Poem The Isles of Greece), *Nan-ta Chung-wen hsüeh-pao*, II, 1963, pp. 83–97.

[7] Hsiung Shih-i, tr., *K'o-ching-ti K'u-lai-teng* (The Admirable Crichton) (Shanghai, 1930), translator's preface, p. vii.

[8] Ch'eng Hsi-meng, tr., *T'an-ko-jui ti hsü-hsien fu-jen* (The Second Mrs. Tanqueray) (Shanghai, 1923), translator's preface, p. 1.

[9] Shen Pei-ch'in, tr., *Na-la* (A Doll's House) (Shanghai, 1937), translator's preface, p. 1.

[10] Shen Tsu-fu, tr., *Hai fu* (The Lady from the Sea) (Shanghai, 1948), translator's colophon, p. 144.

[11] Nieh Wen-ch'i, tr., *Shan-hsin ti chi-hsing jen* (Le bourru bienfaisant) (Peking, 1957), translator's colophon, pp. 71–72.

[12] Chiao Chü-yin, ed., *K'a-erh-ti-ni hsi-chü chi* (Plays of Goldoni) (Peking, 1957), translator's preface, p. 4.

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the art that celebrated nations and limned the ages of progress (as from feudal to national consciousness) in everybody's history.[13] History (and not just Chinese history), class-powered, was the realm of realism; idealism, anathematised, was the bourgeois concept of a timeless and classless 'universal human nature'.

What happened in the sixties? 'Universal human nature' continued to be assailed. But the old realism ('critical realism') became 'bourgeois', as it was taken to imply description of individual subjective states. This was the theme (alleged the Cultural Revolutionaries) of cosmopolitan coterie art, egoistically unconcerned with the collective. That lady who saw herself in *The Lady from the Sea*—she could only be bourgeois, she and the others who seemed to deny class character, and national character, too, in their search for 'all-mankind' (*individual*) universal themes. Empathy was out; not the agonies of transitional man, caught between the old society and the new, but the glories of the hero, unambiguous and unambivalent and larger than life, made the subject-matter for art.

Cosmopolitanism, that is, was out. Sophistication, nuance, were out. The Cultural Revolution had a provincial cultural spirit, and the sophisticates, detached from the *jen-min* by their culture, were detached from the *min-tsu* by their world-wide affinities with fellow cosmopolitans. Specialities, expertise, know no national boundaries. The red-and-expert would still be with 'the people', in the *jen-min* sense, and could thus still be certified in the ranks of the Chinese people. But the only-expert, experts of the wrong hue, bourgeois, not popular, had left the Chinese people; and the latter should struggle against them, in class struggle, in the name of the *min-tsu* nation. The Chinese nation had a new relation to China (to what China had been), and to what the world might be.

Cultural Revolution and the State of the Nation

There were signs in the early sixties, and the Cultural Revolution was formally proclaimed in 1966. Why should a communist movement that once had cosmopolitan associations have become so especially nativist then—not just politically prickly (no problem there), but culturally so anti-western? And why, just then, should a nationalist movement have been so harsh with the national culture, the heritage of the past?

The last shall be first. Partly it was a matter of balance. The very intensity of the anti-westernism compelled a corresponding antagonism to traditional Chinese forms. Otherwise it would have been merely xenophobia, a throwback to the anti-foreign Boxer movement of 1900. And while the communists granted an honourable place to the Boxers, it was a place in history only. The Boxers were harbingers, not prototypes, of the communist fighters for Chinese independence. For Boxer anti-foreignism, while commendably anti-imperialist in political intent,

[13] e.g. Wu Hsing-hua, tr., *Heng-li ssu-shih* (Henry the Fourth, parts one and two) (Peking, 1957), translator's preface, pp. 3–5, 12, 22.

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was reactionary in its defence of 'feudal' culture. Chinese communists were nationalist enough to seek deliverance from traditional imperatives, and Marxist enough to see history as a linear process: it is evolution through revolution; the *past* does not revolve.

Yet the problem of the Cultural Revolution's special iconoclasm remains. Early twentieth-century radicals were generally hostile to the old values, and Chinese anti-communists have always seen their enemies as destroyers of Chinese culture. But once in power, the Party seemed to confound them. Iconoclasm was not a revolutionary prerequisite. Restoration was not a counter-revolutionary prerogative. The communists themselves were 'restoring' (in a way), not scuttling the past. Their way was the museum way. The restoration—of imperial palaces or classical reputations—was not a restoration of authority but of a history which the Chinese people (under *new* authority) could claim as its national heritage. Their historicism enabled the communists to keep the Chinese past as theirs, but to keep the past *passé*: the communists owned the present and would preside over the future.

In the Cultural Revolution, however, the museums, literal and metaphorical, were ransacked. Old books, once assumed to have been sterilised by history of the power to harm, slipped into obscurity, if not into the flames. All kinds of relics were treated as ominously significant for the here and now; they seemed no longer safely dead, or simply historically significant. Even as they threw off the hand of the past, the communists had once retained the priceless advantage of conserving traditional culture to better effect than the modern conservatives did. Then why should Peking have thrown the traditional game?

It was because the modern game was a tricky one to play. Especially in China, where the Confucian amateur ideal was uncongenial to science, the advancement of science had revolutionary implications. It led to specialisation, the cultivation of experts. But these were suspect in communist China—which nevertheless, unlike Confucian China, was absolutely committed to the celebration of science.

It was not just that 'scientific socialists' (hardly humanist literati) could scarcely condescend to science. Marxists traded on the prestige of science, and they knew quite well that in everyone's modern world (quite unlike the Confucian world), in bourgeois countries and anti-bourgeois alike, science had prestige. When the Chinese communists put scientists down they acknowledged that prestige, they did not impugn it; its very universality, its apparent transcendence of ideology, was a threat to the masters of ideology. Science had to be mastered by the ideologues, or their own occupation would be gone. In a world where science could not be gainsaid, mere experts, practitioners of science, had to be bent to Marzist authority, or Mao, the latest Marxist in line, would have lacked authority himself. Ideology, the correct ideology, must dominate the ostensibly non-ideological expert. Politics must take command. For, as Mao proclaimed in his *Problems of Art and Literature*,

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the very profession of ideological unconcern ('art for art's sake') was a classic product of bourgeois ideology.

In spite of the common 'generalism' of the communist cadre and the Confucian official, the latter never believed what the former held as an article of faith: that one of the reasons for demeaning expertise was the need to erase the distinction—a crucial Confucian distinction—between mental and physical labour. Just as the Confucianist, with his amateur ideal, had displaced the old aristocracy, and then taken on an aristocratic aura (with licence to condescend to the technical professional), so the professional in the modern world, having broken the amateur ideal, had the status pride of the aristocrat today. Therefore, the Party had to trim him down ('first red, then expert'), to vindicate its own version of autocratic rule.

It is this that created the impression of a wilful cultural provincialism. The experts were China's 'rootless cosmopolitans'—*rootless*, since the peasants were the roots (whence the Red Guards, as a counter-weight to the urban, university types); and *cosmopolitan*, since, with universal science, the experts might see their association with professional colleagues on the other side of national and ideological walls. And so winter came for the cosmopolitan scientists. But though many were cold, few were frozen. The armies and industries needed them, after all. The ones who were really blasted by the anti-cosmopolitanism were the expendables in the arts, dispensers of English literature, French music, Hong Kong haircuts. Any mute inglorious Schnitzlers or Pirandellos were well advised to stay that way.

Yes, the armies and industries needed the fruits of science, maybe to throw at the Americans. But the armies and industries might be hostages to science and technology, as well as beneficiaries. A war with America would certainly ravage the scientific complex, and exclusively expert advisers would have to counsel peace. Did the deep freeze of the experts, the coldness towards western culture (which was the source of the expertise), mean that the risk of war was acceptable, that merely prudential, technical-expert arguments might be overruled? Then the old spirit of the Long March and the Yenan days, when the stronger battalions were on the other side, would naturally be invoked, and they were. Not senile nostalgia, nor a general taste for spiritual athletics, but a conviction of present crisis may have been driving the train of events. If the weight of weapons was against China, and yet the weapons might come into play, man's spirit (a good Maoist anti-expert shibboleth), not weapons, would have to be decisive.

For spirit, read ideology, the fantastic drenching in ideology that China began to take. It came from a sense of danger, the danger of a war that could not be left to experts, because they would not choose it and could not win it with their expertise alone. And it was this danger that gave the Cultural Revolution its dual targets, the two cultures, western and traditional. The concurrent attack on the latter confirms danger as the source of attack on the former, on the cosmopolitan spirit

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which the experts represented. For the tendency to 'museumify' the past, instead of rooting it out, belonged to the age of self-assurance. It had not been there in the early days of struggle, when the communists had the passion of engagement; and it vanished now in an embattled age of possible destruction. The god of history was a hidden god again. Relativistic historicism, coolly accounting for one-time foes by giving them their niches, went out of fashion. The dead were no longer monuments, but ghosts and monsters to be slain again.

When they had confidence in historical progress (confidence in their own success in moving from strength to strength), communists could patronise their Chinese cultural past. But if the pastness of the past was not so certain, because the future was so uncertain, if regress seemed possible, then the communists would cease to be patrons, encouraging curators to restore; they would be out of the gallery, at action stations, finished with contemplation for a while. And regress was the spectre, regress seen as furthered by Russian action (like the withdrawal of technicians) and dramatised by Russian example (revisionism). If the essential Marxist notion of progress was not to be abandoned in a general failure of nerve, revolutionary voluntarism, not evolutionary determinism, had to be brought to the fore again, and the past be, not relativised, but seen as all too possibly present. Absolutes took command. Impending crisis put the expert under the gun, with the foreign cultural borrowings that made him. And crisis, too, stripped the national cultural heritage of its protective historical colour. China was not listening much to ancestral voices. But someone in China was prophesying war.

Chinese national war or 'wars of liberation': realism is not so dead that Mao's China cannot see the present possibilities. The sense of peoplehood is strong—in both senses. The national people rebuffs the West, but not as Confucian China did. For the people (in the other sense), claiming the nation, against bourgeois, as its exclusive class preserve, aspires to lead the peoples of the world, or at least to inform them with the thought of Mao Tse-tung. And this thought rebuffs the old thought from the old culture, the centrepiece of the 'centre of the world'.

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NATIONALISM IN INDIA

Past and Present

Nirad C. Chaudhuri

NATIONALISM remains as great a passion in India today as it was during British rule, when political subjection had raised it to a very high pitch. But it is not one nationalism. That is why the heading of this article is 'Nationalism in India' and not 'Indian Nationalism'. There is indeed an *Indian nationalism*, but it is only one form of the many forms of nationalism that exist in the country.

Any Indian nationalism properly so-called should begin at home like charity, but what I have called Indian nationalism just now does not. It is concerned solely with the relations of the Indian people with the rest of the world and determines their attitude towards all foreign countries. The other kind of nationalism is an assemblage of separate and different nationalisms within the geographical unit that is India, and it is operative entirely on the internal evolution of the Indian people or, more correctly, peoples. Thus nationalism in India presents an external and an internal aspect.

Of course, nationalism does so everywhere. But in India it has the two faces with a difference. In western countries, and in many of Asia as well, the outward aspect of nationalism is a correlative and projection of the internal aspect, which is the main and the positive element. That is to say, if a people feel that as a group they are distinct from other groups and are driven to adopt different attitudes, friendly or hostile, to these others, they do so because they are conscious that within the country they constitute a homogeneous society with a common language, common culture, common interests, and common attitudes, aspirations, and outlooks. No such correlation exists between the external and internal aspects of nationalism in India. They are independent of and parallel to each other; and not only that; basically, they are also antithetical.

The external aspect of their nationalism makes all Indians feel that they are one as against the rest of the world, and this sense of 'We and They' is virtually pure xenophobia. But strong as it is, it has no repercussions on internal nationalism. It has not supplied and cannot supply an external stimulus to create the sentiment that all over the sub-continent the population of India makes up one nation. There was once a man who knew only two tunes: one was the National Anthem, and the other was not. In its external aspect nationalism in India reverses this sensibility; it knows only two nations: one is the foreign, the other is not. That is to say, it can recognise the other fellow, but not the self.

In contrast, the internal nationalism takes full note of the self and is both tenacious and assertive about it. It therefore has a content and is positive. But instead of being one it is a collection of many distinct nationalisms, each highly self-conscious and therefore acutely conscious

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of all the others as rivals and competitors. In simple words, this nationalism is the feeling which the people of each Indian province have of being one as against the people of all the other provinces. Nowadays provincial organisation in India is based wholly on the unity of language, and this linguistic unity is the most obvious feature of a comprehensive unity in culture, group behaviour, interests, and outlooks that exists within each province. According to the modern western definition of nationalism, this provincial feeling is the real nationalism in India. But it has not yet become fully developed nationalism, though it is on the way to it. Theoretically, it is not recognised and is not considered legitimate. In public speaking it is deprecated and even abused as regionalism. But there can be no doubt about its naturalness, its power, and its reality.

Logically, the two forms which nationalism has assumed in India, that is to say, the external and internal, should clash. It might even be expected that the internal nationalism, being more positive, would erode and eventually destroy the external nationalism, through which alone, apart from lip-service, a feeling of Indian unity finds expression today. But this is not happening. The two forms run along parallel paths, and they coexist, each in its sphere, with considerable power. This duality, which would be considered impossible everywhere else, is the special characteristic of nationalism in India. This may be expected to continue indefinitely for all practical purposes without affecting each other's strength or hold, because both forms have deep-seated and independent driving forces behind them. These forces are passional, and they have now created fixed habits and patterns of behaviour. In discussing nationalism in India the two forms must be kept separate.

I SHALL deal only with the external form in this article. This aspect of nationalism is a continuation and expansion of the anti-British nationalism, which had a single and simple aim—the elimination of British rule and recovery of political independence. Its aim was negative and that made its ideology and methods negative too. As time passed, it not only became more and more negative in itself, but also drove out of the collective mind all non-political interests in the public sphere which were positive.

The first organised national agitation against British rule began in 1905 as a protest against the partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon. Previously, questions of religious and social reform occupied a good deal of room in the Indian mind, but as the nationalist agitation got into its stride, these interests began to decline, until by the time British rule was nearing its end politics as an emotional revolt against British rule became almost a monomania among the Indian intelligentsia. They thought they could put off consideration of other matters until political independence was won. In fact, they even argued that nothing else could be taken in hand without political independence as the indispensable preliminary. Thus they went on becoming more and more political

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with a good conscience, and when not immured in private life had an obsession with politics.

But the politics of nationalism was itself wholly negative. If it did not create a mental void, it only filled the mind with aversions and hatreds. It is necessary to review the different facets of this nihilistic politics briefly.

First, nationalist agitation was negative. It consisted in demonstrations, meetings, boycott of British goods, courts, and educational institutions, refusal to pay taxes, or defiance of particular laws. Between 1905 and independence there were four active movements of agitation. Each of these generated great passion and excitement, and often led to rioting and bloodshed. But they did not create a sense of victory and success, even of a limited kind. They were suppressed by the British administration with relative ease, and their impact on the apparent strength of British rule was very weak.

All these movements therefore left behind a sense of failure and frustration. It was not that they completely failed to produce concrete political results, for after each of them the British Government made concessions which amounted to giving a greater share than before in the government of the country to Indians. These were given by the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, and Sir Samuel Hoare's Government of India Act of 1935, which came into force in 1937. These gave increasing political rights and powers to Indians, but they were always rejected as inadequate by the dominant and active wing of the nationalists and did little to counteract the general feeling of hopelessness combined with irreconcilability to existing conditions. In actual fact, the discouragement after the crushing of each movement was so great that though the hatred for British rule never abated, it was difficult to mount another active agitation with the old recruits; this had to wait until a new generation, untouched by the previous failure, came into the nationalist movement. Hence the intervals of roughly a decade between the active phases of the nationalist movement in India, e.g. 1905–09, 1919–21, 1930–32, and 1942 onwards.

These alternations of enthusiasm and depression produced a crescendo of hatred and emotional revulsion from British rule without any hope of removing it, and made nationalism more and more negative. They created the mental habit of gloating over national injuries, real or fancied, and even enjoying them. Even in 1947, when there was a definite announcement of a British withdrawal from India, there was no genuine and widespread faith in the intentions of the British Government. So, when it actually came about on 15 August, there was wild jubilation all over India as if a miracle had taken place.

If the agitation was negative, no less so was the participation in government of the nationalists under the new constitutional advances, so far as any was offered by them. It did nothing to foster practical and constructive political habits. Those Indian politicians who joined the new governments and took part in the administration were presented as

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the tools of British imperialism, and held up to the contempt of the public. So they set no example. On the other hand, those politicians who came into the legislatures did so with the avowed object of obstructing the British administration. They were to be the Trojan Horse of Indian nationalism. In practice, they carried on a continuous filibuster and checkmated the Government in every way they could. They were applauded for this. They always spoke with an eye to the outside public, and did not concern themselves with actual matters of government.

Political thinking was, if anything, even more negative. Though democratic self-government was the professed aim of the nationalists, they showed no interest whatever in questions of government as such, in political doctrines as such, or in the problem of adapting the theories of government about which they were always talking to Indian conditions. They talked a good deal about parliamentary democracy, socialism, and communism, but all these systems were assessed as dissolvents of British power, not as possible future forms of government in India. They were only ideological weapons against British rule, weapons which the British could meet with no credible arguments in rebuttal.

The negative bias of Indian nationalism pervaded even economic thinking, which one would have thought could be only positive. Nonetheless, it too was negative, and became ancillary to nationalist political thinking. The constant theme of all economic discussion was the exploitation of the Indian people by the British. Their poverty was attributed wholly to British rule, and it was used as a very powerful argument to maintain and increase hatred for that rule.

Listening to the talk of the nationalists in pre-independence days I formed the impression that they would actually be sorry if poverty disappeared from the country. The years from 1937 to 1939 were a period of slump for the nationalists, and I found one of their foremost leaders carefully studying the trends in prices to assess the chances of a new movement.

The task of industrialisation and adoption of scientific technology was approached from the same point of view. While capitalist entrepreneurs were moved by the profit motive and contributed liberally to the funds of the Indian National Congress for a wholly practical purpose, namely, the elimination of British competition, the theorists looked upon industrialisation as a means of turning the tables on European imperialism. They thought they could get even with the west, and even have their revenge, by adopting its technology and economic organisation. Manufacture of consumer goods in India was regarded as the most effective means of inflicting injury on the British people when no political or military revolt was possible.

THERE was another facet of Indian nationalism in British days which is of special importance in understanding Indian foreign policy today. This was the external one. Of course, not being a sovereign

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state, India could have no independent foreign policy at the time. Nevertheless its vicarious foreign policy was clearly discernible, and what might be called the 'idea' (in the platonic sense) of the present-day foreign policy was taking shape in those days as a series of attractions and repulsions towards and from foreign countries and peoples. The driving force behind it was, of course, the internal nationalism, i.e. the necessity of putting an end to British rule, and it had great emotional strength—in fact, the vicarious foreign policy was wholly emotional.

It made the Indian people sympathise with and admire every nation which was at the given time the greatest enemy of the British people. Thus Indians were pro-French and Bonapartist till the Triple Entente. Then they became pro-German, and remained so till the end of the second world war. During that war, indeed, Indians taken in the mass were strongly inclined to the German side. It was this which made the Indian National Congress led by Gandhi and Nehru quite incapable of offering any cooperation to the allied side, though both, and more especially Nehru, were strongly anti-fascist. India was passively pro-Axis throughout the war.

The same selectivity was seen in all the international attitudes of the Indian people. Their attractions and repulsions were governed by the relations of a particular foreign country with Great Britain. If these relations changed Indian opinion also changed. For instance, India was pro-Soviet from 1917 to 1941, but became anti-Soviet when Russia and Britain fought on the same side; following the same law, it is now pro-Soviet again. The Indian people were pro-Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war, but turned against Japan during the period of Anglo-Japanese alliance, and became pro-Japanese again when Japan attacked both the United States and Great Britain in 1941. In the same way, Indian opinion sided with China from 1911 to 1941, but turned against that country when Japan entered the war, to become pro-Chinese once more when the communists won power. That India is anti-Chinese today is due to a special national factor, which has cancelled out the international bias.

The same swings are seen in the Indian attitude towards the United States. The Indian people were generally pro-American till very recently, in spite of the fact that the United States came to the rescue of Britain in two world wars. That did not affect the Indian attitude because the Indian people knew that the United States, and more especially both Wilson and Roosevelt, were against colonialism. But for the last ten years or so India has been becoming more and more anti-American. Apart from many other reasons for this, there is a fear lurking in the subconscious of the Indian people which makes them suspicious of and hostile to the strongest world power as a potential threat to their independence. The foreign domination of India has always come from that power, and therefore the United States, the first world power of today, is coming under deep suspicion. Moreover, during

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recent years American policy in Asia has been such as to transform the suspicion into positive hatred, which is gaining ground every day. There is no doubt that in the eyes of the Indian people, the United States is the Britain-substitute.

Secondly, Indians made common cause emotionally with all peoples who had revolted against British rule or were doing so. That was why accounts of the American War of Independence were read so eagerly in India. The American leaders became our heroes as well. As a boy I myself recited at school the speeches of Patrick Henry. Then came the Boer War. Indians were quite ignorant of the real complexion of Boer nationalism or Krugerism, and could therefore be pro-Boer. But they are now atoning for that mistake by the absence of diplomatic relations with South Africa. The Irish nationalists in the first instance, and after them Sinn Fein, became great favourites. More recently, Indians sympathised with the Arab revolt against British domination in Iraq and Egypt. The affiliation with Egypt was specially close. The Wafd was thought of as the counterpart of the Indian National Congress, and Zaghul Pasha as no less a hero than Gandhi or Nehru.

By extension, every nation which was subject to a European nation, and even to the Japanese—such as the Koreans, the Indo-Chinese, the Indonesians, and the Muslims around the Mediterranean—all had a share in Indian sympathies. Thus the people of India showed great interest in the Druse uprising in Syria and Abdel Krim's rising in Morocco.

Thirdly, the anti-British feeling made Indians take to foreign political doctrines and systems without any regard for logic or coherence. They felt attracted equally to communism, fascism, and nazism because all of them had explicit or implicit anti-British implications. Indians saw no inconsistency between admiring Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler equally, nor did they find it difficult to reconcile their sympathy for Ethiopia and the Spanish Republicans with their admiration of Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia. A number of Indian leaders had even liaisons with the official Fascist Party.

Strangely enough, the anti-British bias made the Hindu nationalists of India ignore the danger to themselves from the most extensive form of Islamic nationalism, namely, Pan-Islamism. Though some Hindu leaders did indeed see that Pan-Islamism was likely to foster and increase Muslim separatism in India, and thus work against Indian nationalism of a non-communal type, the Indian National Congress, even under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru, made an alliance with the Caliphate movement after the first world war. This did not last, but its practical result was a further strengthening of Muslim self-consciousness and finally the partition of India. Nothing could be more shortsighted and opportunistic on the part of the Hindu nationalists than this hobnobbing with Pan-Islamism, but anti-British feeling swamped all positive perceptions.

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All these were aspects of what I have called the vicarious foreign policy of the Indian nationalists. But even during British times they were also trying to build up a practical diplomacy, though it was very inchoate. Under the influence of Nehru, whose international sympathies were no less strong than his domestic nationalism, the Indian National Congress tried to establish close relations with the Labour Party in Britain. The contacts were fairly close by the time Labour came to power in 1945, and the most important contact man in London became the first Indian High Commissioner there. Through his relationship with Labour in 1946–47 the Indian nationalist leaders knew what the British Government of the day had in mind, and were able on the strength of the information passed on to them to thwart all the attempts which the Viceroy made locally to bargain with them. They felt assured that London did not stand behind its representative in Delhi.

THE anti-British feeling brought into Indian nationalism such a negation of every positive attitude that the Indian people became incapable of viewing their relations with the rest of the world objectively and realistically, or of considering political and economic ideas in the light of their needs and interests in order to adapt them to their aptitudes and conditions. The attractions and repulsions were pre-set by their emotional bias, which most often bordered on hysteria.

But what is even more significant in the situation is the intensity of the hatred which accompanied this negation. The ease with which the British administration broke every agitational movement only made it worse, because it was only in the smouldering hatred that the frustration found an outlet. This hatred reached its climax during the second world war. There was an inhuman gloating over the defeat and suffering of small or weak nations like the Belgians, Dutch, Poles, Serbs, Norwegians, and the like, whose only offence was to have been forced onto the British side by *Realpolitik*. There was triumph at the defeat of France, and greater anticipatory triumph at the expected defeat and collapse of Britain. When this did not happen, satisfaction was obtained from the news of the blitz. On the day that the news of the exchange of American destroyers for bases was published, a Calcutta newspaper put it on a back page and splashed the news of the bombing of London. I asked the proprietor why this was done, and the story of the destroyers not given prominence. He replied that my objection was justified on purely journalistic grounds, but that he knew his readers, who, he said, would be disappointed if they did not read about the bombing of London every day. *Gesta dei per Germanos* was the view of the blitz taken in India. Even the prospective defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941 was expected with savage delight, though it had been the idol of the progressive Indian nationalists until Germany attacked it.

The turn of the tide for the Allies in the summer of 1943 raised the hatred to a higher pitch. A friend who had always been sure of an

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Axis victory and to whom I said after the surrender of the Germans in North Africa that an Allied victory was no longer in doubt, only replied: 'Then there is no God'.

The actual victory in 1945 drove the Indian intelligentsia half-mad. Even after the surrender of Germany they had hoped that Japan would carry on for years. The sudden defeat of Japan turned their disappointment into fury. The first target of this rage was the instrument of victory, the atom bomb. Some Indian leaders said that those who had sanctioned its use should be tried as war criminals.

Public resentment had not abated after six months. So on 7 March 1946, the day selected for a formal celebration of the victory in India, there was riotous interference. In old Delhi the town hall was set on fire, people in European dress were set upon and their hats and ties snatched off, their shirts pulled out to hang over the trousers in order to Indianise them. In New Delhi troops in the victory procession were booed, bystanders waved black flags. The later features of the procession were omitted, and two British Field-Marshals went back without completing the ceremony. From then onwards there was a series of demonstrations and riots all over India, which certainly hastened the policy of withdrawal which the Labour Government had decided on.

Independence when it drew near provided an exhibition of another hatred, which was a secondary product of the nationalist movement. It was the deadly enmity between the Hindus and the Muslims. The advent of independence was accompanied by mutual massacres by the two communities, by plunder, arson, and colossal displacements of population which ruined millions of people. This was symbolic of the nihilism to which their nationalism had brought Indians.

The two other passions which ran as contrapuntal lines to the hatred did nothing to soften it, nor to neutralise its corrosiveness. The first of these was an apocalyptic faith amounting to fanaticism which made every Indian believe that independence would come to them without any effort of their own as a dispensation of Providence, and in spite of all their failures in agitation. Without this conviction no Indian could have lived through his political disappointments.

The second passion was a megalomania sustained by a whole series of myths about the past history and achievements of the Hindus. The moral greatness of the Hindus, the antiquity of their civilisation, and the superiority of their way of life were some of the *idées fixes* of this megalomania. Its counterpart was an obstinate disbelief in the existence of any virtue among western peoples. Even their subjection and suffering strengthened the megalomania, for the Hindus implicity believed that they were getting the worst of it only because they were good and noble in a wicked world.

IT is now necessary to look into the antecedents of this nihilistic nationalism, and it had a long history behind it. It could not have

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been brought into existence by British rule alone, nor by the desire for political independence, however burning. That rule was on the whole humane, and all honest and intelligent Indians recognised that it had brought many good things to them in the way of security of life and material improvements. Even more than these, they prized what they themselves had acquired from western civilisation which came to them through British rule. Their modern culture and modern mind were wholly the products of the impact of the West. These they would not give up, and these did not promote negation.

Nor could nationalism, which brought them the concept of political independence, make them negative. Nationalism as understood in the West fostered love of country and of freedom as positive values, and if hostility to foreign rule comes into it, it does so only as a correlative of the positive aspect. Moreover, it is directed at foreign rule and not at the foreign ruling nation as human beings. The pure negation of the Indian nationalism in its latest phase before the end of British rule in India had therefore to come from a different source, and this was the ancient attitude of the Hindus towards foreigners and foreign civilisations, which I would call their basic nationalism. It came into existence at a late stage of their independent political life, and reached its final shape under five hundred years of Muslim rule. Its primary feature was a violent and active xenophobia.

Hindu society was always a closed society in theory, and for the most part so even in practice. It was based on birth and the genetic tie among its members. It did not practise conversion. Thus it developed a very strong self-consciousness, with a sense of irreconcilable contrast with other peoples, all of whom were described as *Mlechchhas*, or unclean foreigners. This contempt for foreigners was not a whit less strong than that of the Chinese people.

This feeling of Hindu exclusiveness was infinitely strengthened by the early Muslim invasions of India from the eighth to the twelfth centuries, before the final conquest in the last decade of the twelfth. Late in the tenth century a great Muslim scholar, Alberuni, noticed this hatred for foreigners and wrote: 'All their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them—against all foreigners', and he added that, above all, owing to the invasion of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, the Hindus 'cherished the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims'.

This xenophobia was accompanied by a hypertrophied megalomania. As Alberuni also says: 'The Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs. They are haughty, foolishly vain, self-conceited, and stolid.'

After the Muslim conquest the hatred turned inwards, and generated a perpetual sense of national injury, self-pity, illusionism, and made all these an emotional enjoyment rather than an irritant. In practice, the Hindus did indeed serve their foreign rulers, learned their language, and even wore their dress. But these were concessions to political and

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economic life; beyond them a line was drawn which no Hindu could or would cross. It was during the epoch of Muslim rule that the Hindus developed the principle of their conduct towards foreigners and embodied it in a fixed pattern of behaviour. The formula was simple—Give to the foreigner things that are his, but to Hinduism things that belong to it—which latter, of course, included an implacable hatred of the foreigner. Through this extraordinary paradox Hindu nationalism was able to flourish on a plane where neither the military nor the political power of the foreign rulers was able to deal with it.

When the British supplanted the Muslims as foreign rulers this principle of conduct was just transferred to them. But here the paradox was stranger, for the people of India welcomed British rule as a deliverance from an intolerable anarchy. During the first hundred years or so of British rule this gratitude was never withheld. But it went with a deep hatred of the British as human beings. In fact, the hostility to the British as a purely emotional bias made its appearance with the very establishment of British rule. This was noticed by a Frenchman who had lived in the country as a native. In his account he gave a number of instances of the common people's extraordinary excitement and exultation at the news of temporary British reverses, and wrote:

> The reader accustomed to read accounts of India these twenty or thirty years past will possibly wonder at my warning him against the disaffection of a nation, which by all accounts seems to be the tamest and most pusillanimous set of men on the face of the earth, and the most incapable of any action. The Indians have been a more dangerous nation than they seem to be now. They may be in a slumber; but they may awake, and they deserve to have a more watchful eye than the English Government seems to think.

Even after British rule was firmly established and when the Indian people were blessing their foreign rulers for bringing them peace and security, this rancour remained in the subsoil of their mind. So one finds the Abbé Dubois writing in the early part of the nineteenth century that the Hindus 'hate and despise their rulers from the bottom of their hearts while they cherish and respect their government'. During the whole of the nineteenth century this underground atavistic nationalism flourished underneath the contentment felt under British rule. Even in quiet and normal times it bubbled and simmered in the depths of their conscious mind. Once it erupted into an open and widespread rebellion—the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

However, at the end of the nineteenth century a new nationalism arose in India, and it was not derived from the ancient one just described, but was the outcome of the impact of European political thought. The creators of modern Indian culture and of this new nationalism had no truck with retrogressive nationalism, though they were all brought up in an environment steeped in its rancorous spirit. These leaders of the Indian Risorgimento, Hindu or Muslim, repudiated

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that nationalism and tried to wean their countrymen from it; they preached a nationalism which was based on a positive love of the country and its civilisation, a love of freedom not as mere deliverance from foreign rule but as the natural atmosphere of the human spirit. They wanted to bring into existence a culture which would be a synthesis of the best in the East and the West and would precede even political freedom. It was this new nationalism which led to the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. But of its very nature it was confined to the English-educated upper stratum of Indian society. It did not strike deep roots.

In the next phase there was an attempt to acclimatise it by putting it on a Hindu foundation. This was not the traditional Hinduism of the masses, but a new Hinduism based on European rational thinking and on the rediscovery of the ancient Hindu civilisation by western Orientalists. It can be regarded as a Hindu Counter-Reformation. As Sir Valentine Chirol wrote at the time, the first organised Indian nationalist movement was inspired in all its ideology by this Hinduism.

After that came Mahatma Gandhi, who transformed and simplified Indian nationalism by linking it to the humble morality of the Hindu masses and denuding it of all intellectual complexity. By so doing he was able to bring the masses of India into the anti-British nationalist movement and give it a backing of sheer numbers which it could never have hoped to gain with the concepts which had inspired it before. Thus the modern course of the Indian nationalist movement had three different and successive complexions: the Liberal, which was wholly exotic; the neo-Hindu, which was a synthesis of the native and the foreign; and, third, the Gandhistic, which was wholly Indian or rather Hindu.

These three successive forms constituted another series showing a descent into rancorous and atavistic nationalism. The Liberal form being wholly western in ideology, was the farthest removed from the old; the new Hindu form, in spite of its intellectual content, was a step towards the retrogressive; while Gandhism took yet another step downwards. It must not be forgotten that, whatever might be the higher ideology of Indian nationalism, its passional intensity was wholly and always supplied by the ancient xenophobia. In the last phase, as I have said, the negative passion was able to push out everything positive.

IT was necessary to go into the historical antecedents of Indian nationalism and trace them back over one thousand years to explain the cast of the Hindu mind, which created modern Indian nationalism. No people could be more unhistorical in their intellectual outlook, and more incapable of orienting themselves in history. Yet no people could be held more relentlessly in the grip of their past. Neither in its international nor in its domestic aspect can nationalism in India be understood without reference to the historical experiences of the Hindus, in which humiliation followed pride to create myths, passions, and modes of behaviour which are virtually ineradicable and

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sub-rational. It is these, developed to an unnatural degree, which have been at the bottom of public policies after independence. Even when plausible or specious intellectual explanations are given for them, these are no better than attempts at rationalising the irrational; actually they rationalise what are basically only collective conditioned reflexes.

I shall try to illustrate the working of these sub-rational forces by taking two expressions of Indian foreign policy which have been puzzling all foreigners. These are, first, the close alignment of India with the UAR and the Arabs as a whole, and the disposition to demand and accept foreign aid without being willing to offer any quid pro quo. The line-up with the Arabs bewilders even many Indians.

Ever since 1948 the Government of India has been ardently pro-Arab, and therefore anti-Israel. But its passively anti-Israel policy became active and fell just short of actual belligerancy during the recent Arab-Israeli war, so that India almost shared the humiliation of the Arabs—which was a mistake the real sanction behind Arab bellicosity, the Soviet Union, did not commit. This wholly unrealistic and one-sided policy continues. It is, of course, explained prima facie by three things: the old *casus foederis* between Indian and Egyptian nationalism; the need for keeping Pakistan isolated from all potential allies in the Islamic world by bidding higher for Arab friendship; and the belief that Nasser, who is regarded as secular and progressive, will keep in check the growth of a new Pan-Islamism. But mere *raison d'état* could not have made Indian policy so obstinately rigid and resistant to changing circumstances. Underneath the rational surface there are much deeper passional waters.

What draws the Hindus and the Arabs together, even though the former are violently anti-Muslim in India, is a whole complex of attractions and repulsions created by the nationalism whose evolution I have described. The most important of these are:

1. The permanent anti-western feeling created by British rule and the struggle against it. The feeling is sometimes vicarious, sometimes active, but it is a fixed reaction.

2. A secondary product of the antipathy towards the West which has developed within the Indian nationalism, that is, a deep suspicion of any country which shows positive traits, for example, self-confidence and assertiveness, combined with freedom from persecution mania.

3. A change in the Indian attitude as soon as a country which was ruled, exploited, or threatened by western powers passed from a subordinate position to one of dominance or even security and self-reliance. This was seen successively in respect of Japan, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, and recently again in the case of China. India quickly lost any sympathy she had felt for these, because its own nationalism makes Indians incapable of all fellow-feeling except for the have-nots in the world.

4. Proneness to derive enjoyment from defeat, persecution, and

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suffering which has been forced on Indians by their long subjection to a foreign rule which appeared to be irremovable by any effort of theirs.

5. The continuing xenophobia which, in spite of the slavish aping of the West in external habits, has actually been accentuated by the sterilisation of their own solid and genuine native culture brought about by this superficial imitation.

In all these respects the Arabs resemble the Hindus. The Egyptians, being the most negative and rancorous of the Arabs, stand even closer to the Hindus. In contrast, the Israelis exhibit the opposite traits. The fundamental offence of Israel is that it is western, and therefore most Indians look upon it as a new practitioner of western imperialism in Asia.

The Indian attitude towards foreign aid is equally the product of historical experience and of the nationalism shaped by it. India expects this aid as a matter of right and not as a favour, for reasons which are very cogent to the Indian people. They have been taught to attribute their poverty and economic backwardness to British exploitation, which was a part of western imperialism. So the whole of the West is expected to pay reparations without any claim to gratitude.

Over and above this, the claim to western money is strengthened by two attitudes which Hindu traditions have made both widespread and normal in India. Among the Hindus holy and learned men have always been supported by the wealthy, and the acceptance of gifts without any obligation has come to be regarded as a privilege, almost the prerogative of the morally and spiritually great. Their nationalism with its self-conceit makes all Indians feel that they stand in the same relationship with the wealthy nations of the West as their holy men stand to themselves. The strong and almost unshakable conviction that India is the moral leader of the world makes Indians disinclined to be grateful for western generosity. In addition, there is the custom developed by the patriarchal joint families of certain of its members, usually the most clever and lazy, to live on the more hardworking and the earning members.

THESE are only two expressions of a general attitude towards other peoples and of a foreign policy shaped by the contemporary form of Indian nationalism. Throughout its previous development, its gestation so to say, it was never called upon to define national interests and requirements, but had always been acquiring antipathies. Therefore when independence came it could furnish only two kinds of emotional power to the foreign policy which the new independent Government of India was under the necessity to formulate. The first was the megalomania, and the second a combination of two ready-made hatreds.

The megalomania made this Government, led as it was by Nehru, whose internationalism and radical leftism made matters worse, think

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that it was the only champion of peace, freedom, and justice in a wicked world dominated by the chauvinistic western powers, and that on this ground it had a major part to play in world affairs. So long as Nehru lived this notion was a genuine force behind Indian foreign policy, and even now it inspires the ineffective intervention of India in international disputes which the country has no power to influence.

The hatreds were for the British and the Muslims. The second hatred found immediate expression in India's relations with Pakistan, which quickly settled down to a 'cold war', and in more concrete attempts to keep Pakistan isolated from all its possible friends. This policy and its application have been remarkably successful.

The hatred for the British has had a more elaborate and complex evolution and is of greater interest to western nations. For one thing, it did not disappear with the British withdrawal in 1947. This withdrawal was too sudden and adroit to satisfy the desire for revenge and for stamping on the head of a defeated enemy which all hard struggles (and in any case hopeless struggles) carried on with an unreasoning ferocity always generate. Besides, Britain was still suspect as the possessor of other imperial interests and as a possible ally of Pakistan. Over and above this, a good deal of illwill towards India was quite mistakenly attributed to the general body of the British people. The suspicion is still alive, and there is always a feeling that the British people must be treated as still on trial.

The more practical expression of anti-British feeling is to be found in its extension into a movement against European imperialism in general—whose aims were to eliminate British and other European rule from those parts of the world where it still survived and to guard against a reassertion of European power in the non-European parts of the world. This brought into existence a League of Oriental Nations which was sought to be made into a system at Bandung in 1955. This was a complete departure from the practice of the three countries of Asia which had a long tradition of foreign policy: Turkey, China and Japan. These, as they came more into the orbit of western cultural influences, never drew a line between themselves and the European countries, nor did they recognise any special ties with other Asian countries. They showed no interest in creating an Oriental bloc standing collectively against the West. Each of them chose its place in the existing balance of power in the light of its national interests.

In complete contrast, the countries of Asia which had recently gained independence and were required to formulate a foreign policy without previous experience were at once led into an attempt to build up an anti-western combination. India at that stage led the movement, and the country's foreign policy became an extension of the old nationalist movement, as if to create a federation of all the domestic nationalist movements of Asia. This Asiatic League was stillborn because there was no natural unity of aspirations or interests among

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the peoples who came into it under the pressure of nationalism. But it survives in the so-called Afro-Asian bloc. But though unorganised, as a passional force the anti-western League remains active as an emotional concert of all non-European peoples, with Indian nationalism sharing all the common attitudes, all the antipathies. I set down the most assertive of these:

1. There is among all these people, including Indians, an instinctive distaste for western strength, and hence a resentment of it—with a condemnation of all the steps which have contributed to it, from nuclear tests to the regional alliances sponsored by the United States.

2. As a corollary, there is an obstinate disbelief in the political, economic, or military strength of the West.

3. In recent years only those actions of the western powers have been praised which have involved some sacrifice or humiliation for them.

4. Even in the countries which are formally allied with the United States or are in the Commonwealth, there is a latent disapproval of the connection, which is tolerated only from a sense of expediency and self-interest.

5. In all these countries there is a tendency towards loosening the western affiliation, and a strong anti-western drift.

6. To these specific manifestations of the anti-western attitude must be added two more which are very vocal in India. First, there is an abnormality of behaviour which suspects western and more particularly British ill-will in everything, ascribes domestic difficulties to foreign intrigues, complains about lack of sympathy and fairness, and assumes that any western country which is not with India is against it. The British press, more especially, is assumed to have an incurable anti-Indian bias. Second, there is the violent prejudice against the English language among the Indian lower middle class, which is the largest human element behind Indian nationalism. The hostility to English is not only an expression of retrospective hatred for British rule, but also a revolt against any continuance of western cultural influences.

The pro-Soviet attitude of the Indian people and the anti-western foreign policy of the Indian Government are really a complement of the wider anti-western movement; it has nothing positive behind it. Although some Europeans have called the Russians Asiatics, the East, including India, has never thought so. It has regarded the Russian people as good Europeans, indeed as good as the French or the Germans, for whom, too, the Indian people, when they were fighting the British, had a fellow-feeling. Nor is communism with all its apparent attraction a stronger bond between the Soviet Union and India. Communist China is no favourite in India. The people of India have no natural love for the Soviet Union. It is only an accompaniment to their anti-British and anti-western nationalism.

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What has to be grasped is that Indian nationalism in its contemporary form is neither wholly national nor purely political. It does not seek simply to defend the political independence of India or even to assure her place in the sun. It is part of a much bigger phenomenon. It furnishes the Indian contribution and contingent to a conflict which not only cuts across the world as it is today, but has also been running its course through history.

Its extra-Indian geographical extension can be more or less easily perceived, for today the western world can see, indeed is being forced to see, that there exists a United Nations of all the peoples who till recently were subject to European rule, who are now determined to work against any form of domination by the West, even by the United States, which never held any Asiatic nation in subjection. It can also see that India is a member of this U.N. But what the West does not see at all or fully is that the ancient East-West conflict is continuing in a new and embittered form. Beginning with the wars between the Greeks and the Persians, it ran its course through the wars between Christianity and Islam, and it is not less of an historical fact today. In its essence it is a conflict between the successive forms of western civilisation from the Hellenic to the American on the one hand, and all the parallel non-western civilisations on the other. This alliance of collateral civilisations has now drawn into itself the peoples of primitive cultures in Africa, so that there is now a general conflict between all obsolete or obsolescent ways of life and the one which is living and evolving.

Neither the technology of the West nor western policies have been able to make any impression on the conflict on the mental plane. Of course, the people of the West expect and even assume that with the adoption of western technology and economic organisation the psychological antithesis will disappear. But this is assuming precisely what is showing no signs of coming about. On the contrary, all the indications point the opposite way: that the peoples with non-European cultures will use the technology of the West to turn the tables on the latter, and then assert their group personalities if not their old cultures. This then is a movement against the one-world concept to which the West is clinging even after its complete failure to make one world of the two European blocs. And this is the aspect of the Indian and allied nationalist movements which the West is more inclined to ignore than to face.

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THE CHRISTIAN-MARXIST DIALOGUE
International Implications

Neil McInnes

THE transformation of the Austrian monthly, *Neues Forum*, into the journal of the communist-Christian dialogue under an editorial committee of east and west European communists, philosophers, and clergy, is held by its promoters to mark a new stage in the evolution of relations between communism and Catholicism. The venture appears to have the blessing of Cardinal König, who is not only archbishop of Vienna but head of the Vatican's secretariat for relations with non-believers as well. For Catholics it will entail more regular contact with communists than the labours of the Paulus Gesellschaft, the West German body that arranged the Catholic-communist conferences of Salzburg in 1965 [1] and of Marienbad (Czechoslovakia) in the summer of 1967. Whereas the governments of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary refused permission for such of their citizens as Robert Havemann, Adam Schaff, and George Lukacs to attend the Salzburg conference, there are east European academics associated with the *Neues Forum* venture; this continues a relaxation illustrated several months earlier by the holding of the latest Paulus Gesellschaft meeting in Marienbad.

To be sure, the Russians still have no part in this fraternisation, which is regarded with equal suspicion by the integralists of the other side. From the point of view of either orthodoxy, the editorial committee that met in November 1967 in Vienna to launch *Neues Forum* on its new career included heretics and laxists. The Reverend Father M. D. Chenu has long been an admirer of Marx,[2] while M. Roger Garaudy has gone so far in his theological studies that the French Communist Party, after calling him to order, now seems to leave him the personal responsibility for his views. Besides, the Catholicism for which M. Garaudy has a weakness is that of Teilhard de Chardin, subject of a *monitum* from the Vatican forbidding the reading of his works by the faithful. As for Ernst Bloch, the Marxist philosopher who once taught in East Germany, his wish to unite Marxism with the great religions of salvation led to the persecution that obliged him to seek refuge in West Germany. Lucio Lombardo Radice, professor of geometry in Rome, is, in contrast, in the best standing in his party, but then that is the Italian Communist Party. Milan Machovec, the most prominent east European member of the *Neues Forum* committee, is professor of philosophy in Prague.

[1] Proceedings published in *Gespräche der Paulus Gesellschaft, Christentum und Marxismus Heute* (Europa Verlag, 1966).

[2] M. D. Chenu, *Pour une théologie du travail* (Paris, 1955).

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Russia's official attitude to the question of relations with the Catholics is halfway between the aggressive atheism of the Albanian cultural revolution and the cautious improvement in the treatment of religion that has been noted in east Europe, especially Yugoslavia, by the Vatican and the National Council of Churches (USA). The Albanians have often denounced 'the Holy Alliance between imperialists, reformists, modern revisionists, and the Vatican against Marxism-Leninism and socialism'.[3] Having closed 2,169 churches and mosques, most of which were turned into communist youth centres of culture and recreation, Albania claimed in 1967 to be the first atheist state in the world.[4] All public manifestations of religious faith have been outlawed after a violent eight-month-long campaign aimed at eradicating religion from the souls of the people, suppressing the illicit traffic in icons and religious pictures,[5] and making Albanian nationalism the only religion of the youth. The violence of this latest 'assault on heaven' would be deplored by the Russians, along with the other excesses of the cultural revolution. The Russians indeed are well placed to know how fragile are the 'definitive uprootings' of religion achieved by these means, having used them in the past with disappointing results. The 1961 Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union favours, rather, patience and persuasion. 'The Party employs the means of ideological influence to educate men into the spirit of a scientific and materialist conception of the world, in order to overcome religious prejudices without allowing the feelings of believers to be offended. It is necessary to explain patiently the inconsistency of religious beliefs that arose in earlier epochs, when men were subjected to the forces of nature and to social slavery, because of their ignorance of the real causes of natural and social phenomena'. Against the ferocious atheism of the Albanians, the Russians recall the one-sided liberalism of article 124 of their constitution (which guarantees freedom of religious *practice* and of anti-religious *propaganda*), and argue that the only interference with religion in Russia is the necessary preservation of public order from the activities of Baptist heretics.[6]

At the same time, the *aggiornamento* of the Catholic Church and the subsequent interest in discussion with communists are dismissed in Russia, with the aid of a suitable quotation from Lenin, as a mere 'polishing up' of a religion that was beginning to lose its propagandist efficacy, a polishing up that makes it, if anything, 'more dangerous'. And, whatever the official doctrine may be, the oppression of religion continues in Russia.[7] There is more than the policing of public order

[3] The Albanian publication in which these fulminations appeared in June 1964 is suitably named *Rruga e Partise* (Party Life).

[4] *The Times*, 3 November 1967.

[5] Though mainly a Muslim country, Albania counts also 250,000 Greek Orthodox and 200,000 Catholics.

[6] This official case is set out, uncriticised, in *The Times*, 6 November 1967, under the title 'The Freedom to Believe', by a Russian Correspondent.

[7] Bodhan R. Bociurkiw, 'Religion and Soviet Society', *Survey*, July 1966.

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in the persecution of the heretical Baptists.[8] Obviously, any Russian participation in the communist-Catholic dialogue would lead to public discussion of the activities of the zealous *antireligiozniki* and of the evident contradiction between officially proclaimed freedom of belief and the fact that hundreds of believers are in jail for what *they* consider manifestation of their beliefs.

All this is not meant to suggest that the dialogue that has found a permanent support in *Neues Forum* is of negligible importance. It is meant rather to foreshadow the themes of what follows: that communism and Catholicism fairly easily could find an ideological buffer state on the ground of a joint heresy, and this could have electoral consequences in the West; that efforts to descend from that ideological *convivenza* to co-operation on practical political issues would encounter grave difficulties, for reasons of institutional conflict already apparent in Russia and Poland; and that, meantime, the dialogue between west Europeans of Catholic and communist persuasions is at the mercy of Russian paroxysms of militant atheism until western communists take their distance from Moscow, as the Italians already are doing.

IN the sense of having been initiated neither by Rome nor by Moscow, the Catholic-communist dialogue is a peripheral phenomenon. Rome is familiar with peripheral phenomena, the Church having been revolutionised by them several times, an experience the new Moscow awaits. The dialogue is, for example, engaged even in the nether regions of both faiths, that is, in Britain. There it began at Cambridge, thanks to the Catholics attracted to Marxism who launched *Slant*. That magazine, now under the commercial wing of Sheed and Ward, the Catholic publishing house, has on its board Father Lawrence Bright, a Dominican. The magazine's editors have held discussions with Mr James Klugman, editor of the British Communist Party's *Marxism Today*, who in turn delegated party ideologues to participate in a dialogue with the *Slant* Catholics, a dialogue that covered both metaphysics and workers' control of industry. Episcopal consent was not requested, but neither was episcopal displeasure expressed; rumours of excommunication of *Slant's* board were taken as a mere shot across the bows.[9]

The Dutch Catholics, who pride themselves on being furthest advanced in the *aggiornamento* of the faith, would no doubt have done as much, but the local communist party is intellectually negligible and, besides, it discourages the best of good wills by showing a marked hostility to Moscow. The dialogue is well spoken of but scarcely engaged in Belgium and Austria. The West German Catholics have taken a lead in sponsoring it but their local communists are clandestine, so the political consequences of the *aggiornamento* in the

[8] Peter Reddaway, 'The Inexorable Persecution of Russia's Protestants', *The Times*, 12 December 1967; M. Bourdeaux and P. Reddaway, 'Soviet Baptists Today', *Survey*, January 1968; M. Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia* (London, 1968).
[9] *The Times*, 16 October 1967.

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Federal Republic concern primarily the SPD. (Those consequences could be important. Already in 1966 the West German bishops drew the conclusion that they were no longer obliged to support the CDU outright, and in the North Rhine-Westphalia elections they declared for neutrality. This was no doubt a prime cause, along with the economic fiasco of Ludwig Erhard's chancellorship, of the CDU defeat in that populous *Land*.[10] If repeated before the federal elections of 1969, and if accompanied by some moderation of the scurrilous terms in which the Catholic press in West German usually speaks of the SPD, this attitude could influence the results significantly.)

For what importance it may have, the Communist Party of the USA has intimated its willingness to institute a dialogue with the hosts of American Catholicism, and the new Communist Party of Quebec has decided to admit Catholics. In Latin America, it is only in Chile, in association with the experiment in Christian democracy there, that anything of a dialogue has been begun.[11]

Considerably more important is the situation in Spain, the country where communism and Catholicism staged their most terrible confrontation, before and during the Civil War, and where one day they no doubt will again find themselves face to face. For the moment, the Communist Party of Spain is a negligible force of 5,000 members and it can speak only clandestinely or from exile. Nevertheless it has offered a dialogue with Spanish Catholics and has received favourable responses even from certain individual priests and prelates. In fact it was a Spanish bishop, Monsignor Guerra Campos, who was most outspoken at the Vatican Council in calling for a dialogue with the Marxists.[12] This appeal was met with a promise of Catholic-communist collaboration by the monthly organ of the Spanish Communist Party.[13] A member of its central committee was eloquent about the prospects of 'an alliance of Catholics and communists',[14] and its secretary-general, Santiago Carrillo, even claimed in an interview with *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (1 January, 1966) that such an alliance had begun, in the shape of 'worker committees' of Catholics and communists in every principal Spanish town. The same leader repeated his appeal for Catholic-communist understanding and co-operation towards the end of 1966 in interviews with *Le Figaro*[15] and *L'Unita*,[16] but the Spanish hierarchy replied with a sharp refusal.[17] Curiously, the Catholic journal *Signo* criticised Carrillo on Marxist grounds for making this appeal, for which

10 *L'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui*, Sept.–Oct. 1966, pp. 2–10.
11 Kevin Devlin, 'Il Dialogo tra comunisti e cattolici', in *L'Est: Rivista trimestrale di studi sui paesi dell'est*, June 1966. (Published originally in *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1966.)
12 The text of his contribution is in *Realidad* (published in Spanish in Rome), May 1965.
13 *Espana Republicana* (published in Cuba), October 1965.
14 Santiago Alvarez, in *World Marxist Review*, June 1965.
15 Reproduced in *Mundo Obrero*, February 1967.
16 Reproduced in *Mundo Obrero*, March 1967.
17 *Eclesia*, 18 January 1967.

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feat its whole editorial board was sacked by the Assembly of Bishops; even Monsignor Guerra Campos said it was inadmissible for a Catholic paper to be so understanding of Marxists as to criticise them on Marxist grounds.[18] The communists flatter themselves that they get a better reception from the Catholic Left, notably from the Union Democratica Cristiana and from the sponsors of the review *Cuadernos para el dialogo*. They certainly do from isolated theologians, such as Jose Maria Gonsalez Ruiz, canon of the diocese of Malaga.[19] Under great difficulties, and with considerable reserve on both sides, the dialogue is engaged, if not in Spain, then among Spaniards.[20]

It is an old affair in France, though it has lost immediate political relevance there with the decline of the Catholic movement in politics in the Fifth Republic. Its prehistory dates from Thorez's famous *la main tendue*, the offer of collaboration with Catholics in April 1936 (that is, in the Popular Front period), which had an enthusiastic reception from a small band of Catholics until a papal encyclical of 1937 condemned them. Besides, the Spanish Civil War was raging by then. Communist-Catholic cooperation was resumed in 1943, under the Occupation, and assumed a variety of incongruous forms, both practical and metaphysical, down to 1951.[21] George Lichtheim has traced the history of these relations down to the eve of the *aggiornamento*.[22] Since John XXIII and the Vatican Councils they have been developed much further. In France, unlike Italy and Spain, it is the clergy, notably Jesuits and Dominicans, rather than Left Catholics, who are most forward in seeking a meeting ground with communists, whereas the party, again unlike Italy and Spain, is reticent and uneasy, leaving the work to a few individuals. It is not always clear how the activities of these individuals are judged by the party leadership. Roger Garaudy, for example, has been rebuked and to some extent disowned, whereas another communist prominent in the *rapprochement* with the Catholics, Gilbert Mury, quit the party in 1966—to join the pro-Peking faction! His reasons for doing so were published, precisely, in a Catholic journal.[22a] Catholics now participate in the annual *Semaine de la pensée marxiste*, and communists in the yearly *Semaine des intellectuels catholiques*, while the columns of *Témoignage chrétien* and *Esprit* are open to communists (who sometimes take the precaution of using pseudonyms, such as 'Jean Dru'). The outstanding production of this exchange is Roger Garaudy's *De l'anathème au dialogue*.[23] Whatever

[18] See Ramon Bulnes and Jorge Semprun, 'Dos posiciones erroneas', in *Cuadernos de Ruedo Iberico*, February–March 1967.

[19] See his 'El cristiano y la revolución', in *Ruedo Iberico*, No. 11, and the interview with him in the same review, No. 12.

[20] The February–March 1967 number of *Ruedo Iberico* (published in Paris) is devoted to 'Marxismo y cristianismo'.

[21] Georges Suffert, *Les Catholiques et la Gauche* (Paris, 1960), Chap. 3.

[22] George Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France* (New York, 1966), pp. 102–111.

[22a] Gilbert Mury, 'Où sont les communistes?', in *Esprit*, January 1967.

[23] Paris, 1965; now available in English with a foreword by a theologian. Cf. two other communist works: A. Moine, *Communistes et chrétiens* (Paris, 1965), and M. Verret, *Les Marxistes et la religion* (Paris, 1963).

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one may think of Garaudy's uncritical eclecticism (which sometimes gets him into the position of being disapproved, for the same essay, by both the Communist Party and the Catholic Church), he deserves credit for being the first to draw the conclusion that western communists cannot stay on this tack and avoid outright condemnation of the situation in Soviet Russia. When Ilichev unleashed the atheist campaign in Russia in November 1963, threatening to blight the hundred flowers of the dialogue throughout west Europe, there followed more than six months of pained silence among the Italian communists. From February 1964, in contrast, Garaudy had condemned the Russian attitude, choosing a Catholic-communist seminar in Lyon to do so. True, he was relieved of the editorship of *Cahiers du communisme* several months later, but his stand set a precedent that has been followed far and wide since. 'It is not a matter of tactics but of principle', exclaimed Garaudy in rejecting the official Soviet atheist campaign. As far as those two can be distinguished in the behaviour of a communist *maître à penser* of long and chequered standing, one is bound to agree that tactical pretences of collaboration with non-communists must be distinguished from collaboration that entails explicit condemnation of Russian doublethink and oppression.

BY far the most important instance of the Catholic-communist dialogue is in Italy. As the home of Roman Catholicism and more particularly of John XXIII, as well as of the biggest communist party out of office in the world (and one with a reputation for independence and liberalism), the Italians owed it to themselves to carry the dialogue furthest. They have thrown themselves into it with that engaging cultural vanity that makes Italian communists proud of 'our Pope John' and Italian Catholics proud of 'our liberal Communist Party', and with that sense of drama (non-Latins call it megalomania) that casts Italy for the central role in humanity's spiritual adventures. One of the most ardent organisers of the dialogue in the peninsula calls Catholic-communist co-operation Italy's 'privilege and human responsibility', adding that it is 'History—the design of God—that places us clearly before a task of universal import'.[24]

As the communists like to recall today, their appeals to the Catholics for political collaboration date from the days when they were a clandestine party persecuted by the fascists. Of course, such appeals were little more than Stalinist opportunism and yet, in recalling them, CPI sources claim that the Vatican took them seriously enough to send emissaries to meet communist leaders in Switzerland in 1938 (in the thick of the Spanish war) to discuss the guarantees the communists would offer the Church.[25] Returning to Italy from Moscow in 1944,

[24] Mario Gozzini in *Il Dialogo alla prova* (Florence, 2nd ed., 1965). Gozzini edited this bulky Catholic-communist symposium.

[25] *Rinascita*, 19 February 1966.

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Palmiro Togliatti affirmed his party's respect for Catholicism and included 'freedom of religion and of cult' among the liberties communists were supposed to defend. At the fifth congress of the CPI in December 1945, that list of liberties was extended further to cover 'freedom of religious organisation and propaganda', i.e. what the Soviet constitution significantly omits to offer. Going further still, the party broke with communist precedent in writing its new statutes by opening its ranks to 'all citizens without distinction of race, religion, or philosophical conviction'.

That this wooing of Catholics, aimed at creating a mass party in a predominantly Catholic country, was dictated by *strumentalismo*, that is, by opportunism and by the wish to manipulate people, is admitted today by the communist leaders.[26] It is to be noted that it worked, in that a large number of practising Catholics joined the party, and also that it reacted on its authors—for our 'tactics' often master us—in that the Italian party became more tolerant and open than other Stalinist parties.

The wooing of Catholics, and specifically of the votes of Catholic women, went further. It went so far that the CPI shares the responsibility for giving the Vatican its influence in the new Italian republic. 'Never in the history of united Italy has the Catholic Church been as powerful and influential as in the two postwar decades', says an historian,[27] and the communists are in part responsible for that, for it was their votes that secured, against the opposition of socialists, republicans, and liberals, the incorporation of the Lateran Pacts, the Concordat between Mussolini and the Vatican, into the constitution of the Italian republic in 1946–47. Similarly, their abstention secured, against the same opposition, the Catholic amendment making marriage indissoluble. This long, and in the eyes of the non-confessional parties, costly courting of the Catholics came to nothing. The cold war broke out and Pius XII in 1949 decreed the excommunication of communists and their helpers. The communists returned to their traditional arguments that the Church is innately reactionary and that progressive opinion is necessarily atheist and materialist. Those years of ideological warfare (which never of course led to the sort of schism between church and party seen in Protestant countries, for in Italy those two overlap so much they must always stay on working terms) are overlooked today by communists writing the history of their good relations with Catholicism. They recall only such episodes as Togliatti's 1954 appeal to the Catholics for joint action, though that was really only an aspect of the 'peace' campaigns of the day. The beginnings of the Catholic-communist dialogue in Italy date from 1960, when the party had drawn the conclusions of destalinisation and when Pope John had been on Saint Peter's throne two years.

[26] Luciano Gruppi, in *Il Dialogo alla prova.*
[27] Norman Kogan, *A Political History of Postwar Italy* (London, 1966), p. 217.

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AS early as its seventh congress in 1956, the CPI had sought an understanding with 'the democratic Catholic masses'.[28] By the ninth congress in 1960 this was made more specific, in that the offer was directed not only to the 'Catholic masses' but to 'their organisations as well', which presumably meant the left wing of the Christian-Democrats and certain agencies of the Church. At the tenth congress in 1962 the appeal was more pressing, even urgent, and it was accompanied by a doctrinal concession to which the party attached considerable importance. It was conceded that not only was religious faith compatible with socialist aspirations, but it could actually stimulate them. However obvious this may seem to the followers of Tawney and other historians of 'the Christian origins of social revolt', one must believe Lombardo Radice when he says it was one of the most controversial theses ever adopted by the CPI, adding that it was adopted in the face of resistance which still persists inside the party.[29] And if one takes it to mean merely that communists should not hesitate to exploit the progressive inclinations of certain Catholics, one must note that it is a point of view still expressly repudiated by Soviet ideologists, for whom religion is necessarily an obstacle to socialism.[30] The CPI's contrary opinion facilitated its overtures to various Catholic organisations, and by the eleventh congress in 1966 the secretary-general, Luigi Longo, could spend 4½ hours expatiating on the analogies between Marxist and Christian 'values', citing papal encyclicals and Vatican Council documents in support. The dialogue—not only with Catholics and their social organisations, said Longo, but with the Church herself—was well established as part of the 'Italian way to socialism'.

Although Longo's rhetoric was rejected by the *bien-pensant* newspaper *Corriere della Sera* as 'outrageous in its base Machiavellianism',[31] the communists had had encouragement from the Catholic side from the beginning. The 'saintly mayor' of Florence, Giorgio La Pira, had never broken off contact with the communists in the cold war of the 1950's, and it was in Florence that, despite reprimands from the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, the left Catholics began the formal, public dialogue with communists. (By 1964 La Pira was accepting the votes of communist members of the Florentine communal

[28] *Dichiarazione programmatica dell'VIII Congresso* (Rome, 1957), p. 913.
[29] L. Lombardo Radice, in *Il Dialogo alla prova*, p. 90.
[30] 'Religion proposes a morality diametrically opposed to the principles of the moral code of the builders of communism. . . . Today as in the past it kills in men the active, creative will . . . it makes them passive servants of god, capable only of kneeling before him and asking pity. . . . Religion cannot but be a brake on scientific progress and in general on social progress.' From Italian accounts of the report of L. Ilichev to the central committee of the CPSU, 25 November 1963. The sociology of religion being a neglected subject in Russia (on the grounds that Marx, Engels, and Lenin said all that needs to be known on it), it is possible for ideologues to speak as though Max Weber never lived and as though all religions were varieties of Tantric Buddhism. Mr Khrushchev used to deplore 'religious prejudices and superstitions that prevent some Soviet citizens from fully developing their personal creative energies'.
[31] K. Devlin, *loc. cit.* p. 126.

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council in order to keep his Centre-Left administration in office, a reminder from the home of the dialogue that Catholic objectives were no more entirely metaphysical than communist.) The publication in 1961 of Pope John's *Mater et Magister* gave them some encouragement, but it was *Pacem in Terris* (April 1963), with its distinction between 'erroneous philosophical doctrines' and the 'historical movements' deriving from them, that provided authority for more ambitious left Catholic approaches to the communists. Such 'historical movements', said the papal text, without citing communism but clearly meaning it, not only were susceptible of change and development, but, 'in so far as they conform to the dictates of justice and interpret the legitimate aspirations of human beings, they contain elements that are positive and worthy of approval'. Further than that, 'a union or meeting, with the aim of attaining certain practical objectives, though once judged [i.e. by the previous Pope] inopportune or useless, may now or in the future be considered opportune and useful'. Joint action with communists, it was plainly implied, was permissible 'to attain economic, social, and political objectives that are useful and worthy of respect'.

This new territory was first reconnoitred in the Catholic-communist symposium, *Il Dialogo alla prova.* Communist efforts to publicise that work assumed the proportions of a major political manoeuvre in 1964 and 1965, and this brought the Catholic political machine into action. The national council of the Christian-Democrats denounced Catholic flirtations with communists and rejected Pietro Ingrao's January 1965 offer of an understanding with 'the Catholic world'. In this, the party was endorsed by the main Catholic professional organisations and trade unions, and firmly approved by *L'Osservatore Romano* and *Civiltà Cattolica.* (The latter, Jesuit, organ has been much more reticent in this affair than its French counterpart, *Etudes.*) The vigour of these reactions was due to the feeling that the communists were seeking to exploit the political divisions inside the Catholic movement, and of course when that movement is divided, denunciation of communism traditionally has been the one point everyone could agree on. The communists certainly showed up such divisions; at various points between 1960 and today, the papacy and the larger and less formal Catholic groups ('the Catholic masses', in communist parlance) have seemed more open to a dialogue with communists than have the ecclesiastical and political machinery in between.[32]

Apart from the general, moral reasons they advanced, some prelates and laity in favour of that dialogue have evidently hoped that Italian communist influence could win better treatment for the Church and its faithful in east Europe. That is the sense of repeated Catholic

[32] Tullio Vecchietti, member of the secretariat of the PSIUP, says: 'The Catholic world is often much more advanced than the Christian Democrats . . . It suffices, for proof of that, to have followed the world congress of the lay apostolate that was held in Rome a few weeks ago. They came from all over the world to say it was necessary to open a dialogue with the communists.' *L'Espresso*, 26 November 1967.

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praise of the CPI as the most advanced of communist parties, as occupying doctrinal positions to which it is hoped those other parties will eventually progress. It is, too, the 'universal import' that is read into the dialogue in Italy. The deal is sometimes almost explicit: the communists will be *dédouanés* in Italy in return for their intervention in support of the Church in the east and in third-world countries where progressive movements all too often are anti-clerical.[33] Alberto Cecchi, a CPI ideologue, claims that the communist side of this bargain is already being kept, in that the improved treatment of believers in some communist countries is in part due to events in Italy.[34] Some Catholics realise that if it comes down to trading influence, the communists could ask for Rome's intervention in totalitarian states like Spain in favour of non-confessional political forces.

However, that latter point has never figured among the political calculations of the Italian communists in their rapprochement with the Church. Much more vital to them than the misfortunes of Spanish and Latin American communists has been their own increasing political isolation in Italy. For it should not be overlooked that the period of the dialogue has been the period in which the Italian Socialist Party was breaking with the CPI and threatening, by its reunification with the Italian Social-Democratic Party, to win some of Italy's workers, peasants, and intellectuals, away from the sterile total opposition of the communists, toward participation in parliamentary democracy.[35] It has been the period, too, of the 'opening to the Left' by the Christian-Democrats and of the limited but undeniable successes of the Left-Centre coalition governments of Aldo Moro. More generally, in this period the whole western communist movement has been in ideological disarray, typified by two extreme and contradictory resolutions: to outflank the Russians on the Left by siding with Peking, and to outflank the socialists on the Right by seeking a pact with the Catholic Church. That disarray arose from the double defeat of communism, the defeat of Russia in the cold war and the defeat of the western communist parties by the evolution of European society. 'The awareness that we do not find ourselves in a pre-revolutionary phase of history and the realisation that any attempt at the violent seizure of power would provoke a contrary reaction of immense vigour, the blank resistance that communist expansion ran into in Europe, the need for the USSR to avoid political difficulties abroad at a time of internal reorganisation of the Soviet state—all this meant that in Moscow first and in other communist centres next there arose the theory of peaceful coexistence, the theory of national ways to socialism and the theory of the peaceful conquest of power'.[36] Although Moscow intended, for domestic reasons and for the security of its hegemony in east Europe, that peaceful coexistence should exclude ideological concessions, and

[33] Gozzini, *loc. cit.* pp. 31, 52, 80.
[34] *Ibid.* p. 247.
[35] Nando Fabro, *ibid.* p. 124.
[36] Ruggero Orfei, *ibid.* p. 196.

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that it should even, according to Mr Khrushchev, be accompanied by intensification of the war on religion, peaceful coexistence inevitably entailed for communists living in predominantly Catholic countries an attempt at reconciliation with the Catholic Church and parties.

Such communists would be all the more inclined in that direction because they could see, whether Russian ideologues admitted it or not, that the *Kulturkampf* had failed, that belief had not been extirpated from the Russian, let alone Polish, soul, and that the militant atheist establishment was provoking scorn and resistance even among the irreligious in communist lands. To get Russian youth to dreary 'atheist soirées', it was necessary to arrange that a dance should follow, just as dances, bingo, and Sunday school picnics were needful on the other side, in the West. As Togliatti said in his Yalta testament of August 1964, 'The old atheist propaganda is getting us nowhere. The very problem of the religious consciousness, of its content, of its roots in the masses and of ways to get beyond it, must be posed in a way different from that of the past if we wish to get through to the Catholic masses and be understood by them'.[37]

IN the particular case of the CPI (in contrast to the French party, which in these years was being courted by the Federation of the Democratic Socialist Left and winked at by President de Gaulle), the resolve to 'get through to the Catholic masses' was strengthened by fear of political isolation. Hence the strident insistence of the Italian communists on the theme of the dialogue: 'No occasion is allowed to pass without some communist representative or other, even in the most incongruous circumstances, talking about dialoguing with the Catholics from one end of the peninsula to the other. Read *L'Unita*, *Rinascita*, or any CPI document and you constantly find the political directive to seek forms of understanding with the Catholics. The least one can wonder is whether a certain way of wearing their hearts on their sleeves is not, for many communists, merely part of a political manoeuvre, a new *main tendue*.'[38]

If this were indeed merely CPI tactics, it was not informed by any strategy, for the most obvious fact about the CPI in this period was its inability to settle on a political design. As a way out from isolation, the party was unable to choose between the suggestions of Giorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao. Amendola argued that both communism and social-democracy had failed in west Europe, and that there was need for a new party 'neither Leninist nor social-democrat'. Ingrao urged, rather than this federating with socialists, outflanking them by making a direct bid for the support of the Catholic masses and by opening direct negotiations with the Church and its agencies. The socialists and the social-democrats turned down Amendola's offer, seeing in it a revival of the Popular Front, while the Christian-Democrats

[37] *Rinascita*, 5 September 1964.

[38] Orfei, *loc. cit.* p. 217.

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and the Church turned down Ingrao's suggestion. Yet of those two refusals, that of the Catholics was the less unanimous, and it is in that direction that the party, in its persistent indecision, still inclines. One guesses that this is why *L'Unita* censored Amendola, though he is a member of the party secretariat, when he declared in a recent television debate, 'I am an atheist, I have not baptised my children and I was an atheist before I was a communist'. He accompanied this confession with expressions of scepticism about 'ecumenical encounters' with Catholics, expressions which also disappeared from *L'Unita's* otherwise full account of the debate.[39] The party newspaper, charged the non-confessional parties, had become a devout sheet in which declarations of atheism were too unseemly to be fit to print.

Moreover, if the Italian communists' courting of Catholics was originally only tactical, it led them, with every sign of reluctance and hesitation, into positions that marked a break with past subordination to Moscow. This emerged from the Ilichev incident. As has already been mentioned, in November 1963 the secretary of the central committee of the CPSU marked the revival of the anti-religious campaign in Russia with a report that denounced religion as an impediment to all scientific progress and social advance. The Italian communists were by then well advanced in their bid to open a dialogue with the Catholics, and their embarrassment was extreme. Ilichev's report was kept out of the Italian communist press for months after Garaudy in France had dissociated himself from it. This hesitation was explicable by the enormity of the decision that had to be taken, namely, to part company with the Russians not only on a point of Marxist doctrine but on an issue of practical politics, where it would be necessary to criticise the Russians as oppressive of liberty. Togliatti, a few months before his death, gingerly initiated the manoeuvre, which has since been carried further by younger men, carried, indeed to some, though not all, of its furthest conclusions. For example, Lombardo Radice has attacked in the militant atheism of Ilichev 'the overvaluation of science and its successes as radical and unanswerable arguments against all transcendence, a view that has more in common with the scientistic materialism of the last century than with historical materialism'. He has criticised, too, the un-Marxist reliance on propaganda to deal with a situation that presumably has objective causes, namely, the persistence of religious influence in Russia so long after the revolution, and he has pointed out that the 'distasteful' (*poco simpatiche*) restrictions on the churches and sects in Russia probably have the contrary effects to those intended.[40]

With Salvatore Di Marco, a prominent Sicilian communist, poet, and trade union organiser, the attacks on Russia attain a violence seldom heard inside the party before. Di Marco spoke of the 'dogmatic and absolutist conception of Marxism' current in Russia, of

[39] Eugenio Scalfari, 'La repubblica dorotea', *L'Espresso*, 29 October 1967.
[40] *Il Dialogo alla prova*, p. 89.

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the 'brutally simple-minded vision' of culture it entailed, of the 'ideological stiffening' of the directing group in Russia after the first wave of destalinisation, and of the 'fossilised, totemist Marxism' that served as metaphysics in that country. More important, Di Marco insisted that the summary and illiberal approach to religion was a facet of the same oppressiveness as had affected other parts of Russian culture and art as much as scientific research.[41] Thus what began as an effort to dissociate the Italian communists from Ilichev's atheist campaign was soon broadened, by the nature of the case, into a general repudiation of the 'dogmatic and intolerant Marxism' that blighted Soviet society. This entailed, also, the admission that fifty years after the revolution Russia still awaited the introduction of several fundamental liberties. Just when this Italian campaign was gathering force, the manner of the removal of Mr Khrushchev from office brought Italian criticism to a narrowly political focus, and sharpened it into an attack on the 'centralised and bureaucratic structure of the Soviet Communist Party' and its authoritarian procedures. This in turn led the Italians into an examination of the 'contradictions in Soviet society' that lay behind the 'myth of monolithism'. At the eleventh congress of the party in January 1966, the Soviet emissary, Suslov, had to listen to Luigi Longo mock the 'antiquated, idealist, conservative position that makes the religious "ideology" the opium of the people'. Said Longo: 'As we are against the confessional state, so we are against state atheism. That is, we are opposed to the state attributing any sort of privilege to one ideology or philosophy or religious faith or cultural or artistic current, to the detriment of others'.[42] That this position readily finds application to other cultural fields quite apart from religion was shown when the Italian communists intervened in the Havemann affair in East Germany.[43] However, the further developments of this line of thought are less relevant here than the main point: that it began to be elaborated clearly and publicly in relation to the question of religious liberty.

THE dialogue to date has consisted mainly in talking about the possibility of talking, and thus has produced little or nothing concrete. The talking has changed, however, says Milan Machovec: 'Ten years ago we talked while being convinced that the other side was condemned to wither away or collapse.'[44] Now each feels that, though the other represents an illusion, it is an illusion with an indefinite future. As to what collaboration might issue from the dialogue, there is general agreement on the formula: 'cooperation in specific political tasks without ideological concessions'. Peter Schmid was told by a representative of the Italian Catholic Workers Association: 'We are ready to open a dialogue with the communists but only on quite concrete problems

[41] *Ibid.* pp. 407–15.
[42] *L'Unita*, 26 January 1966.
[43] See the article 'Havemann and the Dialectic', in *Survey*, January 1967.
[44] *Le Monde*, 15 November 1967.

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where agreement between us is necessary. On the basic principles there can be no dialogue.'[45] A French theologian puts it similarly, excluding ideological compromise and limiting political collaboration to 'specific objectives recognised as acceptable to Catholics and important to the common good, in circumstances that exclude the danger of such co-operation going beyond agreed limits'.[46] One of the Catholic promoters of the dialogue in Italy, while most optimistic about future fraternisation, insists on 'the impossibility of any attempt at philosophical mediation at the purely theoretical level. The Christian conception of man and of life offers no support for reconciliation with the Marxist view as a whole; and vice versa.'[47] The communists mean the same thing when they outline the possibility of political collaboration with progressive Catholics without surrender of Marxist principles.

Though common, this formula presents difficulties. It would seem that each side expects that the other will succeed in dissociating its political practice from its ideology but does not contemplate such dissociation for itself. Each hopes the other will put *its* metaphysics back in the private sector, thus clearing public life of ideological conflict. Pope John made the distinction between 'erroneous beliefs' and 'social movements', and his left Catholic exegetes specify that this means taking the traditional papal anathema, 'atheist communism', and separating its two components one from the other. The communists will be required to keep their atheist materialism to themselves while leaving in the public domain, open to collaboration from outside, their social, economic, and political programmes. In the same way, the communists expect that the Catholics will at last consent to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and put *their* metaphysics back in the private sector.

As simple *vues de l'esprit*, both these suggestions are coherent. Socialism and communism are only contingently associated with a materialist philosophy, while there is no cogent reason why they should be allied with militant atheism. The first revisionists took 'Back to Kant!' as their slogan; the Marburg school of neo-Kantians included Marxist socialists; Otto Bauer argued that Marxism was compatible with any philosophy, 'including Thomism'. All were on solid theoretical ground. Conversely, the Christian tradition is full of efforts to get the Church out of politics; and some believers even feel that there is a recall to the pristine purity of their faith in such admonitions as this: 'The Church did not receive from Christ a mission to produce political, social, or cultural techniques . . . So the Church has no business creating a Christian politics, a Christian culture, a Christian society, a Christian state, or even a Christian party . . . Its task is not to create its own *civitas* in which the gospel is turned into an economic, political, and

[45] Peter Schmid, 'Chez les communistes d'Italie', *Preuves*, April 1966.
[46] Yves Calvez, 'Chrétiens et communistes', *Revue de l'action populaire*, November 1965.
[47] Gozzini, *loc. cit.* p. 9.

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social code. The *civitas* must build itself, with its own autonomous means. Just as the Church was mistaken in constructing successively a " feudal Christianity ", a " bourgeois Christianity " and a " democratic Christianity ", so now it must take great care not to construct a " socialist Christianity ".' [48]

THE fact remains that such views, whether from the Catholic or the communist side, are intellectualist remonstrances addressed to institutions; the contingent associations they deplore are stubborn facts. Movements do not easily dissociate their ideology from their practice, and they are unlikely to accept outsiders' ideas on where their ideology ends and their practice begins. When it is a totalitarian movement—as both communism and Catholicism are, in the sense of seeking to enrol men totally, in every aspect of their lives—willingness to cooperate with another totalitarian movement would in itself involve an immense ideological concession: abatement of the claim to represent a total, unique, and exclusive truth. At the centres, in Rome and Moscow, one sees no readiness to make that concession. Yet at the periphery it exists. The Italian communists say they are ready for this surrender. Lombardo Radice says (while emphasising that it is his personal disposition, not a party decision) that he is willing to accept the Catholic invitation to ' relativise the communist " faith ", to take it to be an indispensable component but not the unique and exclusive determinant of the new society that is to be built '. And of course Catholics have done as much, in predominantly non-Catholic countries, though not yet in Italy or Spain.

It is conceivable then that, without actually putting metaphysics back in the private sector or agreeing to disregard ideology in public life, the two movements could work towards an ideological truce at the frontiers. The communists have a doctrine that facilitates such armistices with idealist movements: the doctrine that only communism can ' realise ' the ideals cherished by such movements, that it can incarnate the values that others revere but do not live up to, that it alone can practise what they preach. It has been duly produced on this occasion. Luciano Gruppi, who is in charge of ideological education in the central committee of the CPI, says the Marxists' objective is ' to liberate the *real human values* of Christianity from their mystical wrappings, liberate them on the level of united mass action aimed at the politico-social realisation of those values '.[49] Historically, the main function of this ' realisation ' doctrine has been to stifle ethical criticism and innovation, on the grounds that the task of communists is not to question or rebel against traditional, religion-sanctioned morality, the way existentialists, beatniks, hippies, and Socratic philosophers do, but to create the social conditions for the ' realisation ' of that uncriticised morality—as though there were nothing wrong with moralising except its hypocrisy, its

[48] Jose Maria Gonsalez Ruiz, *Ruedo Iberico*, No. 11, pp. 16, 50.
[49] *Il Dialogo alla prova*, p. 189.

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impotence to change the world into 'a better place'. This attitude may be seen already in Marx, who was shocked by the hypocrisy of the bourgeois world but hardly questioned its 'moral values'. It has been responsible for much of the conservatism of Soviet society, and in turn it could offer the basis for a working agreement between communists and left Catholics.

Already that prospect has awakened in some Italian liberals the fear of a 'clerico-Marxism' that would unite the lowest common denominators of two uncriticised faiths, what Eugenio Scalfari has called *la repubblica conciliare* 'marked by the meeting of Catholics and communists under the sign of ecumenism'.[50] The vision of Church and party shaking hands over the mangled corpse of liberalism is no doubt fanciful, for their common antipathies—to individualism, to economic liberalism, to disagreement with authorities, to birth control, for example—are inadequate content for a positive meeting of minds. (It is only in their most debased forms that socialism and Catholicism find a common content, and that is in anti-semitism. Socialism, as Engels pointed out, is often in danger of degenerating into '*un anti-semitisme à grandes phrases*', which is the hallmark of a certain popular Catholicism.)

More likely than any such positive meeting is the constitution of a joint heresy, reproved and held on the margin by both orthodoxies but consistent enough to provide a respectable buffer state that would reduce the number and the sharpness of confrontations. Teilhard de Chardin, who appears to be the favourite philosopher-theologian of many of the left Catholics anxious to dialogue with communists, and who carries the odour of sanctity for many Marxists, even in Russia,[51] offers a convenient meeting ground. Generous spirits repelled by the aridities of scholasticism and of dialectical materialism find refreshment in the large, if vague, views of the banned Jesuit Father.[52] The presence of Ernst Bloch among the *Neues Forum* patrons of the dialogue might encourage participants to explore further the similarity of the views that Teilhard came to from the Catholic side with those that Bloch arrived at from the Marxist side, and the resemblance of both with the mystic materialism of Giordano Bruno.[53]

The philosophical value of such a joint heresy (which need not be less than that of its Catholic and Marxist constituents taken separately), would be less important than its social function as giving intellectual respectability to the common but uneasy situation of dual allegiance to communist party and Catholic Church. Millions of people are in this situation in the Latin countries, and as long as the spokesmen of the two movements insist as firmly as Cardinal Ottoviani and Leonid Ilichev

[50] Scalfari, *loc. cit.*

[51] See David Barea, 'Sobre el dialogo entre marxistas y catolicos', *Ruedo Iberico*, and L. Lombardo Radice, *loc. cit.* pp. 100–105.

[52] 'It is worth while emphasising the resemblance between the "Point Omega" of Teilhard and the definition that Marx and Lenin give of communism . . .' Roger Garaudy, *Perspectives de l'homme* (Paris, 1959), p. 195.

[53] Ernst Bloch, *Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke* (Berlin, 1952).

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that there can only be blank contradiction between them, it is presumably an uncomfortable situation. If a small but eminent minority were to maintain otherwise, whatever official leaders continued to say, this could make it possible for more Catholics to support the communist parties in Europe and Latin America. In the particular case of Italy, it could help the communists to win over the left wing of the ramshackle Christian-Democrat motley. Indeed, political adversaries see nothing in the whole Catholic-communist dialogue but a plan to disintegrate the Christian-Democrats 'with the aid of the Pope and the left Catholics', with a view to killing the Left-Centre government and, perhaps, of gaining Italy for the neutralist cause with Vatican blessings.

THOSE would be extensive consequences indeed to flow from what after all remains the quest for an ideological truce, of interest to unhappy minorities in both movements. Before taking those consequences as probable, one would do well to recall that the relations of Catholicism with communism are not those of faith with reason, nor even of one disembodied faith with another, but of one institution with another. Thus they involve specific institutional conflicts not susceptible of philosophic mediation. In particular, the Church in Italy is the owner of considerable property, the administrator of an educational system, and the possessor, through the Concordat, of extensive civil rights. On all such issues, as the continuing clashes between the Polish Church and communists show,[54] it is inevitable that it should encounter grave difficulties with the communists and with any government supported by that party. The election campaign in Italy in coming months will illustrate how such concrete affairs can stand in the way of the dialogue initiated by ideologues. It might even show that the main conclusion so far drawn from the dialogue is the reverse of the truth: that ideological compromise is possible, and could go quite far at the periphery, but that attempts at circumscribed political cooperation prove impossible because of incompatible material interests.

As to property, it is clear that although the Church hedges in the notion of private ownership with reservations about social duty that are unacceptable to the theorists of liberal capitalism, it is nevertheless a defender of private property against the cardinal economic doctrines of the communists. Yet it is less its ideas about property that are at stake than its own property. The Church does not conceive of its vast possessions as private property, but as the source of the revenues it needs for its vast obligations. As those obligations are assumed by the state (in education, poor relief, hospitals, etc.), the state claims those revenues for itself, i.e. it moves to expropriate Church property. This was already true of the liberal state and is infinitely more relevant to the socialist state. This sows the seeds of conflict between the Church

[54] Concerning recent disputes over taxation of Church revenues and state control over catechism classes, see Bernard Margueritte in *Le Monde*, 11 November 1967.

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and the communists, a conflict whose proportions in countries like Italy and Spain would be commensurate with the importance of the Church's wealth there.

The monopoly that the Catholic Church enjoys in primary education in Italy, and Catholicism's constitutionally consecrated status as 'the base and the crown' of Italian education, provide another inevitable point of conflict. The lay parties have already subjected that monopoly to attack, and the communists will have to take up a position on the dispute as it becomes more lively over the next few years. If their position is consistent with the Soviet doctrine of 'separation of church from state and of school from church', it cannot fail to cause trouble.

Then, on the matter of revision of the Concordat, which is certain to be one of the main issues in the Italian elections this year, the position of the communists will be no less embarrassing. As has been said, they are regarded by the lay parties as responsible for the incorporation of the Concordat into the constitution and hence for the anomaly of the perpetuation of fascist social dispensations under the republic.[55] Ever since 1946 the communists have offered varying, and laboured, explanations of their behaviour on that occasion,[56] yet they have consistently blocked, as 'provocative', 'maximalist', or 'futile', the efforts of the lay parties to have the Concordat abrogated. It was the invoking of the Concordat's provision making Rome a 'sacred city' in order to prevent the staging there of Rolf Hochhuth's play, *The Deputy*, early in 1965 (the actors were actually jailed briefly) that provoked a determined bid by the secular parties to have the Concordat at least revised. On that question, as on the related move to introduce into Italy a form of divorce, the communists in the next two years will have the choice between alienating the Catholic sympathies acquired in the last seven years of the dialogue, and, on the other hand, risking the scorn of the non-confessional parties, the other communist parties and the Russians, by siding with the Church on education, on divorce, on taxation of Church revenues, and on the fascist Concordat.

Not all their embarrassments come from that side. The treatment of religion in Russia and Poland will continue to be a handicap to the Italian, as to all western, communists in their efforts to win the sympathies of Catholics. So far, they have sought to meet this by speaking out ever more plainly against the Russians and by emphasising the independence of each 'national way to socialism'; to that extent, the courting of the Catholics is a solvent of international communist unity. Lombardo Radice said, 'I think it is quite mistaken of the Italian Catholics of socialist inclinations to put off collaboration with the Italian communists until the day the Soviet Union corrects its present attitude towards believers. The autonomy of the communist parties is a fact

[55] See the reminiscences of Lelio Basso, president of the PSIUP, and Mauro Ferri, president of the parliamentary group of the PSI, in *L'Espresso*, 15 October 1967.

[56] Giovanni Malagodi recalls one in *L'Espresso*, 15 October 1967; for others see *Il Dialogo alla prova*, pp. 171–2, 328–31.

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no intelligent person can any longer doubt. It is a real autonomy, not just because it is proclaimed but because it is made actual in the elaboration of a line, of a political and ideal revolutionary strategy, that is quite obviously original and autonomous. The guarantee of religious liberty that the Italian Communist Party offers to believers is " the Italian way to socialism ".' [57] Such protestations, however firm and however uncomplimentary to the Russians, will remain unconvincing in the view of most Catholics, who tend to retort that the difference between Russian and Italian communists may not be that the former are wedded to monolithism and the latter to pluralism, but that the first are in power and the second not.

What that incredulity brings home to communists is that no assurances of religious liberty are taken seriously until institutional guarantees are envisaged. It is not constitutions, laws, and programmes that assure religious or any other liberty, as the Stalinist experience under the world's most democratic constitution showed, but live, independent institutions that have the material possibility of defending rights when they are infringed. In other words, to demand religious freedom is to call in question the notion of the one-party state. This is what Luciano Gruppi admits: ' It is, in sum, a matter of getting beyond an historical situation where the affirmation of the principle of liberty of conscience has not been enough to avoid the inferiority in practice of believers, because one single ideology has been institutionalised. It is a matter of working towards a situation in which the liberty of conscience will possess, not only at the level of religious organisations but also of political, social, and cultural organisations, the instruments it needs to protect itself and affirm itself '.[58] Communist conversion to that sound doctrine will be seen to be complete when communists concede that pluralism, like Christian charity, must begin at home, when, that is, they liberalise the internal operations of their own party. At that point, they will be committed to criticising Russia not just for its treatment of this or that religious minority, but for the very conception of the one-party, one-ideology state.

The Italian communists are on the way towards that position and since it was the question of religion that set them on it (their attitude on the Chinese question was simply a deduction from the stand they took on religion), it is worth noting that they would find all these issues easier to deal with if they would consent to abandon the patently inadequate Marxist ' theory ' of religion, the arbitrary assertion of the fourth Thesis on Feuerbach in particular. Only a sort of religious veneration would make men go on repeating this century-old assertion that is so plainly at variance with the facts about numerous religions, facts that have been brought out in that century by psycho-analysis and by the sociology of religion. To insist that religion is the ideal reflection of

[57] *Il Dialogo alla prova*, p. 110.
[58] Cf. B. Bociurkiw, *loc. cit.* p. 63.

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social contradictions and that it will vanish when they are resolved, and that meanwhile it is an opiate that dulls the will to social change; to speak indeed of 'religion' as though there were only one, as though the Russian Baptists were the same as the corrupt Orthodox clergy of Tsarist days or as though even Orthodoxy was not capable of social change over such momentous years as the last fifty—this is to disarm oneself before the question is tackled. Yet even Italian communists piously repeat 'the Marxist theory of religion' as though this were a substitute for study of the facts. One had hopes that this inadequate theory would be discarded when it was shown, in Russia as in Italy, that it could be turned against the Soviet state itself: if religion persists so tenaciously in Russia, this must reflect the failures and contradictions of post-revolutionary society. Instead, the theory was retained and the logical corollary denied, its authors being condemned for the 'incorrect conclusion that the very same reasons which nourish religious prejudices in capitalist countries operate also in a socialist society'. Yet that might be the beginning of wisdom.

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BONN AND PANKOW

Intra-German Politics

Melvin Croan

CONTRASTED with many another of the world's many trouble-spots, Germany may well appear quiescent. Yet outward appearances may well conceal potential for explosiveness of a rather high order of magnitude. Few assumptions about world affairs stand in greater need of critical examination than those comfortable commonplaces upon which even some of the best informed Anglo-Saxon opinion relies whenever it is prone to dismiss the German problem entirely. However widespread it may be, no view is quite so misleading nor potentially more pernicious than the notion that the partition of Germany between East and West serves to stabilise the European political scene. Actually, the very opposite assessment would seem to be much more in keeping with the developing realities of the situation.

In a sense, Germany's division into two separate states and divergent societies may once have registered a kind of stability and order on the continent. The temporarily stabilised order was, of course, that imposed by the Cold War. Historians may argue about its precise chronological demarcation, but no one can doubt that the international political system of the Cold War, characterised by a rigid bipolarity of power and a direct political confrontation and unmitigated ideological hostility between East and West, no longer exists in anything like its classic contours. Be that as it may, the very fact that the two German states and societies were themselves the by-product of bipolarity at its most rigid and the Cold War at its most intense, now bequeaths a doubly disruptive legacy.

In the first place, both successor Germanies have been—and in many respects still remain—repositories of the dogmatic Cold War orthodoxies that attended their birth. Thus each Germany, in its own way, tends to serve as an obstacle to the attainment of a viable post-Cold War international order in Europe. Secondly, but no less significantly, the internal structures of both Germanies are highly vulnerable to any attenuation of the original international bipolarity that lent them initial shape, coherence, and a sense of domestic legitimacy and international purpose in the eyes of their respective political elites. As a result, those changes in the bipolar international milieu that are already in progress challenge their domestic stability and, ultimately, may even threaten their survival. Small wonder, then, that intra-German politics, which once seemed conspicuous by its very absence, should now show undeniable signs of reactivation and suggest the likelihood of movement and change. The more reason, therefore, to scrutinise the trends that have already emerged and the tendencies that may lie just beneath the

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surface in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and to try to assess their implications for European international politics more generally.

PARADOXICAL though it may seem, the structure of the de facto East-West 'settlement' in Germany and, indeed, the entire fabric of the enforced Cold War order in Europe, began to come apart with the very event that seemed to many at the time to seal Germany's national division. That event was, of course, the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. Viewed in retrospect, it is now clear that the Wall set in motion forces that were to belie the ostensible stabilising effect attributed to it by those western commentators who sought to put the best possible face on what was, after all, an audacious move by the communists and a major political victory for them. Irrespective of whether the order to throw up the Wall was motivated by defensive or aggressive designs, its very erection proved once again the validity of a much tested theorem of intra-German politics: the impossibility of stabilising one part of the divided nation without simultaneously threatening to destabilise the other part.

There can be no question that the Berlin Wall did introduce a measure of stability into East Germany's domestic affairs. By effectively removing the option of westward flight, it compelled the East German population to make its peace with the SED regime. Moreover, by arresting a highly damaging exodus of skilled labour, it provided the necessary, although not yet the sufficient, conditions for the GDR's subsequent economic progress. Without the Wall, it is highly improbable that East Germany would have attained the standard of living it enjoys today or would have realised, in spite of persistent ideological obstruction and recurrent bureaucratic ineptitude, the economic potential that makes the GDR an industrial power to be reckoned with, not only within the eastern orbit, but increasingly in the world at large. All this aside, however, it is simply not true, as some wishful western writers would have it, that the Wall prompted East Germany's communist leadership to turn inward to the exclusion of any further concern with the larger 'German problem'. On the contrary, although the first order of East German priorities after the Wall went up shifted to domestic construction, the leadership never lost sight of the inherent rivalry between the two German states and in the first flush of new-found self-confidence even began to challenge West Germany to renewed struggle for the allegiance of the German nation as a whole. After the Wall as before, the SED leaders remained fully attentive to both the promise and the menace of political developments within the Federal Republic. As Hermann Matern, one of Ulbricht's long-time colleagues, said in a rare moment of uninhibited candour, 'Naturally, we are of the opinion that we are also equally responsible for developments in West Germany and therefore will interfere in its politics as far as our own powers

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enable us to do so'.[1] With that unfailing sensitivity to political change instilled by their own ideological upbringing, East Germany's leaders served notice, if any were needed, that Wall or no Wall, they could be expected to continue their engagement in intra-German politics, from which there was no real escape anyhow. So much the better, from their point of view, that in the German version of 'competitive coexistence' between East and West, the GDR could breathe a little more easily by virtue of having 'secured the border'.

As for West Germany, the first reaction to the Wall, it will be recalled, was anything but stable or passive. A sense of bitter frustration swept over the population. Charges of betrayal by the western powers because of their inability to prevent and their seeming unwillingness to counter the Eastern coup, were frequent, and so were impassioned if unrealistic outcries to the effect that 'the Wall must go'. Yet it was only when the popular uproar subsided that the deeper unsettling effects of the Wall upon West Germany began to emerge with complete clarity. At stake was nothing less than the very raison d'être of the Federal Republic.

Alfred Grosser has pointedly remarked that 'the Federal Republic was born in 1949 as a twin sister of the Atlantic Alliance. Their father was the Cold War'.[2] The various consequences of both the kinship and the ancestry deserve full recognition. For the Federal Republic's essential political rationale comprises not only the claim to stand for Germany as a whole but also the anticipation of national reunification along western democratic constitutional lines. Before the Wall, both the claim and the anticipation enjoyed widespread popular support in West Germany. This support buttressed the Federal Republic's membership in the western alliance system. As a corollary, German public opinion generally took it for granted that the Federal Republic's western partners shared its national aspirations to the full. From that there followed in turn an unspoken assumption that there would never be a meaningful détente between West and East until the attainment of German reunification (or, at the bare minimum, tangible progress towards that goal). The popular hold of all these postulates was demonstrated by the degree to which Adenauer's policies, calling for a 'policy of strength' in alliance with the West and promising 'reunification in freedom' (i.e. a collapse of the East German communist regime or the withdrawal of Soviet power, thought to amount to the same thing), had won the day over all their domestic German critics.

By challenging all the Federal Republic's official postulates and shaking popular confidence in the whole framework of assumptions that underpinned them, the Berlin Wall necessarily called into question the political foundations of the Federal Republic itself. Of course, it was not

1 *Neues Deutschland*, 18 March, 1962, as quoted in Alois Riklin and Klaus Westen, eds., *Selbsterzeugnisse des SED Regimes* (Cologne, 1963), p. 19.
2 Alfred Grosser, *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bilanz einer Entwicklung* (Tübingen, 1967), p. 12.

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to be expected that so highly institutionalised and vigorously governed a political entity as West Germany under Chancellor Adenauer would collapse. Rather, what ought to have been feared was a slow erosion of West Germany's internal political stability as the Federal Republic was brought face to face with the novel circumstances of intra-German competition in a changing context of East-West relations.

As it happened, so long as Adenauer remained Chancellor, the Federal Republic's Cold War tenets continued to be upheld, at least officially. In actual practice, however, as both legal purists and Cold War strategists were quick to point out, absolute positions were often implicitly compromised in negotiations between West German and East German authorities concerning such humanitarian matters as issuing holiday passes to enable West Berliners to visit their relatives in the East. Much more significant, even under Adenauer, the Federal Republic's official tenets began to lose much of their previous hold on West German public opinion. Long before the political parties dared to speak on the basic issues, certain opinion leaders were already loudly bemoaning the 'credibility gap' between the Federal Republic's doctrinal pretensions and its all too evident inability to alleviate the consequences of enforced national division, much less hasten the day of German reunification. Sensing a shift in popular attitudes, the political parties followed suit. Not only from the SPD, then in opposition to the Government, and from the FDP, always anxious to make a display of its 'national concern', but even from the CDU, or at least from one wing of it, there came a succession of proposals, if not quite plans, for a 'fresh approach' to the German problem and unilateral West German initiatives towards the GDR.[3] Not surprisingly, all these partisan pronouncements, coming on top of the real or imagined forfeiture of bits and pieces of the Federal Republic's once unassailable legal position by Bonn's own negotiators served only to conjure up the spectre of a total erosion of West Germany's essential political rationale. West German champions of the Cold War status quo loudly lamented the growing threat, but no more so than did reform-minded critics of the Federal Republic's stand-pat policies; each group thereby made its own sizable contribution to a growing sense of rudderless West German ship of state. How to arrest the erosion, with all its deeply disruptive potential consequences for the Federal Republic's domestic political stability, while making the necessary changes in basic policy matters pertaining to the German problem, emerged as a crucial issue at the end of the Adenauer-Erhard era. It remains an unresolved dilemma right up to the present day.

DESPITE the hopes that attended its investiture at the end of 1966, Bonn's present Grand Coalition (CDU-SPD) Government has fared no better than its predecessors in the search for a formula with which

[3] For further treatment of these proposals, see Melvin Croan, 'Party Politics and the Wall', *Survey*, October 1966.

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to tackle the perplexing problem of how to deal effectively with the GDR without at the same time undermining the Federal Republic's own political position. Its failure cannot be attributed to any lack of awareness of the multiple dimensions of the problem. Nor can it be chalked up to any unwillingness to strike out on previously untried tacks. On the contrary, the Grand Coalition prides itself on being a 'government of national unity' in command of overwhelming parliamentary and therefore presumably popular support, and, on this basis, both willing and able to draw upon the best thinking to tackle the necessary reform of all-German policy. Moreover, the new government set out with evident determination to leave, in Theo Sommer's apt phrase, 'the trenches of the Cold War'.[4] It also determined to do so pragmatically; that is, to discard the inhibitions imposed by formal juridical doctrine wherever it threatened to impede policy innovation and political initiative. Unfortunately, good intentions do not always produce desired results.

The most noteworthy result of Bonn's novel frame of mind and fresh approach has been registered in West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, that is, in the Federal Republic's relations with the communist states of eastern Europe. By quietly dismantling the Hallstein Doctrine, which had prohibited diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR, the Federal Republic has been able to establish diplomatic relations with Rumania and since then resumed them with Yugoslavia. Although hopes for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia proved premature, West German diplomatic, trade, and cultural activities have been stepped up with respect to both these countries. Indeed to the extent to which all members of the sometime Soviet bloc might prove receptive, any one of them would be eligible for previously unthinkable favours from Bonn. The Federal Republic has adopted an unmistakably new tone and a markedly different style towards communist eastern Europe as a whole, and all this is evident in Bonn's treatment of outstanding issues between particular east European states and Germany. Thus, although the Kiesinger-Brandt government has stopped short of outright acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's final eastern boundary, its official pronouncements on the subject omit the homage traditionally paid by previous West German governments to Germany's 1937 borders. With respect to Czechoslovakia, Kiesinger has gone much farther than ever before—although still not the entire distance demanded by Prague—in renouncing the 1938 Munich agreement as 'invalid'. While unfolding its new approach towards eastern Europe, Bonn has also sought to counter Soviet fears that West Germany's new, activist *Ostpolitik* might be directed either against the Soviet Union or else towards furthering divisive tendencies throughout eastern Europe as a whole. Finally, and quite significantly, the Grand Coalition has disclaimed any intention of seeking to 'isolate the GDR',

[4] Theo Sommer, 'Bonn Changes Course', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1967, p. 488.

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a strategy that had been advocated by some American protagonists of a greater German involvement in eastern Europe, but one that has earned almost universal disapproval on the part of West German opinion, on the quite reasonable ground that such a policy might only serve to entrench the Ulbricht regime and thus further deepen Germany's division.[5]

With the strategy of isolating the GDR ruled out, what conception was to be followed with respect to intra-German relations? Actually, apart from rhetoric about the need to 'preserve and extend contacts', 'build bridges', and 'risk initiatives'—all taken over from the vocabulary of critics of previous Bonn administrations—no grand strategy has emerged at all. Those who purport to see the outline of such a strategy point to the Grand Coalition's acceptance of the view that although national reunification must remain the ultimate objective, the immediate task is to render division more 'tolerable'. They also call attention to Bonn's readiness to deal directly with East Berlin on the basis of what Willy Brandt has called 'regulated coexistence', that is, to seek interim solutions to practical problems by acknowledging the existence of the Ulbricht regime, without at the same time recognising the legitimacy of the GDR as a 'second German state' or relinquishing Bonn's own claim to sole representation of the entire German nation. As concrete evidence of this new attitude, they cite such matters as the Government's direct appeal to the seventh SED congress and the Kiesinger-Stoph exchange of letters, in the course of which the Federal Chancellor offered direct negotations at the State Secretary level.

Splendid as all this may sound in theory, it has yet to produce any tangible results. The reason is quite simple. Ulbricht and company have turned a deaf ear to Bonn's overtures. Whatever the degree of accommodation that may perhaps have been urged by one or another faction or ranking personage behind the closed doors of the highest SED party councils, the official East German position has come to insist that Bonn accept its maximum demands, including recognition of the GDR, as a precondition for discussion of precisely the kind of intra-German measures with which Bonn would like to deal while avoiding the recognition issue. Fearing the possibility of disruptive domestic consequences within the GDR, and yet also doubtless sensing the opportunity of further eroding Bonn's essential political rationale, the SED has hit upon the formula of 'no negotiations without recognition' and, incidentally, no reunification without a prior, thorough-going 'democratic revolution' in the West. As a result of this escalation of East German demands, even those practical measures designed to alleviate the human suffering caused by national division, such as the holiday pass agreements that had earlier been hammered out, are no longer within the reach of West German policy. Optimists in Bonn and elsewhere may profess to see in the mere willingness of GDR premier, Willy

[5] See Theo Sommer, ed., *Denken an Deutschland* (Hamburg, 1966), especially Part IV.

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Stoph, to correspond with Chancellor Kiesinger (even though in polemical tones) a glimmer of hope for the future. That is scant consolation for the present, when Bonn's initiatives seem to have run into the sand.

THE present stalemate notwithstanding, all signs point to an expansion rather than a contraction of intra-German politics, provided only that the term 'politics' be conceived properly. Obviously, it need not be synonymous with the establishment of formal contacts between the Federal Republic and the GDR. Even in the absence of such contacts, intra-German politics persists in the interplay between the two Germanies in their respective domestic settings and international alliance structures.

How, then, do the two aspects mentioned at the beginning of this essay—the natural tendency of each German state to be a repository of Cold War orthodoxies and the implicit threat to both Germanies posed by the disintegration of post-war alliance systems—figure in the present phase of intra-German politics? At first glance, one would be hard put to it to make a convincing case against the Grand Coalition government in Bonn as a repository of Cold War orthodoxies. (Needless to say, such a case has been made by Soviet and East German commentators, but they are scarcely the most reliable or objective interpreters of the matter.) If anything, Bonn's Grand Coalition has been stumbling all over itself in an effort to strike out on new paths more nearly in line with efforts elsewhere in the West to achieve a relaxation of tensions and perhaps, ultimately, an East-West settlement in Europe. All well and good—except, of course, that the desired reciprocity has simply not been forthcoming from East Germany. On the contrary, with each more moderate pronouncement from Bonn, with each successive initiative undertaken by the Federal Republic, East Berlin has only stiffened its own stand the more. What is involved can best be described as a reversal of roles. If once it was the Federal Republic which refused to deal with the East German communist authorities, except perhaps on arrangement for the liquidation of the GDR, now it is the GDR that refuses to deal with West German authorities, except on the basis of unconditional acceptance of Germany's division and conceivably much more, including demilitarisation and revolutionary transformation in the West; terms that amount to a call for the liquidation of the Federal Republic. If once it was the East Germans who pressed for all-German contacts and the West Germans who professed to see in the offer an insidious scheme for subversion, now it is the West Germans who propose contacts and the East Germans who shun them like the plague. Whereas once it was the Federal Republic which proclaimed the Hallstein Doctrine to throw up barriers against the GDR, now it is the German Democratic Republic that is attempting to dam the spread of West German influence in eastern Europe by proclaiming a kind of Hallstein Doctrine in reverse, that is, by advancing the contention that no communist country should enter

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into diplomatic relations with Bonn unless and until the Federal Republic first recognises the GDR unconditionally. In sum, it seems almost a 'law' of intra-German politics that the more flexible the policy of the one Germany, the more rigidly orthodox the Cold War response of the other.

To leave matters at that, however, would not be to do full justice to the complexities of the intra-German dialectic. Whether or not there are, as is sometimes asserted, less dogmatic positions behind the scene in East Berlin, there are unmistakably reactionary streams among the many currents which flow in West Germany. A powerful body of political opinion in Bonn still regards overtures to East Berlin and contacts with Ulbricht to be at the best futile and at worst downright dangerous. From the very start of the Grand Coalition, adherents of this school have tacitly opposed fresh initiatives and, in some instances, may have been instrumental in sabotaging their implementation. More recently, the same body of opinion has begun to express itself more openly and indeed quite vocally, as in the storm that recently broke over the head of Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz when his confidential memorandum about further steps towards East Germany was leaked to the public.[6] It has also been evident in the easy reversion to Cold War certainties which has lately taken place within CDU ranks, as well as in the renewed vigour with which outmoded and seemingly forgotten postulates of the Adenauer era have come once again to be publicly championed. By its refusal to meet the initiatives of Bonn's Grand Coalition, the SED leadership, for its part, is tacitly supporting the growth of reactionary political reflexes in West Germany. In this instance one must acknowledge a second 'law' of intra-German politics, one which has been frequently tested and often proved valid in other political contexts as well; namely, extremes feed extremes.

By the implicit support it has rendered to Cold War doctrinaires in West Germany, the SED has demonstrated only one of the ways in which, in the present conditions of political flux, it may function as a significant influence upon and perhaps even serve as the ultimate arbiter of West German politics. For the recrudescense of Cold War dogmatism is only one important recent tendency in West German political opinion. Another, no less significant, development has been the crystallisation of a segment of opinion frankly in favour of going the whole distance to accommodate Ulbricht's demands. Such sentiments are not confined to the German 'New Left', much less to certain publicists and editors who for some time have enjoyed a notoriety of sorts by virtue of their disdain for the Federal Republic and all its juridical pretensions. On the

[6] Schütz has been Chairman of the quasi-public body, *Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland* and an avid champion in his own right of new approaches to reunification. One of his several tracts has recently appeared in English translation with the title, *Rethinking German Policy* (New York, 1967). For a fuller account of the controversy raised by his memorandum, 'Is there still a German nation?' see *Die Zeit* (North American edition), 12 December 1967, and *Die Welt*, 6, 7, 9, and 11 December 1967.

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contrary, this opinion has a much wider potential constituency. Champions of recognition have appeared within the trade unions and are fighting for control of at least one of West Germany's traditional political parties, the FDP.[7] As a result, Chancellor Kiesinger has felt obliged to throw up belated defences against the threat from his left flank while simultaneously trying to secure the government against doctrinaire reactionaries on the right. The Chancellor's initial denunciation of certain unnamed 'theorists of recognition' and his subsequent attacks on a phantom 'recognition party' suggest how troubled is the 'middle path' to the German problem chosen by his regime. This situation clearly lends itself to further exploitation by the SED. The emergence of the 'recognitionists' in West Germany was made almost inevitable by virtue of the Grand Coalition's initial promise of progress on the German problem and the SED's ability to frustrate the hopes that were kindled by that promise. Should the GDR choose to appear even slightly less intractable towards the Federal Republic in the future, it could greatly strengthen the hand of the recognitionist element. In fact, merely by standing pat for the moment, the SED heightens frustrations in West Germany and, in so doing, may well be contributing to the same outcome. No amount of belated exhortations against 'illusions', and no calls for 'patience' by spokesmen for the Grand Coalition seem able to turn the trick, for the spectre of recognition has already shown itself to be a creature of flesh and blood.

FOR those non-Germans who may still find the significance that Bonn attaches to the matter of recognition slightly baffling, it is not enough merely to point to the legalistic bent of the German political mind. For by going to the core of the Federal Republic's essential political rationale, the single issue of the GDR's recognition by the Federal Republic immediately conjures up all the larger stakes of intra-German politics: that is, the political stability of both German states and, ultimately, their very survival. Certainly, the East German leadership has been acutely conscious of these stakes and rightly fearful lest contacts between the Federal Republic and the GDR prove disruptive domestically. This much was apparent in the fate of the public discussions between ranking figures of the East German SED and the West German SPD, originally proposed in early 1966 by the East German side, only to be finally rejected by the SED on a rather flimsy pretext.[8] Doubtbless much the same fear of disruptive domestic repercussions lies behind the reluctance of the East German authorities to publish so much as a single one of the letters dispatched during 1967 by Chancellor Kiesinger to his East German counterpart. Perhaps the propensity to risk-taking within the top echelons of the SED may be

[7] On the FDP, see *Die Welt*, 8 January 1968.

[8] The projected SED-SPD discussions have been well treated by Gerhard Wettig, 'The SED-SPD Dialogue: Communist Political Strategy in Germany', *Orbis*, Summer 1967.

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greater than what has been displayed so far in official East German policy. For those observers with a Kremlinological bent of mind, there is much fruitful material in the many, often contradictory, pronouncements which have emanated from East Berlin over the last year as to whether, despite the existence of two German states, the German nation as such still persists or has been replaced by two separate *nations*, with the East German population singled out as a distinctive *Staatsvolk*.[9] Yet to concentrate on such manifestations of division of opinion within the SED leadership, tantalising though the subject may be, is to run the risk of missing a major point: in the last analysis, the political dictatorship exercised by the SED in East Germany may be much better equipped to weather the present phase of intra-German politics than the political democracy of the Federal Republic. At the very least, the SED commands a network of control mechanisms against the fragmentation of political opinion and the disintegration of internal structures that is denied its western constitutional-democratic rival by virtue of the Federal Republic's very nature.

The contrast between the prospects for each of the two German regimes seems further heightened when one turns from purely domestic considerations to look at their respective international alliance settings. Both the GDR and the Federal Republic suffer from a traditional German malaise, *cauchemar des coalitions*, that is, the fear of political isolation and hostile encirclement. The greater the success of either German state in making good its claims on its own behalf, the deeper the trauma of the other. Hence the panic that recurrently attended West German diplomacy in the late fifties and early sixties, and the obstinacy with which Bonn clung fast to the Hallstein Doctrine in the pre-Grand Coalition period, whenever the GDR threatened to make diplomatic inroads into the third world of newly independent, self-styled neutralist states. Hence, again, the hysteria that accompanied the GDR's enunciation of a 'Hallstein Doctrine in reverse' in 1967, when the Federal Republic threatened to score a diplomatic break-through of its own in eastern Europe. Symptomatic also have been the tensions that have erupted between West Germany and its western alliance partners on the one side, and between East Germany and its communist neighbours on the other, whenever either larger alliance or one or another nominal ally has seemed to be relaxing its hostility towards its particular German adversary.

BUT who is isolating whom at the present stage of intra-German politics? The answer to that question depends in real measure on one's assessment of the viability of the respective alliance systems to which each of the German states belongs. On balance, disintegrative forces may well have inflicted greater long-run damage upon the western

[9] See Th.(eo) S.(ommer), 'Doch eine Nation', *Die Zeit* (North American edition), 2 January 1968.

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alliance than upon its eastern counterpart. Suffice it to note that, despite the undeniable erosion of Soviet political authority throughout eastern Europe as a whole and the serious difficulties that the Soviet Union has encountered in its relations with the communist states of eastern Europe's southern tier, the northern tier has held relatively firm.[10] Moreover, despite the surface frenzy and deep-seated fears that have accompanied East Germany's recent representations in various east European capitals against Bonn's activist *Ostpolitik*, it would be wrong to neglect the tangible results that these East German efforts have achieved. At least for the present, the GDR has largely succeeded in securing its own rear and blocking the Federal Republic's political offensive in the East. This, surely, is the deeper political significance of the series of formal bilateral treaties of 'friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance' concluded during 1967 between the GDR and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Much more important, Ulbricht has also succeeded in enlisting the Soviet Union's active support for his heightened claims and more vitriolic campaign against West Germany. Superficially amicable contacts between Foreign Minister Brandt and the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn aside, the last year of Soviet-German relations has been marked by several sustained Soviet propaganda salvos against the Federal Republic and everything for which it is said to stand. Perhaps the most notable feature of recent Soviet attacks on West Germany has been Moscow's effort to emphasise the electoral successes of the right-wing National Democratic Party and to interpret them as a sign of the resurgence of nazism. By so doing, the Soviet Union has demonstrated its readiness to align itself with Ulbricht's own deepest aspiration of discrediting the Federal Republic in western eyes, and isolating West Germany from its alliance partners.

As if all of this were not menacing enough, there is yet another, potentially much more explosive, element in the German calculus. It is, of course, the continued anomaly of Berlin. The western presence in Berlin, under arrangements which the Soviet Union no longer recognises, has been implicitly undermined in recent years by the activities of the very West German politicians who would be the first to invoke the Allied presence in the face of a direct Soviet or East German threat to West Berlin. More specifically, while the SPD organisation in Berlin has called upon the city to utilise its 'special status' in order to make its own approaches to the East, the CDU organisation in Berlin has called for West Berlin's integration into the Federal Republic. Both proposals serve to compromise allied rights in Berlin, and to invite Ulbricht to try a renewed test of wills there. In fact, something of precisely this sort may lie behind the claims of East German spokesmen of recent months that the whole of Berlin lies

[10] The northern tier consists of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and, in most instances it would seem, Hungary as well. For the tier concept as applied to recent developments in eastern Europe as a whole, see J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (New York, 1966).

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in the territory of the GDR whose sovereign power will determine the city's future. While the Soviet Union need not necessarily endorse whatever specific aggressive designs may be implicit in such an East German assessment, the possibility of the Soviet Union being dragged along in support of any such designs may be inherent in the situation in which they will be unveiled. The recent Soviet note on Berlin suggests that the issue can always be reactivated.

On the other side, the support proferred West Germany by its alliance partners has necessarily been limited. Apart from formal rejoinders to Soviet charges and rhetorical reaffirmations of faith in West German democracy and the righteousness of the Federal Republic's foreign policy, there is little else concrete to report. On the negative side of the ledger, however, the Federal Republic continues to be a prime target of Franco-American rivalry. The redirection of American concern from Europe to the Far East has not exactly helped matters either. If anything, the net result of this rivalry and of the diminution of American involvement in Europe has been to increase nationalist self-concern in the Federal Republic. The dangers inherent in this development ought not to be minimised. As Henry Kissinger has rightly observed, 'the best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany' has always been 'to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself'.[11] Obviously, to the extent to which that 'something larger', which once presented itself in the form of the western alliance system and the western political community, continues to be subject to erosion, Germany will increasingly lose its hold on the larger stake. This in turn may well have seriously adverse repercussions upon domestic political life in the Federal Republic in the long run, while in the short run it seems almost certain to compound nationalist frustrations consequent upon the absence of any tangible progress towards a solution of the German problem.

* * *

Alarmist notes have been struck so frequently in the past with respect to postwar Germany that it is entirely understandable that they should now fall on deaf ears. In any case, is it not also at least conceivable that new European structures will arise to take the place of outmoded Cold War alliances and thus defuse the German issue? Such, indeed, is the hope of many non-alarmists both outside Germany and within the Federal Republic as well.[12] The vision of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic taking their place side by side in cooperative ventures within something akin to a United States of Europe cannot fail to exert its attractions. The only problem is, unfortunately, that several major facets of present-day European international politics are rather seriously askew.

[11] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York, 1965), p. 222.
[12] For one recent example, see Klaus Mehnert, *Der deutsche Standort* (Stuttgart, 1967)

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For one thing, so long as Moscow strives to foster political fragmentation in western Europe while simultaneously seeking to preserve Soviet hegemony over eastern Europe, Soviet policy is bound to continue deliberately to exploit and exacerbate the German issue. More seriously, the attainment of a post-Cold War supra-national European political community is necessarily predicated upon the decline of nationalism, whereas in fact all signs point to the resurgence of nationalism as a major political force within Germany no less than elsewhere on the European continent. While this development by itself need not automatically produce a radicalisation of German politics, it is hardly the best augury for any lessening of the competition between the two German states for the national allegiance of Germany as a whole. Those who wish Germany well—and in view of Germany's crucial role in the European system one can scarcely afford the luxury of being anything other than a well-wisher—need not underestimate the political maturity of the Germans in tackling their own problems. By the same token, however, one ought not to minimise the innate complexities nor overlook the potential explosiveness of the basic problem. The barest necessary beginning will have been made with the recognition that Germany persists as a problem, and one that will not simply go away, much less be resolved, through lack of attention.

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GERMANY'S STUDENT REVOLT

Harold Hurwitz

TODAY, for the first time in the brief history of the German Federal Republic and its insular foothold in West Berlin, there has emerged on the political left a radical minority which seeks to undermine, through a strategy of 'enlightening' provocations, the self-assurance of German society and its confidence in government based on a parliamentary democracy. Here as elsewhere, the initiators of the New Left are young intellectuals and students. So far, their success in mobilising a following has been limited largely to launching student revolts in many German universities. Especially in West Berlin, but also in Hamburg and Frankfurt, these revolts have already taken on the character of mass movements. A protest-issue on Berlin's Free University can easily turn out 3,000 and mobilise as many as 8,000 demonstrators. In traditionalist Tübingen, where one-third of the students belongs to *Korps*, nearly as many are said to be turning towards the left. In Bonn the police registered 25 demonstrations during the first six months of 1967: against legislation to give the government emergency powers, against 'genocide' in Vietnam, the Shah of Persia, the *coup d'état* in Greece, the kidnapping of Korean and the arrest of Libyan fellow-students.

In their off-campus activities the radical students have found allies in some trade-union and social-democratic youth groups, and in a growing number of Republican Clubs organised by radical former students and professional intellectuals, while among their juniors, several thousand secondary-school pupils follow the students' example.

There are many similarities, but also significant differences between New Left revolts by students and young intellectuals in Germany and in other industrialised countries. All have been alienated by and attack certain aspects of modern civilisation: mass universities, the manipulation of mass culture, the growth of technocracy, established parties and parliamentary systems which, to their mind, do not function democratically. As minority movements they trade ideas, styles, and above all, effective techniques of provocation that can 'expose' the repressive aspect of any authority. Nevertheless, each New Left does have special characteristics and significance in the political culture of its country.

The German revolt, for example, is almost desperately intent on calling itself 'scientific', on using the words 'rational', 'dialectical', 'theoretical', whereas American rebels care little for theory. Yet in a matter-of-fact sense the Americans are more philosophical. There is nothing in the German revolt to compare with the American rebels' emphasis on 'love', 'community', or their ethic of 'human warmth';

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although moral indignation is a major source of their motivation, the German students are not preoccupied by the concept of means and ends as a moral problem. They use the techniques of civil disobedience not for ethical reasons but because they seem 'appropriate to the historical situation'. With incomparably less justification than the advocates of black power have in America, the German students say that 'counter-force' is warranted by the force that repressive authority exercises.

It is also politically relevant that the leaders of the German New Left are making it convincing to a growing number of students who do not yet share their more far-reaching ideological convictions that their government and society today are 'nearly authoritarian' or actually 'becoming fascist'. Most often it is their own provocations that provide the evidence. When the authorities take repressive, sometimes arbitrarily violent action against student demonstrations, when citizens become annoyed enough to express intolerant opinions ('put them in work-houses', 'go to East Germany'), this seems proof enough to the young rebels that they are living in an undemocratic system.

Because it is primarily a student movement and because it describes itself as 'Marxist' or even 'Maoist', the New Left has little chance of recruiting a mass following, but as a gadfly movement it is already having far-reaching effects of a somewhat ambiguous nature.

On the one hand, in the course of a year, the student revolt has turned certain problems, that do call for radical reform, into burning issues. Through a strategy of provocations on campus, in the streets, before court-houses and parliament buildings, with alarmed coverage in the press and interviews on television, the student revolt has aroused public interest and created in government and parliament a greater readiness than previously existed to reform the university system, deal with press monopoly, and redraft an antiquated code of criminal law and legal process. On the whole, where realistic issues are concerned, the Establishment has been receptive—if often grudgingly—to criticism by this 'upstart' extra-parliamentary opposition.

On the other hand the reactions of many—although by no means all—German people to student agitation is often alarming. As in Berkeley and Amsterdam, German university administrations, local government and police forces have found it exceedingly difficult to cope with sit-in, sit-down, teach-in, love-in, and the elusive 'provo' tactics. Especially in West Berlin, the major centre, of revolt, but elsewhere as well, officials have vacillated between an authoritarian and a democratic response. Expressing indignation, they at first tend to be repressive and arbitrary; but when faced with the threat of more violent confrontations, sometimes in consequence of police action that is downright brutal, the authorities try out a tolerant, reasoning approach and concede a great deal to the students. This is undermining the respect of many Germans for authority. Not only the older generation, but young

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housewives, workers, and especially policemen call for a more determined and consistent repression of student agitation, interference with traffic, 'happenings' in public places.

TOTALLY oblivious of the fact that they are not more tolerant than their elders when they demonstrate in a wilfully violence-provoking manner in order to prove how intolerant everyone else is, the young German rebels are stripping off the thin democratic veneer of self-satisfaction that covers up the genuine problems of political culture in post-nazi German society. It is a somewhat rigid political and social system, in which authoritarian residues of the past still manifest themselves quite strongly in the structures of certain institutions—particularly in schools and universities—but even more in the values, attitudes, expectations, and social behaviour of all sorts of people.

Since the early 1950s, even on the German left, anti-nazis have tended to concede that self-indulgence in an affluent society has too greatly preoccupied and engaged the energies of a population that had been severely sobered but not yet transformed by the experience of nazi defeat. 'It is probably best', most democratic politicians agreed, 'to let sleeping dogs lie'. The young rebels seem determined to wake up all the sleeping dogs in Germany.

During the past two or three years West Germans and West Berliners have been shaken by new experiences: a modest economic recession (that produces more anxiety than is objectively justified), disillusionment about the chances of German reunification and of political integration in western Europe, the breakdown of Nato unity, and the loss of the security that once came from psychological identification with America as an all-powerful protector. These things have given rise to what is called a peculiar German restlessness (*das deutsche Unbehagen*) and to the emergence of a pseudo-nazi party, the NPD. The young intellectual radicals are trying to shatter the self-assurance of society when its threshold of confidence, and of tolerance, is relatively low.

In arguing with students, it becomes evident that a great many Germans cannot yet cope with the verbalisms, manners, and provocations of deviant minorities; they want, above all, not to be disturbed, and many would seem to prefer a more authoritarian—not a nazi or totalitarian—form of government if one were needed to protect them from harassment by 'outsiders', on the left or extreme right, in their own society.

On the other hand, the shock treatment of student revolts, for which no one was prepared, is providing many Germans with a primary education about the democratic process. It is a test that can form democratic values. A recent opinion poll shows that when considering how to deal with student demonstrators, West Berliners are as prone to favour fairness and tolerance as to advocate repressive measures. Not only

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in the leadership of democratic parties, but also in the general population, sympathy has increased for the problems of students and for their political rights as citizens of the universities and in society.

Despite their minority character, it is not an exaggeration to say that student revolts are submitting the West German polity to a major trial in its development as a democratic system. This applies to the adaptability of its established institutions, which hitherto did not have to reckon with radical extra-parliamentary opposition. It also applies, however, to the ambivalent character of an opposition that is led by young radicals and revolutionaries who believe they are democrats, but who have not been conditioned in a culture—by families, schools, or universities—where firm democratic traditions predominate. Some of them want to replace the parliamentary system, others to influence it.

THE leaders of the SDS, the German Socialist Student Union, who were expelled by the SPD in 1961, were decidedly pragmatic and undoctrinaire in their thinking; their frame of reference was shaped by the problems and dilemmas of democratic socialism in Europe. The break with the SPD left the SDS stranded in the political arena. Although this first generation of the student New Left is criticised by the second for having 'turned inward' to theoretical discussions, in the early years SDS members developed a plan for democratic university reform that is considered to be a model today. They also organised an exhibition, shown in many West German cities about nazi persecution of the Jews.

To the first generation of student radicals, the collapse of nazism and its aftermath had been a formative experience. By 1965 this no longer applied to German students in general. For younger radicals in the SDS a new frame of reference had emerged in which China, Cuba, and Vietnam—not the post-revolutionary, bureaucratic systems of the USSR or East Germany—were the major points of interest. The SDS now had an influential 'Maoist' fraction. Before the student revolt really began, the SDS was led by extremists who imagined they were a persecuted minority in a 'para-fascist system', and some even were making plans to 'go underground'.

On many matters SDS extremists cannot reach other student rebels, but in some ways, the politically active section of the student body is responsive to their irrational political psychology. Generally German student rebels see themselves as democrats, and the nazi past is a burden to them as Germans, and in many cases because they feel their own parents either collaborated or were cowardly. However, they comprehend this in terms of their own present experience with what they consider to be a manipulated society and a repressive state. Thus they are trying to get rid of a double burden: the charge of historical guilt and their own problems in German society. They tend to do this

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without self-scrutiny or self-criticism, and often by espousing theories —' revolution of the Third World ' and ' guerrilla tactics in the cities '— which are so remote from their own society's problems or their own possibilities that these function as self-deceptive projections of ideological identification. Often they seem to identify more in the manner of ' victims ' than in the way radical reformers or genuine revolutionaries do; there is much self-pity and an irrational defensiveness in their attitude. Their charge of hypocrisy against their elders is not based on common values which parents have ' compromised ' or ' betrayed ', for they sense that democratic values have not yet been internalised in German society. Their provocations are frequently humourless, producing an inquisitorial atmosphere of terror and blackmail. In contrast to American student radicals and hippies, the German rebels do not try to demonstrate that they are right by living a ' better way of life '. There are few experiments in communal living, few hippies, and precious little flower-power spirit in the German student movement.

It is macabre but revealing to observe how the young German rebels can identify with the victims of the nazi past. Not with considered intent, but under stress and in outbursts, they may usurp to themselves the role of those whom the nazis persecuted. At the peak of last year's revolt, when a policeman killed a student and the West Berlin government forbade demonstrations for a few days, a ' resistance congress ' was held after the funeral in Hannover; there, Berlin student spokesmen referred to themselves as ' refugees ' before hurrying back to study and agitate in Berlin. The movement's best known propagandist, Rudi Dutschke, has called Germany's student rebels ' today's Jews '. Few students winced when, at a mass meeting in Berlin, one speaker compared the persecution of the Jews to the plight of students today in the troubles they have with their landladies. When arguing with an altogether reasonable woman on the Kurfürstendamm, a hard-pressed student suddenly shouted, ' then throw us into the gas-ovens right now! '

Incidents of this kind are not common but they are characteristic of this revolt. One reason why protesting German students *seek* alienation from their parents' system is to find relief from the burden of past guilt. It is impossible for them to identify with a government whose Chancellor once belonged to the NSDAP. However, their protest is so negative, so deficient in the assertion of positive values, because their own society and culture provide them with too little of what people who belong to a progressive minority, no matter how deviant, need if they are to remain or become democrats: social and moral justification for their revolt as sincere and decent human beings.

Those who might help, the few radical professors and liberal publicists who sympathise and point out how much the revolt's strategy of provocation has already accomplished in the way of reforms and in making Germany's untried democracy aware of its failings, have so far been unable to provide moral guidance to the movement. Some

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of its ideological mentors, such as Herbert Marcuse, disappointed the utopian yearnings of student radicals by refusing, during a week of intense discussion in Berlin, to outline the contours of a future socialist society; more painful was the criticism of Frankfurt's neo-Marxian professor of sociology, Jurgen Habermas, who identified a latent 'left-fascist' danger in the movement, should it be committed to provocations of authority for their own sake in a situation that is clearly not revolutionary. 'The kind of satisfaction that seeks by provocation to transform sublime power into manifest force is masochistic, not satisfaction but rather submission to this very force'.

Revealing also in this respect is the way Berlin's Republican Club has developed. It was organised by former SDS leaders who, having grown older and more moderate, were deprived of influence by young extremists. With more than 600 members, an associated law office and information service, the Club has restored these older New Leftists to a position of influence. However, this centre of extra-parliamentary opposition has become less and less critical of the student revolt's nihilistic psychology and forms of action. Initially, it was intended that the Club would operate as a forum for discussion with liberals in parties and government, and provide for communication and conciliation between them and the student rebels. Asked why this rational aspect of the Club's programme has been neglected, a leading member candidly replied: 'It *is* important, but provocations on the streets are far more gratifying emotionally'.

An even older generation, the politically conscious writers of Group 47, who were the New Left of 1945 and are still renowned, have done nothing collectively, and little individually, to influence the new movement. Instead, the SDS visited them in the customary manner last fall, interrupting their convocation with bursting balloons and a petition to sign (against Axel Springer's press monopoly); the Group was annoyed and evaded a discussion. Only the most radical of these writers, Peter Weiss, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, and Reinhard Lettau, are genuinely friendly to the New Left. Günter Grass has given good advice to the students, but the more radical ones will not listen to him.

WITH 2,500 members in the fall of 1967, the SDS has doubled its membership in a year and caught up in the dragnet of its activities other progressive groups, such as those affiliated to the SPD and FDP. These student groups cooperate with the SDS and adhere to the strategy of provocation because they hope it will make parliamentary democracy work. In a number of universities even the CDU student group stands to the left of the SPD.

The influence of the SDS on the escalation of revolt is not the work of a highly organised cadre, for it is not a centralist organisation. Local SDS groups tend to operate independently, and in the larger ones this also applies to members and cliques. In this sense, the SDS is more

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an anarchist than a Marxist organisation, which makes it easier for extremists to set a stamp of violence, hatred, and even terror on the demonstrations and tribunal-like convocations of the German student revolt. However, the extremists do not always have their way. In such situations student participants respond in a highly volatile fashion. Often they applaud both sides of an issue. Sometimes, when SDS activists try to end a discussion and take immediate action, the mass assemblies insist that discussion continue. When Rudi Dutschke, the extremists' star orator, steps on to the platform, he is usually greeted with an ovation, but he has sometimes also been drowned out by catcalls for going too far. Appeals to fairness, if put astutely, win applause. The first time Berlin's Mayor Klaus Schuetz submitted himself to the ordeal of cross-examination by the students, SDS extremists tried to break up the meeting and failed. On the second occasion, when Schuetz threatened to leave if his aide was evicted for tearing down an insulting poster that a girl held up behind Schuetz's head (text: 'We have to listen to this idiot!'), the assembly voted to hear him. Yet the outcome is usually advantageous to the more radical leaders. They are very skilful at manipulation, and outsiders are unprepared to cope with the mentality and arguments of student rebels.

There is ambivalence, too, in the way radical leaders of the student revolt think about and try to practise democracy. In order to realise their main objectives, democratisation of the universities and a new society, they have developed two strategic demands. One is student co-determination in university affairs.

West Germany's universities are antiquated and still more exclusive than either the American or the British.[1] Only 5 per cent of German students come from working-class families. In the extreme view co-determination means giving students, as well as dons and assistants, a one-third vote, equal to that of full professors, on all university matters including appointments. In accord with liberal reformers, student rebels advocate dividing faculties into departments and ending a system in which the professors who hold chairs (the *Ordinarien*) retain nineteenth-century prerogatives which reduce the rest of the university community—dons, assistants, and students—to the status of subordinates, dependants, or rank outsiders. Since *Land* governments are very reluctant to attack the vested interests of the full professors directly, only slow progress is being made in changing this system. On the other hand, the principle of co-determination is finding wider acceptance under the pressure of their revolt.

[1] Only 7 per cent of German children qualify for a university-level education, at which time they are, on the average, nearly 21 years old. Only 3 per cent do study; in half of these instances the employed parent is an official or a professional person. Whereas 90 per cent of British students complete their studies with an exam that qualifies them professionally, this is true of only 40 per cent in West Germany, and the proportion is much smaller in those disciplines—social sciences and humanities—which produce most politically active students.

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Student radicals claim that official reformers want to turn the universities into an uncritical training ground for the economic and government Establishment. They attack the concept of non-partisan scholarship and have founded on several campuses 'critical universities' where courses are directed to political action. To make meaningful the medieval liberties which students enjoy in Germany, they want introductory courses to be printed in advance for discussion with assistants in small study-groups; this would take the full professors off the auditorium stage. In many universities students have issued critiques of courses. In Bonn, a history professor who refused to give time for discussion in a course on Soviet Russia was so plagued by critiques and provocations that he terminated the course. In Hamburg the outstanding issue has been the demand to make a professor stand up for cross-examination about things he wrote in the nazi period. But on many of these issues—the reasonable limits of student co-determination, the form 'critical universities' should take, the harassment of individual professors—student opinion is divided.

This is also true of the radical leaders' second, and for them more important, strategic demand: the 'political mandate'. They assert that student government—parliaments and executive organs (*Allgemeine Studentenausschüsse*, or ASTA)—have a mandate from the student body to take positions and organise action on any political issue. This becomes an elitist principle when student radicals also claim—as many do—that students are today in the best position to comprehend the 'true interests' of other groups in a manipulated society.

The SDS leaders believe that democratic university reform is not possible under the present political system, and their main reason for applying the provocation strategy to university and off-campus reform issues is to radicalise more students—which is happening—and then carry revolt into other sections of society (a far less likely prospect). Although they do not expect a revolutionary situation in the foreseeable future, they favour continuous revolt. Dutschke set the standard by proclaiming that 'the rules of the game in this unreasonable democracy cannot be our rules'.

With the 'political mandate' as their legitimation, the radical leaders have developed operational rules, a strategy to transform the organs of student government into a system of 'plebiscitarian democracy' that is easy to manipulate. By and large, the Left hopes for low participation in student elections, because the revolt has also made conservative, career-oriented students and members of *korps* politically active. Recent elections show a sharp increase in participation. The outcome varies; the Left lost control of ASTA in Munich, but gained strength in Marburg. In Berlin's Free University the SDS gained while its coalition partners lost seats.

If the radicals gain control of ASTA by securing a relative majority in student parliaments—as in Cologne, Marburg, and Hamburg—or with a narrow absolute majority, as now in Berlin, Göttingen,

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and Frankfurt, they tend to bypass the student parliament if they can do so. They prefer to seek approval and to launch activities from plenary mass assemblies that are open to all students but which only the more active attend. In accord with an ethos of spontaneity, action committees are set up to conduct investigations and programmes. Thus an anarcho-syndicalist pattern of organisation is emerging, with nearly autonomous action committees and the idea of continuous student revolt. The ASTA of the Free University functions in a distinctly syndicalist manner. The same applies, without a political mandate, to radical leaders in Bonn, who transferred their campus-revolt activity to a 'student trade union' after the student parliament deprived them of control over ASTA. Since this loosely organised and easily manipulated system is coupled with the momentum of continuous revolt and with the defensive solidarity of a self-styled 'persecuted minority', it is difficult for existing differences of opinion to become clear-cut issues in the student movement, for new values to emerge, or for democratic alternatives to gain support.

MOMENTUM and solidarity are produced most effectively when confrontations with government and the police become violent, produce martyrs, arrests, and trials that end in contestable verdicts, jurisdictional disputes, and parliamentary investigations. This is the way revolt has escalated in Berlin, Frankfurt, Bremen, and other cities.

The worst confrontation to date occurred on 2 June 1967, during a demonstration against the Shah of Persia at the Berlin Opera House. Waiting for the Shah behind a police cordon across the street, some students pelted policemen with eggs, smoke-torches, and stones. Once the Shah was safely inside, the police started clubbing the demonstrators without opening up avenues of escape. Many were hospitalised and one, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot dead. The incident shocked thousands of students throughout Germany into joining the revolt. In Berlin a parliamentary investigation culminated in the resignation of the chief of police, the minister of the interior, and the mayor. However, this does not satisfy the student rebels, who are inclined to believe that the police kept avenues of escape closed in order to revenge themselves on the demonstrators—a question which the parliamentary commission neatly evaded. Moreover, a Berlin court did not convict the detective who killed Ohnesorg, for it could not ascertain whether or not his gun had gone off during a scuffle with other students. Students take this verdict as further proof that German courts are partisan and administer 'political justice'.

The belief that they are combating a system that is arbitrarily repressive and becoming 'fascist' again, leaves the student revolt little room for satisfaction when its protests and provocations bring a change of government, win concessions, or even encourage far-reaching reforms. Such gains are not generally taken as evidence that German democracy can function or that it is beginning to do so. Indeed, radical leaders of

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the revolt do everything possible to ensure that its achievements should not encourage a reformist mentality among activists. As the chairman of the SDS in Frankfurt put it, 'the fact that our demands are beyond realisation should make students aware how bad the society we live in is'. Wolfgang Lefèvre, the Jesuit-trained offspring of a Prussian officer family and an adroit SDS 'provocateur', observed with satisfaction 'before 2 June there was not a grain of anti-parliamentarism in the student body. After 2 June the students grasped that the legislature works hand in glove with the executive'.

Although the revolt has set itself democratic goals and seeks through 'enlightenment' to free mankind from man-made oppression, it cannot in fairness yet be called a democratic manifestation of a new German political culture. Too many of its characteristics reflect the very burden of the past that these young Germans, no doubt sincerely, seek to destroy. Coupled with sincerely democratic intentions one finds elitist voluntarism, anti-parliamentarism, an anarcho-syndicalist ideology pledged to action for its own sake, a disposition to manipulate others, and a persecution complex that manifests itself in hatred, arrogance and an objectively unwarranted despair.

Thus, the specific character of the revolt suggests that the political context in which it has arisen is still insufficiently democratic to provide a secure shield against the irrational appeals of totalitarian politics. The fact that this has become evident in the behaviour and thinking of a younger generation of radicals indicates that authoritarian patterns of social behaviour and totalitarian residues in the mentality of this unpolitical people still retain influence. Fortunately this weakness has become apparent, both on the extreme left and on the extreme right, in a period of relative affluence. It is unlikely that the student revolt will itself become totalitarian; it can develop more democratically, but it is also possible that a future German New Right will learn a great deal from the German New Left.

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GRINEVETSKII AND SOVIET INDUSTRIALISATION

Leon Smolinski

ACCORDING to the generally accepted Soviet view, 'the GOELRO Plan is the first scientific, long-term plan of reconstruction and development of the Soviet economy'.[1] 'The GOELRO Plan was built upon the granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism'.[2] '[It] reflects V. I. Lenin's ideas concerning the economic policy of the Communist Party . . . [and] represents the result of many years of Lenin's work and efforts'.[3] In recent appraisals, the lasting influence of that document on subsequent Soviet planning activities is emphasised. Thus, 'all main programmes of the first Five-Year Plan fully coincided with those of the GOELRO Plan, making the latter more concrete and fully developing them'. Even today the GOELRO Plan represents 'an encyclopedia of planning in which Soviet economists find their know-how and inspiration'.[4]

These official accounts present a rather incomplete and inaccurate picture of the origins of the Soviet long-term economic planning and industrialisation policies. The first long-term economic plan for Russia was drawn up not by the GOELRO Commission in November 1920, but some 2½ years earlier, by Professor Vasily Grinevetskii, Rector of the Moscow Institute of Technology. It is contained in his seminal study, *The Postwar Outlook for Russian Industry*, written from January to June of 1918 and published early in 1919.[5] Grinevetskii's plan was not destined for the construction of socialism, which its author actively opposed, but for a democratic, capitalist Russian republic. 'The granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism' are conspicuous by their absence in both documents. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that a number of strategic priorities, targets, methods of planning, and even specific investment choices found in the GOELRO, and subsequently in the early five-year plans, were influenced by the ideas expressed in Grinevetskii's study.

At the time of its writing, V. I. Grinevetskii (1871–1919) was one of Russia's foremost scientists and engineers, with important theoretical discoveries and inventions to his credit. He was, however, no armchair

[1] *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia*, 2nd ed. (1952), XII, p. 362. The 10–15 year GOELRO Plan was prepared by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia from February to November 1920.

[2] Krzhizhanovskii, G. M., preface to *Plan GOELRO*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1955), p. 9.

[3] G. Perov, 'Leninskii plan GOELRO', *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1967, No. 8, p. 3.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 13, 14.

[5] V. I. Grinevetskii, *Poslevoennye perspektivy russkoi promyshlennosti*. The first edition, 1919, is a bibliographical rarity. I used a copy preserved in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. Page citations in this article refer, unless specifically indicated, to the second edition (Moscow, 1922).

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theorist. As an industrial consultant he acquired a wide-ranging, intimate knowledge of Russian industry's realities and problems. He put this experience to use in his teaching, as Professor of Heat Engineering at the Moscow Institute of Technology, and is credited with having founded a new school of thought: engineer-economists who, unlike the old-style technocrats, learned from him to use economic criteria as the decisive yardstick in choosing the optimal technical solutions.[6] During the first world war he was, with Professor Kirsh, put in charge of planning Russia's fuel supply, and tried unsuccessfully to use this strategic sector as a launching pad for introducing a more comprehensive approach to national economic planning. After the revolution he was unanimously elected Rector of his school and, as President of the national Polytechnic Association, became a leading spokesman for the country's engineers. In June 1918 he was one of the organisers of the famous meetings of scientific and engineering organisations in Moscow protesting against the nationalisation of industry. These meetings culminated in a letter sent to Lenin, of which Grinevetskii was a prominent signatory.[7] His study, completed on 30 June 1918, was thus written as it were on the margin of his many other activities.

The Moscow professor seems to have been one of those fortunate men who, in times of trial, maintain the courage of their convictions, the loyalty of their friends, and the respect of their opponents. An old Bolshevik, G. M. Krzhizhanovskii, after freely admitting Grinevetskii's 'counter-revolutionary' attitude, calls him nevertheless 'a man of iron energy and enormous learning . . . a historic personality'. Soon after the completion of his manuscript, Grinevetskii left Moscow for the White-occupied Ekaterinodar. A few weeks after the publication of his book he was stricken with typhus and died on 27 March 1919.

Habent sua fata libelli. The fate of this primer of planned industrialisation abounds in ironic paradoxes. Written by an active opponent of the communist government, the book was enthusiastically received in Soviet publications and aroused Lenin's interest. Destined for an open, competitive, capitalist economy, Grinevetskii's plan was, to a large extent, carried out by a government which repudiated this institutional framework. Following price signals and profit criteria, the author arrived nevertheless in most cases at the same priorities, policies, and even specific investment choices as those selected by Soviet planners in disregard of these criteria.

An examination of these apparent paradoxes is long overdue and of more than historical interest. According to official Soviet industrialisation doctrine, long-term development plans can be constructed only 'on the granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism', after nationalisation of the means of production, neutralisation of market forces and of the

[6] For a good description of his scientific and pedagogic activity, see: V. I. Prokofiev, *Moskovskoe vyssheie tekhnicheskoe uchilishche, 125 let* (Moscow, 1955), p. 210 ff.

[7] G. M. Krzhizhanovskii, *Sochinenia*, II (Moscow, 1934), pp. 331–2.

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price system, and within the socio-political framework of a Soviet state. This was the prescription imposed upon the countries of the Soviet bloc and recommended to the developing countries of the Third World. But did the origin of Soviet planned development itself conform to this pattern? An analysis of *The Postwar Outlook for Russian Industry* and of the nature of its influence on planned Soviet industrialisation may throw some light on this issue.

GRINEVETSKII saw Russia's future economic system as a dynamic capitalism, committed to growth and innovation, with more freedom of enterprise and of foreign trade than had been granted under Tsarism. Land would belong 'to the sturdy, business-minded peasants' (p. 32). The country's long-term economic development would be directed by a comprehensive plan, for the preparation of which Grinevetskii's own study was to provide the guidelines. The plan was to be prepared apparently not by government bureaucrats but by an independent board composed of professionals,[8] and to be implemented by a strong, competent, democratic government which was firmly committed to 'one overriding goal, that of the economic restoration of Russia and the development of its forces of production. All political and class interests must be completely subordinated to that goal' (p. 89).

But who was to govern? The Russian scientist makes abundantly clear who was not. He repudiates the Tsarist regime for its economic conservatism and lack of vision, for its obsolete ideology 'into which modern economic ideas could at best be clandestinely smuggled' (p. 88). He condemns in even stronger terms the government by intelligentsia of 1917–18 for, apparently, its excess of vision, for utopian attempts to build 'a social perpetuum mobile' (p. 33), for 'having done more harm to the Russian people within one year than the oppressive Tsarist regime had done in decades' (p. 39). Characteristically, Grinevetskii lumps together the February and October revolutions, the provisional and the bolshevik governments. His strongest condemnation is reserved for the communists, not so much on ideological or political grounds, as because of what he considers to be their unbusinesslike, amateurish and inept conduct of economic affairs. His views (which were apparently representative of a large segment of the country's technical intelligentsia) were expressed in the letter to Lenin: 'The government which in October assumed the responsibility for all economic activity is powerless to carry it out, the [local] Soviets disobey its decrees, the Supreme Council of National Economy lacks any plan. . . . The nationalisation decree is built on sand. It will impair entrepreneurship, prevent foreign investment and trade, hamper technological progress.'

[8] As early as 1915, Grinevetskii called upon the country's engineering and scientific professional organisations to assume the task of preparing a national economic plan, for which the government bureaucracy lacked competence and vision whereas businessmen lacked objectivity and a macroeconomic viewpoint. Cf. 'Tekhniko-obshchestvennye zadachi v sfere promyshlennosti v sviazi s voinoi', *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1915, no. 1.

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Thus, paradoxically, Grinevetskii rejected the communists on grounds similar to those on which the latter rejected capitalism: anarchy, lack of plan, excessive decentralisation. He mistook the passing anarchic strain in Leninism, injected into it by tactical necessities and temporary alliances, for its essence. A government which sacrificed economic growth and efficiency at the altar of a utopian egalitarian ideology could not last. Nor could it achieve its economic objectives with political means: in the final count, 'the workers' living standards will be determined not by their dictatorship but by their productivity'. In general, Russia's political superstructure would be determined not by ideology but by the country's economic potential and needs. Grinevetskii accordingly saw the future Russia as 'a petty-bourgeois, peasant state' (p. 85). The bourgeois professor appears to have been a better Marxist (albeit not a better prophet) than was many a bolshevik leader at the time.

His approach to economic development is throughout market-oriented. The economy is viewed as an organism, all parts of which are intimately interrelated; in particular, they use each other's outputs as inputs. He attempts to quantify some of the resulting relationships as a prerequisite for calculating output and investment targets: 'the [planned] rates of growth of various branches of our industry must be determined by the changing capacities of the markets for their products' (p. 40). For this purpose he estimates first the prewar and then (very roughly) the postwar structure of Russian industry by breaking it down into five sectors and analysing the sources and uses of the product of each sector as well as the recent trends in relative prices. This enables him to bring out the main long-term structural maladjustments as well as the short-term bottlenecks. Grinevetskii then proceeds to draw up on this basis a long-term (six to ten years) plan of postwar reconstruction, growth, and modernisation of the key sectors of Russian industry and transport.[9]

Investment was at first to be concentrated in a few strategic producer-goods industries ('leading links' in Soviet parlance). Their unbalanced but rapid growth would soon spill over into other industries by expanding markets for their products. Eventually investment on a broader front would be possible. His market and price analysis brings the author to the following conclusions. The backwardness of Russia's industry was largely due to the inordinately expensive fuel, metal, and freight transportation.[10] The high cost of these basic inputs made Russian manufactured goods expensive, closed foreign markets to them, and limited domestic demand, thus making them forgo the advantages of mass production. High-cost producers prospered behind the protective

[9] In the final chapter the time required to reach the assigned targets is extended from 6–10 to 10–12 years, reflecting the rapid disorganisation of Russian industry between January and June 1918.

[10] For example, the prewar price of a ton of coal (with standardised caloric contents) was 2·5 times as high in Russia as in Germany, and per capita consumption of mineral fuel was one-tenth (p. 49). Russia's supply of fuel and metal was 'fit for a beggar', said Grinevetskii, sounding almost like Lenin.

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screen of tariffs. But postrevolutionary, weakened Russia would be forced by foreign investors to abandon protectionist policies. It was therefore imperative to bring the prices of manufactured goods down as soon as possible. This could not be done, however, without a drastic reduction in the cost of the basic inputs just mentioned, which presupposed a rapid expansion and modernisation of the respective industries.

And this is how Grinevetskii arrived at his general goal of rapid economic growth and at the following time sequence and order of priorities which had to be 'most strictly adhered to': fuel and power industries, metallurgy, industries supplying raw materials, railroads. Next came the intensive determinants of economic growth: drastic organisational changes such as vertical disintegration of industry, subcontracting, standardisation, independent quality control, since organisation and management were 'indisputably the weakest spot in Russian industry' (p. 28); the promotion of entrepreneurial initiative, 'which met with so many obstacles in the past'; and various measures aimed at raising industrial labour productivity from its extremely low levels (pp. 40, 100).

THIS order of priorities is instructive. It contradicts the traditional Soviet claim that an industrialisation plan based on price and market criteria must necessarily give precedence to consumer-goods industries as being 'more profitable'.[11] In fact, the top priorities adopted by Grinevetskii on the basis of his price and market analysis are exactly the same as those adopted 2½ years later in the GOELRO Plan and similar to those of the early five-year plans.[12] The planned rates of growth of various commodities *within* each of the priority sectors are, once again, set in accordance with the recent trends in demand and in relative prices. For example, the country's fuel balance was to be adapted to the relative scarcities of various kinds of fuel. The use of fuel wood, the price of which had risen most steeply during the war, was to be severely curtailed, and oil was to be substituted for the more expensive coal. Technical progress was to be geared to the peculiarities of Russian fuel supply, and Russian designers were immediately to develop economical diesel locomotives, without waiting for the less suitable products of other countries. Similarly motivated is Grinevetskii's proposal for the widespread electrification of industry, 'which will be supplied with power by a network of regional electric power stations, utilising low grade inexpensive local fuel' (p. 46), mainly peat, lignite, and, where economically justified, hydraulic power in such locations as the Dnepr rapids.

[11] Cf. *Politicheskaia ekonomia, uchebnik* (Moscow, 1954), p. 341.

[12] The main difference being the absence of machine building in Grinevetskii's top priorities. He apparently thought that, lacking protection, Russia would have largely to limit itself to producing simple machinery and import the more complex equipment during the decade covered by his plan (as indeed it did until the mid-1930s).

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This proposal foreshadows Lenin's subsequent formulation but with a difference in emphasis. For Lenin, electrification (especially of the countryside) was to usher in the age of socialism by bringing about a profound psychological and social revolution. Grinevetskii views it as just another fuel-saving device.[13]

The leading part in the industrialisation drama assigned by Lenin to electric power stations is played in Grinevetskii's plan by railroad construction, 'which must become the axis of our entire economic policy' (p. 67) and which accounted for some 51 per cent of the total planned investment expenditure. This choice, like others, is first explained in terms of price signals, viz. the inordinately high and rising postwar freight rates: 'without a reduction in freight rates, the economic rebirth of Russia is absolutely impossible' (p. 60). But even more important were the broader effects of new railroad construction, which could not be caught in the meshes of the price system. It would impregnate the economy with the seed of progress, create new markets, open up new territories, provide the mainspring for a cumulative upswing where the expansion of one industry spilled over into others. Furthermore, massive construction of new railroads in Asiatic Russia is viewed by the author as a crucial part of his grandiose programme of shifting the location of Russian industry eastward. This pioneering proposal, which subsequently became one of the cornerstones of Soviet industrialisation policies, is once again derived from an analysis of the market forces expected to operate in the post-1918, open, market-oriented, capitalist Russian economy (p. 51). Grinevetskii expects a massive, voluntary eastward migration of urban population from the war devasted cities of European Russia. This would supply new markets and a trained labour force for industry in the Asiatic provinces. At the same time, entrepreneurs would find it advantageous to locate beyond the Urals, since high transportation costs to Russia's western boundaries would act as a substitute for custom duties, thus effectively protecting these precious markets from the influx of foreign imports. We see how location policies, which Stalin was to justify on the grounds of defence against western invaders, had been first proposed by Grinevetskii to defend Russian markets against the invasion of foreign goods.

But why not use instead the traditional Tsarist policies of protective tariffs? Grinevetskii saw the economic cost of Russia's defeat in the war and of revolutionary devastation in a prolonged future

[13] Another difference was that Lenin emphasised the uses of electric power in agriculture whereas Grinevetskii confined them largely to industry. Interestingly enough, electrification under Stalin conformed to Grinevetskii's rather than Lenin's priorities: regional stations were prohibited from supplying power to collective farms. In 1940 the countryside consumed only 0·9 per cent of electric power output which accounted for only 2 per cent of all mechanical power used in agriculture. A. Vinter and A. Markin, *Rol elektrifikatsii v postepennom perekhode ot sotsializma k komunizmu* (Moscow, 1952), p. 19. The situation has considerably improved since.

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dependence on western financiers who would effectively prevent the postwar Russian governments from resorting to such measures. He puts the total cost of his ten-year investment programme at roughly 17·5 billion gold roubles,[14] of which about three-fourths was to be spent on transportation, 2·3 per cent on electric power stations, 9 per cent on extractive fuel industries, etc. This compares with 17 billion gold rubles to be invested under the ten-year GOELRO Plan of 1920 which, despite its subtitle of 'an electrification plan', allocated only 7 per cent of that amount to the electric power industry, as against 17·6 per cent to fuel and 47 per cent to transportation.[14]

As regards the sources of finance, Grinevetskii estimated that postwar domestic capital formation would decline to some 30–50 per cent of its prewar rate, and grain exports would take some 10 to 15 years to recover their prewar level (p. 92). He expected accordingly that about three-fourths of the total cost of his investment programme would have to be covered by foreign investment: loans to the government and, especially, concessions. It is characteristic of his distrust of any government bureaucracy that he preferred the latter: concessions would spread foreign know-how and superior organisation, while foreign loans might be misused by government bureaucrats.[15] Grinevetskii was subsequently criticised for wanting to enslave Russia to foreign concessionaires, and his programme was contrasted with the communist method of industrialising the country without the interference of foreign capitalists. In the context of pre-Stalinist Russia, this criticism lacks substance. When Grinevetskii was writing, Lenin's government had just made onerous economic concessions to Germany and was considering ceding Kamchatka to the United States. The GOELRO Plan 2½ years later, proposed to cover 35 per cent of its investment programme by foreign loans and concessions. This figure is lower than Grinevetskii's 75 per cent, reflecting not so much the greater desire for economic independence on the part of the GOELRO authors as their highly unrealistic estimates of Russia's capacity to export farm products in payment for foreign capital goods. In 1920, on the eve of a devastating famine, they were planning to finance their investment plan by, inter alia, annual exports of foodstuffs to the tune of 1 billion gold rubles. This daydreaming can hardly be considered an improvement upon Grinevetskii's more sober estimates. Even so, Lenin stated at the time that without concessions the GOELRO Plan could not be carried out.

WE have noted in passing similarities between Grinevetskii's development plan and later Soviet work. Equally if not more

[14] Calculated from pp. 42 ff, and 99 in Grinevetskii's study and from p. 183 in Plan GOELRO, *op. cit.* I used midpoints of ranges in terms of which Grinevetskii provides most of his investment estimates.

[15] He justifies his mistrust by the unfavourable experience with government construction projects in Tsarist Russia (pp. 64–5). This was apparently one of the reasons why the technical intelligentsia tended to oppose the nationalisation of industry.

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important were his pioneering achievements in planning methodology. One finds in his work, fully or partly developed, virtually all the methods later known to be used by Soviet planners. In particular, his pioneering attempt to estimate the size and direction of intersectoral flows in Russian industry paved the way for the impressive achievement of the balance sheet of the national economy constructed by P. I. Popov and other in the mid-twenties.[16] One may note parenthetically that Grinevetskii's successors have not always improved upon his methods. For example, he gave an explicit warning that the plan's targets should not be derived by extrapolation of prewar trends, too many parameters having shifted since. But the central target of the GOELRO Plan, the planned 80 per cent rise in total industrial output, was derived by just such extrapolation of the 1908–12 rate of growth.[17]

Contemporary Soviet reviewers, while paying a tribute to 'the iron logic and lucid thinking' which characterised Grinevetskii's plan as a whole,[18] were most impressed by his proposals for specific investment policies or projects. His first reviewer (April 1919) and the editor of the second edition of his book in 1922, both praise him as it were ex ante for pioneering such policies as the shift of industry to Asiatic Russia, the development of the Kuznetsk project, Dneproges, the Turksib railroad, and a half a dozen other projects upon which the Soviet government had not yet embarked. The *Large Encyclopedia* biographical sketch, written in 1930, at the time when the projects in question were in progress, similarly praised him 'for having raised these problems which are at present being solved by the Soviet proletariat'.[19]

This interpretation seems to suggest that the projects in question had somehow sprung out of Grinevetskii's inkstand like Minerva out of Jupiter's head. It over-simplifies the complex process of intellectual osmosis and interaction that actually took place and that accounts for the origins of Soviet industrialisation policies. For all his versatility, the Moscow professor was no Leonardo da Vinci, and only some of the ideas in question (mainly technical innovations proposed for the railroads) originated with him. In other cases he acted as a sensitive and discerning receiver, selecting and transmitting ideas and projects advanced by other Russian engineers, scientists, and economists in the preceding decade or two. This by itself was no mean achievement. Had Grinevetskii merely provided a catalogue of such projects, he would have rendered a signal service, since in Tsarist Russia their

[16] P. I. Popov, ed., *Balans narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR 1923–24 goda* (Moscow, 1926). Grinevetskii's contribution to the theory and methodology of economic planning is explored more fully in my forthcoming book, *The Origins of Soviet Planning*.

[17] Plan GOELRO, *op. cit.*, p. 184. It is amusing in this context to note Krzhizhanovskii's claim, made in 1925, that 'the GOELRO Plan provided for higher rates of growth than could be achieved not only by the Russia of landlords and capitalists but by any bourgeois country': *ibid.* p. 7.

[18] M. V. (Vindelbot?), in *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 1919, no. 4, p. 90. He concludes: 'Professor Grinevetskii's study . . . can and must be used in the practice of building our industrial future.'

[19] Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, 1 ed., 1930, XIX, pp. 391–3.

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existence was as a rule known only to a narrow circle of specialists. An engineer writing in 1918 (before the publication of '*The Postwar Outlook*') complained of an ignorance gap separating 'hundreds of outstanding Russian engineers [who] in the silence of their studies . . . created such projects as the Volga-Don canal etc. etc.' from the educated public 'who may have heard something about the Channel tunnel' but were utterly uninterested in similar grandiose domestic proposals.[20] It was this substantial and rapidly growing stock of unpublicised and as yet unutilised blueprints for new hydroelectric dams, industrial combines, railroad lines, canals, that provided the main source of Grinevetskii's proposals and, partly through the intermediary of his book, of Soviet engineering ventures. Instead of an unexplainable quantum jump we find a fairly continuous line of development. Two examples will suffice. Research, prospecting, and blueprints for the Turk-Sib railroad were completed as early as 1906.[21] The builder of the Dnepr hydroelectric station, Professor I. G. Aleksandrov, pointed out that his project submitted in 1924 'was the outcome of the very long and intense work of several engineering organisations over a period of twenty years', and that it was the *seventeenth* such technical solution to be proposed since 1900.[22]

Because of his national prominence and unusually wide interests, Grinevetskii was well placed to become familiar with this stock-in-trade of early twentieth-century Russian engineering thought; but he did much more than merely catalogue it. His major contribution was to select viable and economically justified ventures, to present them not in isolation (as they were conceived by their respective authors) but as parts of an overall, internally consistent development programme, to indicate at least roughly their order of priority by relating them to the country's needs and resources and by estimating the order of magnitude of the aggregate costs involved. This was done with a remarkable economy of means. Taking as his point of departure three strategic facts of Russia's postwar economy: the shortage and high relative price of fuel, the dependence on foreign capital, and the central importance of railroads in an economy extending over 5,000 km. from north to south and over 11,000 km. from east to west, Grinevetskii integrated projects and policy proposals emanating from many sources into a relatively coherent whole which was more than the sum of its parts. Unusually for an engineer, he had a macroeconomic approach to microeconomic problems, and emphasised cost and demand considerations rather than technical perfection. If a label is needed, Grinevetskii was an econocrat rather than a technocrat (the latter designation might be more justifiably applied to Lenin).

[20] M. Pavlovich, 'Gosudarstvennye sooruzhenia i ikh znachenie v khoziaistvennoi zhizni strany', *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 1918, no. 2, pp. 4 ff.
[21] S. A. Taube, in *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1928, no. 4, p. 215.
[22] I. G. Aleksandrov, *Dneprovskoe stroitelstvo i ego ekonomicheskoe znachenie* (GIU, 1925), p. 3; I. G. Aleksandrov, *Elektrifikatsia Dnepra* (GIU, 1924), p. 29.

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To what extent could the investment policies and projects he proposed be realised, and how far were they? Here is a list of them, with the subsequent fate of each shown in brackets.

(1) Division of the country into economic regions, inter-regional specialisation and regional planning (initiated under the GOELRO Plan, pursued since);

(2) Shift of industrial location to Asiatic Russia (initiated under the first five-year plan, pursued since);

(3) Centralisation of electric power supply in a network of large regional stations (adopted as the central idea of the GOELRO electrification Plan, pursued since. By 1963, regional stations accounted for 78 per cent of all output);

(4) Construction of a hydroelectric station on the Dnepr rapids (included in the GOELRO Plan, designated as a top priority project 6 November 1926, completed 10 October 1932);

(5) Construction of a modern steel and coal combine in the Kuznetsk region (begun 1928, completed 1932);

(6) Expansion of coal mining in the Moscow region (the share of these coalfields in the nation's output rose from 1 per cent in 1913 to 10 in 1955);

(7) Development of new oilfields in Emba (became a priority project 12 November 1923, developed since);

(8) A four- to fivefold expansion in the length of the railroad network by 1950 (an increase by some 70 per cent only was achieved by that time, but railroad construction was never assigned a high priority in Soviet plans);

(9) Construction of the Turk-Sib railroad (completed April 1930);

(10) Conversion of some existing lines into 'super-trunk railroads', raising their carrying capacity without increasing their length by double-tracking, reducing curvatures and similar streamlining measures (included in the GOELRO Plan. Lenin was impressed and thought that western capitalists might want to finance such a super-trunk line linking London with Peking via Moscow, but found no takers);

(11) Construction of canals linking Volga with Dnepr, Black Sea with Baltic Sea, Volga with White Sea. Unlike Stalin, Grinevetskii treated these as very low priority projects on account of the long delays involved and 'colossal costs'[23] (the Belomor canal was completed in 1933, the Volga-Don in 1952);

(12) Replacement of steam locomotives by Diesel engines (not adopted until the early 1950s, whereas Grinevetskii treated this as urgent);

(13) Turkestan farming to specialise in irrigated cotton and to import grain (done under the early five-year plans);

[23] Stalin managed to reduce both by the use of forced labour, a capital-saving innovation which the good professor hardly anticipated.

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(14) Development of extensive farming in what was to become 'the Virgin Lands' (tried unsuccessfully under the first five-year plan and, on a large scale, in the mid-fifties);

(15) A general shift from grain farming to livestock raising (the reverse trend actually set in: there were 1·17 head of cattle per 1 ton of grain produced in 1916, against 0·73 in 1966, a decline of 38 per cent);

(16–19) Organisational and managerial innovations, viz.: subcontracting of spare parts, forgings, stampings, and other semi-manufactured goods inefficiently produced by small auxiliary shops. Standardisation of products and parts. Independent quality control. Introduction of scientific management methods and sales and accounting techniques (on all these counts, except perhaps standardisation, little progress has been achieved even though lip service is paid to the necessity of these reforms).

The degree to which the ideas expressed in Grinevetskii's study have been implemented varies from sector to sector. In industry the record is impressive. In transportation, his plan for the railroads remains underfulfilled by a wide margin; the policy followed was the intensive utilisation of the existing track, and the directors have been quite successful in satisfying the growing economy's demand for transportation in this manner.[24] In agriculture, on the other hand, the failure to heed Grinevetskii's warning that industrialisation must be accompanied by a growth in agricultural output (and not only in marketings, as was the case under Stalin) led to serious difficulties. It is instructive to note that none of Grinevetskii's proposals for modernising the organisation and management of Russian industry has been implemented. The problems faced in these areas by the Soviet command economy of 1968 appear to be rather similar to those that worried the Russian scientist in 1918 or 1913. An industrial executive in Tsarist Russia, to judge by Grinevetskii's account, appears to have been as dependent on personal pull, as neglectful of his customers, as ignorant of the actual profitability of his various products, as disinclined to subcontract and thus make himself dependent on other inefficient factory managers, as is nowadays his counterpart in the Soviet command economy.[25] Conversely, Grinevetskii's calls for reforms of these practices might be inserted *verbatim* into any recent speech by Premier Kosygin or any articles by Professor Liberman. All this suggests that Soviet planners might find many an interesting idea in *The Postwar Outlook* today, even if not as many as their grandfathers did half a century ago.

[24] However, when the GOELRO Plan was being revised in 1925, Krzhizhanovskii came out in favour of shifting resources into railroads. cf. G. M. Krzhizhanovskii, 'K peresmotru plana GOELRO', *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1925, no. 7, p. 22.

[25] For the classic description of the latter, see Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Harvard, 1957), and David Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR* (Columbia University Press, 1954).

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THE question still remains unanswered, through what medium did the ideas expressed in Grinevetskii's study come to influence Soviet industrialisation plans?

One might say that in regard to the actual (as distinct from the mythical) origins of Soviet planning for industrialisation, the medium *was* the message. To put it briefly, the authors of the GOELRO Plan themselves were in the main the medium. The similarities between their *opus* and Grinevetskii's work are due in part to borrowing, which they freely admitted at the time, and in part they reflect the common heritage, the intellectual tradition of Russian engineering thought in which both Grinevetskii and the GOELRO commissioners shared.

In developing this view, let us first recall that the GOELRO Plan consisted of two layers. The commission was originally appointed to produce an engineering programme of the construction of a network of electric power stations. But, to quote Krzhizhanovskii, it was immediately realised that such a programme, involving a technological transformation of the whole economy, could be drafted only as part of a comprehensive long-term national economic plan. Our search for 'the granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism' should therefore be carried out separately for these two constituents of GOELRO's work.

To start with the electrification programme proper, we find that its guidelines have been proclaimed as early as 1912, by the eighth All-Russian Congress of Electrical Engineers, a non-Marxist, non-political, professional organisation, which adopted a special resolution calling (in almost identical words as those used later by Grinevetskii and, finally, by the GOELRO commission) for the electrification of the whole country by the constructing of a network of large-scale regional stations. The first such station, designed to use inexpensive low-grade local fuel (another basic item in the GOELRO Plan) was built in 1913. At the same time several groups of engineers and economists were working out a detailed electrification plan for southern Russia, making on the spot surveys, regional studies, etc. It was these groups that became the core of the GOELRO commission in February 1920. The electrification programme submitted by that commission did not therefore represent a new departure, a dialectical quantum jump, but a continuation of the work initiated before and during the war. It was, incidentally, no other than Krzhizhanovskii himself, the head of the commission, who at the time indignantly denied the charge that the electrification programme represented a hasty bolshevik improvisation; on the contrary, 'it was conditioned by the entire historical process of Russia's economic development, of Russian scientific thought'.[26]

So much for the electrification plan proper. When we pass to the second layer of GOELRO work, the long-term national economic plan, Grinevetskii's pervasive influence became obvious. Of the three

[26] *Pravda*, 7 November 1922.

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authors of the plan for industry, one, Professor L. K. Ramzin, was Grinevetskii's student and then succeeded to his chair at the Moscow Institute of Technology; another, Professor K. A. Krug, was Grinevetskii's colleague and close collaborator. Krzhizhanovskii (himself a tireless propagandist for some of Grinevetskii's ideas who seems to have known portions of *The Postwar Outlook* almost by heart), points out that 'a group of the closest collaborators of Professors Grinevetskii and Kirsh . . . took the most active part' in drawing up the GOELRO Plan, which could be completed within nine months 'only thanks to this continuity of effort and to the fact that, to a considerable extent, the materials were already available'.[27] Krug himself reports having incorporated Grinevetskii's calculations and findings into his work,[28] while Krzhizhanovskii said that 'our estimates of the financial aspects [of the GOELRO Plan] are based on the publications, known to us all, of a foremost expert on Russian industry, Professor Grinevetskii'.[29] These estimates Lenin considered the most valuable part of the whole document, and he quoted them as conclusive proof of its scientific character and its superiority to 'the tedious scholastic twaddle' about economic planning of the Marxist economists such as Larin, Kritsman, and Miliutin, who had criticised the GOELRO Plan.[30]

As regards the political views of the great majority of the more than two hundred members of the GOELRO commission, one looks in vain for 'the granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism' in their political make-up. No less an authority than Lenin himself stated at the time that 'almost all of them, without exception, are opponents of the Soviet government'.[31]

It took Lenin's genius to harness their energy and dedication for the purpose of consolidating communist rule, just as he had used the soldiers' longing for peace, the peasants' for land, and the workers' for the control of industry, in his drive to establish that rule. It is true that, in some degree, the interests of Russia's scientific-engineering elite and of the communist leadership tended to converge. Both shared with Marx the goal of economic development and industrialisation. But the classics of Marxism had little to say about the mechanics of planned industrialisation in a backward socialist country, or about the methodology of national economic planning. Lenin was prepared to borrow from any source to fill this gap in the received doctrine. Grinevetskii's programme and the Russian engineers' projects were (irrespective of their authors' political views) more directly applicable to Russia's problems than, say, Karl Ballod's *Der Zukunftstaat*, which was also consulted, but which had been prepared for the more advanced

[27] *Ibid.*
[28] See minutes of the meeting of the GOELRO Commission held 16 March 1920, in V. S. Kulebakin, ed., *Trudy GOELRO* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 205, 214.
[29] *Trudy 8-go Vserossiiskogo elektrotekhnicheskogo s'ezda*, vypusk I (Moscow, 1920), p. 87.
[30] *Pravda*, 22 February 1921.
[31] Lenin, *Sochinenia*, XXXII, p. 468.

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German economy.[32] In appraising Lenin's interest in these diverse projects, we might also consider that a long-term development plan was, in his eyes, not only a bona fide blueprint for the Soviet government's investment policies but also (and this regardless of its feasibility) a powerful propaganda weapon aimed at capitalist countries.[33]

Furthermore, dialectically enough, if the collaboration of the still hostile technical intelligentsia was indispensable for producing the GOELRO plan, the plan itself was viewed as an appropriate vehicle for bringing Russian engineers and scientists into the communist fold: 'the skilled engineers will join us when we prove to them in practice that by doing so they will help to develop the country's forces of production' (Lenin, *Sochinenia*, XXXII, p. 468). And Lenin once offered to swap 'dozens of boastful communists . . . for one competent bourgeois expert' (*Pravda*, 22 February 1921).

For their part, the communists contributed to the partnership that strong, stable government, ruthlessly dedicated to the cause of industrialisation, which Grinevetskii had been longing for. They soon suppressed the anarchic tendencies that disturbed him. They repudiated foreign debts, thus abolishing the main burden implicit in industrialisation à la Grinevetskii. Through collectivisation, compulsory deliveries of farm produce, and reduced real wages, they provided those sources of finance which he sought from western capitalists. In 1931 they abandoned that utopian (or, to use Stalin's formulation, 'petty-bourgeois') equalitarianism which so irritated the Moscow professor. And, as we saw, they carried out most of his projects.

GRINEVETSKII would have asked his favourite question, 'But at what cost?'. And the simple answer is that nobody knows. As pointed out by Professor Birman, the decision-making rule was to reach the assigned targets regardless of cost.[34] Furthermore, Professor Bergson has shown conclusively that Soviet prices are not equilibrium prices and fail to reflect the actual factor costs of the projects or policies undertaken by the system's directors. The idols of 'quantity and deadline', whose demise in postwar Russia Grinevetskii once confidently announced, were returned to the place of honour. His own criterion of cost and profitability is timidly reappearing now, in Kosygin's 1965 reforms, after forty years of dogmatic slumber. Grinevetskii's key postulate, that industrialisation should be accompanied by growth in agricultural production (rather than merely in agricultural

[32] Cf. L. Smolinski, 'Planning without Theory, 1917–1967', *Survey*, July 1967, for a description of Ballod's influence on Soviet planning.

[33] For example, he left a rough draft of a manifesto to French workers and farmers appealing to them to institute a Soviet government which would 'carry out an electrification plan . . . a short Ballod [plan] for France. . . . You could then treble your riches within three to five years and work not more than, say, six hours a day'. *Sochinenia*, XXXV, p. 467. And to think that Bukharin was subsequently castigated for his 'enrichissez-vous' slogan directed at *Russian* farmers!

[34] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, 15 June 1963, p. 6.

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marketings), and that financial equilibrium should be maintained, went unheeded. Stalin's contempt for the 'huckstering search for profitability' and his goal of autarky would hardly have met with the approval of Grinevetskii, who proclaimed that 'Russia cannot afford the luxury of investing deliberately in unprofitable ventures. But most autarkic investments are of that nature.' (p. 95).

As regards the Soviet system of forced saving designed to finance rapid industrialisation, one is tempted to argue that it may have been too efficient even for its own good. Khrushchev once described how, in 1947, 'grain was being exported while in some areas people were swelling and even dying of hunger'.[35] Now, industrialisation is bound to come at a high human cost, whether in Dickensian England or post-1918 Russia. In Grinevetskii's own model it was industrial labour that was presumably to bear more than its just share of the cost of economic development. In his 'peasant-petty bourgeois state' industrial wages 'would tend towards the extremely low earnings of farm labour', and even 'the preservation of the eight-hour working day is questionable' (p. 100), although free labour unions were to be preserved. And yet the high human cost of Soviet industrialisation (by how many million are we to multiply the ten years in the life of Ivan Denisovich spent in shifting Russia's industry eastward?) might have been substantially lower in Grinevetskii's model, where the electorate was, periodically, to have the chance to turn the rascals out.

It is true, one might take a more dynamic view and argue that the machinery purchased with the grain supplied by the starving peasants of 1947 enhanced the welfare of the next generation. But in our age of contempt, the welfare of future generations assumes increasingly the role once assigned by Dr Johnson to patriotism: that of the scoundrels' last refuge. And the dynamic viewpoint loses its edge as we recall that the peasants dying of hunger in 1947 *were* the next generation from the viewpoint of the peasants dying of hunger in 1932 during the post-collectivisation famine.

* * *

OUR examination of Grinevetskii's plan and of its influence on early Soviet planning suggests some interesting implications for the developing countries today.

First, it points to the great importance of the *initial conditions* as a factor determining the plan's priorities and targets, and to the relatively minor role played by ideology. Grinevetskii, the GOELRO commissioners, and Lenin saw eye to eye on these matters, on which Lenin's fellow-Marxist economists disagreed with him. Of these initial conditions we shall briefly consider three: endowment with natural

[35] N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitelstvo komunizma v SSSR i razvitie selskogo khoziaistva* (Moscow, 1964), VIII, p. 265.

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resources, availability of statistics, supply of engineering and scientific talent and of preliminary blueprints for the plan.

Abundant natural resources appear to be a prerequisite for the success of both Grinevetskii's plan and Stalinist planning. In the former it attracts foreign concessionares and capital. In the latter it cushions the economy to some extent against the adverse effects of inefficiency.

Without the availability of a vast body of (albeit very imperfect) industrial and agricultural statistics, price data, and (it goes without saying) a fairly sensitive price system in which they originated, neither Grinevetskii nor the GOELRO commission could draw up their plans.

Finally, and most important, the plan itself and the activity to which it gives rise show, as it were, only the top of a submerged iceberg. It had taken decades of patient work by Russian engineers, scientists, and economists, 'in the silence of their studies' but also in the hardships of geographical and topographical surveys, to make possible some of the Soviet plans' prize projects. In turn, it took a ruthlessly (perhaps too ruthlessly) determined government and long years of forced saving to convert these blueprints into reality. A government desirous of applying the Soviet recipe for industrialisation might therefore be well advised to analyse its real (as distinct from its mythical) ingredients.[36] An examination of the actual origins of Soviet long-term developmental planning might be a good point of departure for such an analysis, and Grinevetskii a knowledgeable guide.

[36] It almost appears as if a country already had to be fairly well developed in order to apply the Soviet recipe for development.

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THE SOVIET NORTH

Terence Armstrong

THE northern land areas of this planet are climatically uninviting, very sparsely inhabited, and economically underdeveloped. They have long been thought to conceal riches, both mineral and biological, on plausible grounds of probability, and more recently this has been demonstrated to be the case. The pressure to make use of these territories is therefore bound to increase as the number of human beings in the world grows. It so happens that sovereignty over the land areas of the north belongs to economically advanced nations, so that political problems associated with much underdeveloped territory (in Africa, for example) do not arise. The Soviet Union, Canada, Denmark, and the United States, to list the four largest land-owners, have no difficulty in obtaining the technical expertise needed to apply modern methods. Their problem is that of deciding how much of their resources to devote to this end. Over the last forty years, the Soviet government has been the one most willing to commit the largest proportion, because the national and international situation of the country seemed to it to call for maximum reliance on domestic resources. So there has been much activity in the Soviet north during this period, motivated by the desire to establish a strong and self-sufficient economy. The other northern Powers, facing many of the same practical problems, can learn a good deal from the Soviet experience. This paper will summarise certain aspects of that experience, examine some of the problems and estimate what the future may hold.

First, it is necessary to delimit, at least in broad terms, the territory to be considered. The true Arctic, north of the tree line, embraces in the continental Soviet Union a strip of territory only a few hundred miles wide along the north coast. But add the sub-Arctic, as climatologists define it, and about half the country is involved. In the Soviet literature there is no consensus as to what is implied by 'the north', but definitions put forward by S. V. Slavin of Gosplan are gaining acceptance. These are based on factors affecting economic development, such as population density, and so are relevant to this enquiry. By Slavin's criteria, the southern boundary of 'the north' runs not far from the 60th parallel in Europe, and drops to the 50th by the time it reaches the Pacific seaboard. All the major industrial and agricultural regions of the country lie to the south of this line; to the north, there are almost everywhere fewer than five persons to the square kilometre, and the average is much lower. This area is about 55 per cent of the whole country. Let it be the field of our enquiry.

It is largely forested, broken by mountains in the east and giving place to tundra in the north. The climate is everywhere severe, in the sense that temperature extremes are great, and the summers, though

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often hot, are short. There is abundant animal life. Virtually the whole area, apart from the off-lying islands in the Arctic Ocean, was inhabited, if sparsely, before the Russians moved in from the south and west over the last ten centuries.

In the last forty years the main thing the Russians have been after is the mineral resources, and the main prerequisite for getting at them (or at anything else) was a transport system. Historically, the waterways had been the highways, usable whether liquid or frozen. It was the waterways that were selected first again—the rivers and the seas. Nature has provided a good network of rivers, remarkably free of rapids, and their mouths are joined by the offshore waters of the Arctic Ocean. The first major project, therefore, was to organise a Northern Sea Route, which would permit access to the Siberian rivers from either the Pacific or the Atlantic. With the aid of icebreakers and a highly developed system of weather and ice reporting and forecasting, traffic built up to the present level of some hundreds of ships operating in these waters each season. The season itself has been extended from about two to about four months. The sea route has never been of any significant economic use as a link between Atlantic and Pacific, although this is the role commonly ascribed to it. Only in the last year has this aspect received any prominence, when the Soviet Union invited foreign shippers to make use of Soviet navigational aids, for a fee, and to save perhaps thirteen days' sailing time between, say, Hamburg and Yokohama. None accepted the offer during the first season it was open. On the rivers, large fleets of powered craft and barges have been assembled. Latterly, hydrofoils have been extensively used, bringing down travel time often from days to hours. The sea-river combination does provide a solution to at least some of the freighting problems, but its limitation in time is a serious drawback. The possibility of sidestepping this by use of submarine freighters—suggested in other Arctic areas—has apparently been considered but not taken up. Certainly the very wide continental shelf would cause difficulty.

A fortunate coincidence has been the advance in aircraft technology at just this period. Air transport has made all projects vastly easier, and in some cases has been the decisive factor. A town like Yakutsk, 4,000 miles from Moscow and with a population of 100,000, has five direct flights to the capital a day. At the other end of the scale, a farming village of 500 on the Yana river gets a couple of single-engine aircraft calling daily. Aeroflot also lets out aircraft on charter at very reasonable rates, so prospectors and scientists are well served. The helicopter has helped enormously, though distances are often too great for its economic operation. Hovercraft, curiously, are not in use, nor even, it would seem (despite protestations to the contrary) under very serious consideration.

On land, the winter track has been the most widespread medium of communication, and there is still little of greater sophistication. A very few all-weather roads exist, chiefly in the north-east, and a few spurs

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of railway line attack the southern fringes of the area. Much is being written currently of a 'northern Trans-Siberian', but this is a line which may, in perhaps twenty years time, parallel the existing line only a couple of hundred miles or so to the north (its route will be Tobolsk-Surgut-Kolpashevo-Maklakovo-Boguchany-Ust'Ilim, and then along the line of the earlier projected Baykal-Amur Magistral). Even such a major centre as Yakutsk still seems unlikely to have a rail connection in the foreseeable future. Perhaps it is possible for regions to achieve industrialisation, by-passing the railway stage, just as some Siberian peoples are said to be achieving socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage.

This transport system, in spite of its shortcomings, is a remarkable achievement in its context and it has permitted the growth of many major mining operations. The emphasis has always been, naturally, on minerals of exceptional value. At first it was gold (in the nineteenth century there were important workings in the Yenisey valley); then apatite in the Murmansk region; then nickel, at Norilsk and later at Pechenga (the Finnish Petsamo until 1945); then, in the north-east, tin, and more gold; during the war, coal at Vorkuta; in the 1950s, the spectacular discovery of diamonds in the Lena basin; and in the 1960s, the opening up of a huge oil and gas field in the West Siberian plain. Thus a regional party secretary, V. Uvachan, could write in *Kommunist*, no. 14, 1967: 'the north contains virtually all the diamond resources of the country, nearly half the gold and tin, and a large part of the nickel, mica, and apatites'. This alone justifies, in the past and in the future, heavy investment in northern development. It has caused the construction of many towns: Norilsk (over 120,000 in 1964), Vorkuta (200,000, with its neighbours in the coalfield, in 1965), Kirovsk (40,000 in 1959), Apatity (20,000 in 1959), Mirny (20,000 in 1965), and numbers of smaller places. Of particular interest now are the towns with controlled microclimate, the first of which is under construction in the Lena basin. Ancillary industries have grown, too—in particular local food production and local fuel. The hydro-electric station on the Vilyyuy, for the diamond industry, is attracting special attention at present because it is the first of its kind in this environment.

The obvious primacy of mineral extraction must not obscure the existence of other important northern industries which exploit renewable resources. Fur, the original stimulus to Russian occupation of almost the whole of this area, is still hunted and ranched, and the annual Leningrad auction remains a highly significant event in the world fur trade. Timber is cut and processed in very large quantities. Much of this is done in more southerly parts of the country, but the European north and part of central Siberia provide lumber of high quality and are the main sources of exports. Mention should also be made of the very large and fast growing sea fishery which, though not an exclusively northern undertaking, has two major bases in the north: Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-na-Kamchatke. Murmansk alone handles as much

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fish a year as all British fish ports combined (800,000 tons in about 1960), and is probably the busiest fish port in the world.

TO catalogue economic undertakings in the Soviet north is not the object of this paper. It is sufficient if the impression is given that significant production is now coming out of the area, for the main point of interest is not precisely how much benefit the Soviet state derives from all this, but what the methods and problems are. That is the information most likely to be helpful to others working in a similar environment. Two groups of problems may be distinguished: technical—how to build and operate the necessary plant, and human—how to get people to work there.

Examples of major technical problems are those posed by the existence of frozen subsoil (permafrost) in almost the whole of the area, and by the presence of floating ice on the waterways. The permafrost problem is simply described. Any major structure, whether building, road, bridge, or runway, will, unless precautions are taken, cause the soil temperature to change, with consequent differential settling of foundations, so that damage up to and including the collapse of the structure may result. The necessary precautions, therefore, have been studied in some detail. Geologists, geophysicists, and soil mechanics specialists, working over the last thirty years chiefly in the Institute of Permafrost Studies (whose headquarters is now at Yakutsk) have evolved solutions in principle to most of the problems. This is a successful example of directing effective scientific enquiry to a practical field where the results are urgently needed. The Russians are understandably the world leaders in permafrost studies. The emphasis now is on finding quicker, cheaper solutions, on paring down the safety margin. The floating ice problem was attacked in a similar way. A group of oceanographers and meteorologists was assembled at the Arctic Institute in Leningrad in the early 1930s, and they have developed forecasting techniques which result in very real assistance to shipping. At the same time the construction of icebreakers has been pressed forward, often with use of Finnish yards and designers, and the first nuclear-powered icebreaker, *Lenin*, was completed in Leningrad in 1959. There has never been, as far as one can tell, any attempt to relate the cost of the scientific programme in any exact way to the income to be derived from the activities thus assisted. If there had, it is doubtful if support would have been so generous.

These are two technical problems among many. The effective way in which they have been handled is repeated in some of the other cases, but not in all. A loudly-voiced current complaint is that too much mechanical equipment used in the north was not designed for that environment at all. It has been used because it was all there was, and the breakdown rate has been high. The work could be done in spite of this (in other countries this might not be so) because conditions, both

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natural and man-made, are severe in much of the rest of the country. But it was, and is, demonstrably wasteful.

Human problems are generally more intractable than technical ones, and this is probably true of the Soviet north, even though men have at times been treated as if they were machines. The attraction of labour into an area which is undeniably more uncomfortable than other possible places to work has been attempted in various ways. From the 1930s to early 1950s, forced labour was widely used. This was inefficient as well as cruel, and is not likely to be repeated for any economic reasons. Contemporaneously, but rising to a peak after the forced labour period, appeals to patriotism, sense of adventure, and Bolshevik endurance were tried, and seem to have had a certain success. But ever since the early 1930s, and underpinning the other methods, there has been an elaborate system of incentive payments and privileges. These 'northern increments', as they are called, are scaled to vary with locality and length of stay. Every few years—in 1945, 1960, and 1967—the law in which they are embodied has been amended, and new rates introduced. The change last year was in the upward direction, with emphasis on larger increments earlier in the immigrant's stay in the north. In addition, there is another set of wage differentials called 'regional coefficients', which are essentially cost-of-living allowances. These are paid as percentage increases on basic pay, and vary in the north between 30 and 100 per cent, depending on locality. The northern increments and regional coefficients, taken together, have ensured that any worker who volunteers for northern service and stays on the job for, say, five years, is between two and three times better off, in various ways, than he would have been if he had continued to work in a central region.

There is another possible source of labour in the indigenous peoples. The north in our sense contains about 950,000 'natives', belonging to some twenty different national groups. This is only about 20 per cent of the total population (1959 figures), but it is the fraction with the greatest expertise at living in this environment. The most numerous groups—Karelian, Komi, and Yakut, who between them account for all but 120,000 of the 950,000—are to some extent integrated in the industrial economy which has come in from the south, and some of their number are employed in mining, transport, and administration. The remaining peoples, in general more primitive, have continued to follow their traditional pursuits of hunting, fishing, or reindeer herding. This has been Soviet policy, on the grounds that as long as food and fur are required, these peoples are the most skilled at producing them. But recently there have been signs that this may change. The standard of living of the pastoral groups is below that of the industrial workers, so perhaps, it is argued, young people in the former should be attracted into industry. An important factor in all this is that since 1960 the native inhabitants of these regions have been eligible for the 'northern increments', and this has tended to reduce the disparity (*sovkhoz* workers therefore receive them, while *kolkhoz* workers do not).

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Despite these measures, there is a labour shortage in places, and the turnover of labour remains much higher, in some regions, than is consistent with efficient and economic running of the enterprises. The upward revision of the increments in 1967 was of course designed to ease these problems. To what extent it will do so will not become clear for some time (the higher rates became effective only on 1 January 1968).

What is quite clear is that solutions to all these problems are being energetically sought. The approval of the wage increments in 1967 must involve many millions of rubles, and so makes unlikely any abandonment or cutting down of the northern investment programme as a whole. It is true, however, that more and more is being written about the need to reduce costs. Furthermore, voices are heard advancing what is in the Soviet context a novel idea; that northern development should be strictly limited to necessities; that big cities like Norilsk arose at least partly from prestige considerations, and are not economically justifiable; and that settlement in the north should be planned for the expected period of exploitation of the resource, and no longer. The reason that these simple and logical views were not advanced long before seems to be that the motives for northern development had always previously been more than just economic. Confirming sovereignty over the area, sovietising the northern peoples, making strategic dispositions—all these undoubtedly played a part. If serious thought is now being given to a policy of comparatively quick in-and-out, this must indicate diminishing relative importance of the other motives. At least, it can no longer be considered grossly unpatriotic to suggest that the population of these remote areas might be permitted to stop rising. If this is to be the trend (and one should emphasise that these views are not yet dominant), then it will accord with the latest thinking on the American north. For there too the accepted idea that a continuously-growing population is essential to economic development is being questioned: new transport media may be making it unnecessary, and the rising value of wilderness and open space in an urbanised society may be making it undesirable. In the Soviet case, economic activities will still be at a high level, because the known resources happen to be very valuable, and continuing geological exploration will undoubtedly produce more of value. Development will thus proceed in any case, but its motivation may be more exclusively economic.

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DOCUMENTS:
Writers on Trial

We publish below nine documents which show that Soviet literature is still in the sixties facing problems similar to those of the thirties. In his letter to the Soviet government, written on 28 March 1930 and reminiscent of Zamyatin's famous letter to Stalin written the following year, Mikhail Bulgakov pleaded to be allowed to go abroad, since by then, to use Zamyatin's phrase, 'the only future for Russian literature is now its past'. On 18 April Stalin telephoned Bulgakov. His wife recorded this conversation in her diary:

> *Stalin: We received your letter. I and some other comrades have read it. You will get a favourable reply. I do not think that you should be permitted to go abroad. Tell me, have we made life so difficult for you?*
> *Bulgakov: In these last years I have often wondered whether a Russian writer can live beyond the borders of his country. I think he cannot.*
> *Stalin: You are right. I think so too. Where do you want to work? In MKhAT?*
> *Bulgakov: Yes, but they have already rejected my approach.*
> *Stalin: Write an application. I think they will agree. . . .*

They did. Stalin's intervention was apparently successful. Bulgakov survived, economically and physically, the dangerous thirties, to die in 1940. But his masterpiece, The Master and Margarita, *had to wait twenty-eight years for publication.*

Solzhenitsyn's troubles seem remarkably similar to those of Bulgakov and Zamyatin—a virtual ban on publication of his works and a campaign of vilification, this time more discreet, since, as he says, it is carried on viva voce *rather than in the press, which has been instructed not to mention his name. Solzhenitsyn's letter, is a follow-up of his famous circular letter to a large number of participants of the fourth Soviet Writers Congress in May 1967 (published in* Survey, *July 1967). It is known that some of the recipients replied to this letter supporting him, and others addressed themselves to cultural officials, declaring their solidarity.*

The letter by Pavel Antokolsky, one of the more cautious liberals, reproduced below, is an eloquent expression of the support that Solzhenitsyn was able to command.

The account by Pavel Litvinov of his interrogation in connection with the trial of Bukovsky-Kushev, and his statement, made jointly with Mrs Daniel, on the verdict in the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial, were widely reported in the western press, and are given here in full for the record.

Letter to the Soviet Government from Mikhail Bulgakov *

1

I address the following letter to the Government of the USSR.

* Cf. Michael Glenny's article in *Survey*, October 1967.

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After the banning of all my works, voices were heard, among many citizens to whom I was known as a writer, all giving me the same advice: to write a 'communist play' (I give the quotation in inverted commas), and in addition to address to the Government of the USSR a repentant letter, containing a renunciation of my former views, as expressed in my literary works, and assurances that I would henceforth work as a fellow-travelling writer dedicated to the idea of communism. The purpose was to save myself from persecution, poverty, and inevitable destruction at the end. I did not follow this advice. I would hardly have succeeded in appearing to the Government of the USSR in a favourable light after writing a letter full of lies, which would have been an untidy and at the same time naïve political manoeuvre. I did not make any attempt to write a communist play, knowing full well that such a play would not work out in my case.

The desire, which has ripened within me, to end my torments as a writer compels me to address a truthful letter to the Government of the USSR.

2

Analysing my scrapbook-cuttings, I have discovered, over the ten years of my literary activity, three hundred references to me in the Soviet press. Of these, three were laudatory, and two hundred and ninety-seven hostile and abusive. These two hundred and ninety-seven are a mirror-reflection of my life as a writer.

The hero of my story *The Days of the Turbins*, Alexei Turbin, was called in a printed poem a 'son of a bitch', and the author of the play was recommended as being 'possessed of a dog's old age'. I was described as 'a literary floor-sweeper picking up the leavings after a dozen guests have vomited themselves silly'. They wrote as follows: '*Mishka* Bulgakov—my godfather, forgive the expression—the writer, rummages in the stale garbage. . . . What, I ask, my little brother, is this ugly creature doing in your play? . . . I am a tactful man, take him and beat him from head to toe. We can do without the Turbins, just as a dog can do without a brassière. He was found, the son of a bitch, Turbin was found, only to have neither full houses nor success' (*Zhizn iskusstva*, no. 44, 1927).

They wrote of Bulgakov that he will remain what he is, 'a neo-bourgeois spawn, splattering the working class and its communist ideals with poisoned but impotent spittle' (*Krasny proletrarii*, no. 14/X, 1926). They reported that I liked 'the atmosphere of a dog's wedding around the wife of any friend' (*Lunacharsky*, *Izvestiya*, 8 October 1926), and that my play *The Days of the Turbins* stank to high heaven (stenographic minutes of an Agitprop conference in May 1927), etc.

I hasten to state that I am not by any means quoting all this with the intention of complaining of criticism or of entering into any polemics whatsoever. My purpose is much more serious.

I am proving with the documents in my hands that the entire Soviet press and, together with it, all the institutions charged with supervising the drama repertoire, have, over all the years of my literary activity,

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unanimously and *with unusual* fury proved that the works of M. Bulgakov cannot exist in the USSR.

And I declare that the Soviet press *is quite right.*

3

My play *The Purple Island* is my starting-point for this letter. All the critics in the USSR, without exception, received this play with the statement that it was 'untalented, toothless, and miserable', and that it represented a 'libel on the revolution'.

The unanimity was complete, but it was broken suddenly and quite surprisingly.

In no. 12 of the *Repertuarny biuleten* in 1928, there appeared a review by P. Novitsky, in which *The Purple Island* was said to be 'an interesting and witty parody' in which 'there rises the ominous shadow of the Grand Inquisitor who suppresses artistic creativity, cultivates slavish and fawningly absurd dramatic patterns, and effaces the personality of author and writer', and a play about 'an ominous dark power breeding helots, lickspittles, and panegyrists'. It was further said that 'if such a dark power exists, then the *indignation* and *malicious wit* of this dramatist glorified by the bourgeoisie are justified'.

One may well ask: where is the truth? Is *The Purple Island*, in the final analysis, a 'miserable untalented play' or the 'witty pamphlet' of which this reviewer speaks? The truth is contained in Novitsky's review. I will not take it upon myself to judge how witty my play is, but I will admit that an ominous shadow does indeed arise in it, and this is the shadow of the Main Repertoire Committee (*Glavrepertkom*). It is this committee which breeds helots, panegyrists, and intimidated 'lackeys'. It is this committee which is killing creative thought and which is ruining Soviet drama and will eventually succeed in ruining it completely.

I did not express these thoughts under my breath in a corner. I put them into a dramatised pamphlet on the stage. The Soviet press, taking the part of the *Glavrepertkom*, wrote that *The Purple Island* was a libel on the revolution. This is puerile babble.

The play contains no libel on the revolution for many reasons, of which, for lack of space, I will point out only one: *it is impossible* to write any libel on the revolution on account of its extraordinary grandiosity. The pamphlet is not a libel, nor is the *Glavrepertkom* the revolution.

But when the German press writes that *The Purple Island* 'is the first call in the Soviet Union for freedom of the press' (*Molodaya Gvardiya*, no. 1, 1929), it is writing the truth. I will admit this. Fighting censorship—whatever its nature and under whatever regime it may exist—is my duty as a writer, just as is my call for freedom of the press. I am an ardent admirer of this freedom and believe that, if any writer ever wanted to set about proving that he did not need it, he would be like a fish giving public assurances that it did not need water.

4

This is one of the characteristics of my writing, and it alone is quite enough to ensure that my writings should not exist in the USSR.

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But connected with this first characteristic is everything else that appears in my satirical stories: the black and mystical tones (I am a mystical writer) in which the countless uglinesses of our life are drawn, the poison in which my tongue is steeped, the deep scepticism towards the revolutionary process which has taken place in my backward country, and the tendency to contrast it with my favourite Great Evolution, and—most important of all—the depiction of all those dreadful traits of my people, which, long before the revolution, used to cause my teacher Saltykov-Shchedrin the deepest suffering.

There is no point in saying that the press of the USSR did not think seriously of mentioning all this, preoccupied as it was with unconvincing statements to the effect that Bulgakov's satire contained 'libel'.

Once only, when I first became known, was it noted with a shade of, as it were, supercilious astonishment that: 'Bulgakov wants to become the satirist of our epoch' (*Knigonosha*, no. 6, 1925).

Alas, they are wrong to use the verb 'wants' in the present tense—it should be transposed into the pluperfect: Bulgakov *had become a satirist* just at the time when any satire (penetrating into forbidden zones) was absolutely unthinkable in the USSR. It was not to me that the honour fell of expressing this criminal thought in the press. It is expressed with complete clarity in an article by V. Blum in the *Literary Gazette*, and the sense of this article can be summarised brilliantly and exactly in one formula: any satirist in the USSR is making an attempt on the Soviet system.

Do we think in the first person in the USSR?

5

And finally, my latest portrait as seen in my ruined plays *The Days of the Turbins* and *The Run*, and in the novel *The White Guard*: the persistent portrayal of the Russian intelligentsia as the best social stratum in our country. In particular, the portrayal of a family of the intelligentsia and nobility, cast by the will of an immutable historical destiny in the years of the civil war into the camp of the White Guard, in the traditions of *War and Peace*. Such a portrayal is quite natural for a writer bound by blood to the intelligentsia.

But portrayals of this kind in the USSR earn their author, just like his heroes—regardless of his great efforts to stand impassively above Reds and Whites—the tag of a White Guard, an enemy, and once having received this, as everyone will recall, he can consider himself a finished man in the USSR.

6

My literary portrait is completed, but it is also a political portrait. I cannot say what depth of criminality can be found in it, but I ask one thing: not to look for any hidden meanings. It is executed with complete honesty.

7

Now I am destroyed. My destruction was received by the Soviet public with great joy and called an 'achievement'. R. Pikiel, noting

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my destruction (*Izvestiya*, 15 October 1929), expressed a liberal thought: 'By this we do not mean that the name of Bulgakov has been struck off the list of Soviet dramatists'. And he raised the hopes of the slaughtered writer with the words: '. . . that it is a matter of his past dramatic works'. Despite this, life, in the person of the *Glavrepertkom*, has shown that Pikiel's liberalism lacks foundation.

On 18 May 1930, I received from the *Glavrepertkom* a document which laconically informed me that—not one of my past works—but my new play *Pious Servitude* (based on Molière) was not allowed to be staged.

I will say briefly that beneath the two lines of this official communication were buried with my work in libraries, my imaginative play which had been called 'brilliant' by countless theatre critics.

R. Pikiel is mistaken. It is not only my past works that have perished, but also my present and all my future works. I personally, with my own hands, have thrown into the fire the draft of a novel about the Devil, the draft of a comedy, and the beginning of a second novel, *The Theatre*.

Everything is hopeless for me.

8

I ask the Soviet Government to take into consideration that I am not a political figure, but a man of letters, and that I have devoted all my output to the Soviet stage. I ask it to pay attention to the following two references to me in the Soviet press. Both of them come from irreconcilable enemies of my works, and for this reason they are very valuable.

The first reference, from 1925, reads: 'He shows himself to be a writer who does not dress himself up in political colours' (Averbach, *Izvestiya*, 20 October 1925). And in 1929: 'His talent is as obvious as the socially reactionary character of his work' (Pikiel, *Izvestiya*, 15 September 1929).

I ask the Soviet Government to take into consideration that not being able to write is for me tantamount to being buried alive.

9

I ask the Government of the USSR to order me to leave the USSR without delay.

10

I appeal to the humanity of the Soviet regime and ask it to release magnanimously into freedom a writer who cannot be useful in his own fatherland.

11

Even if what I have written is unconvincing that I am doomed to lifelong silence in the USSR, I ask the Soviet Government to give me work according to my specialisation and to order me to work in the theatre as a full-time producer. I offer the Government of the

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USSR quite honestly, without any shade of sabotage, a specialist producer and actor, who will undertake to stage any play conscientiously, from Shakespeare down to present-day works. If I am not appointed a producer, I ask for a full-time post as an extra. If I cannot even be an extra, I ask for a position as a stagehand. And if even this is impossible, I ask the Soviet Government to do as it thinks fit with me, but at least to do something with me, because I—a dramatist who has written five plays, who is well known in the USSR and abroad, and who is available at a moment's notice—am afflicted by misery, penury, and ruin.

I ask the Soviet Government to order me into something, since neither a single organisation nor a single person answers my requests.

28 May 1930

M. BULGAKOV.

Letter from Pavel Antokolsky to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, P. N. Demichev

Dear Peter Nilich,

Along with other delegates to our congress, I received the well-known letter of the writer Alexander Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, and it greatly moved me as well as some other comrades. As an old writer and a communist I feel it my duty to convey to you my feelings.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn seems to me to be a writer of rare talent, a man of growing promise for our realist literature, and heir to the great humanistic tradition of Gogol, Tolstoy, and Gorky. We should appreciate and cherish such cultural figures. The criticism of the published works of Solzhenitsyn was shocking because of its passionate hostility and lack of proof.

Confiscating his manuscripts, as described in detail in his letter, appears to be an incredible abuse, which is unworthy of our socialist society and our Soviet state. It is even more horrible because only a few years ago the same thing happened with the manuscript of the second part of the novel of the late Vasili Grossman. Is this kind of seizure of our writers' manuscripts to become a legalised custom?

This cannot and must not be! Such a brutal attitude to works of art is incompatible with our basic laws and unthinkable in any normal human community. If there is anything questionable or unclear in the works of Solzhenitsyn, if they contain any political errors, they should be subject to open discussion in our [writers'] community. There are many such possibilities for writers.

I have been working as a writer for fifty years. I have behind me many books and my whole life, and I have been through many difficult moments. There were times when I had great fears for the fate of our literature and the fate of individual comrades: Bulgakov, Pasternak, Titian Tabidze—I recall these because they were close to me.

Having lived such a life, I just cannot imagine that at the end of my days this kind of fear should arise again, and that it should happen on the eve of our great and famous anniversary.

If a Soviet writer felt compelled to address to his fellows such a letter as that of Solzhenitsyn, it means that we have all to bear responsibility before him and before our readers. If he cannot say what

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he wants to say to the readers in our country, then I, an old writer, have no right to face the readers either.

PAVEL ANTOKOLSKY

SOLZHENITSYN: THEN AND NOW

A New Name in our Literature (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 November 1962)
P. Kosolapov, TASS Correspondent

In 1941 he joined the Soviet army. In 1942, after graduating from the artillery school, he was appointed commanding officer of a battery. In this position he stayed continually and uninterruptedly in the front line until February 1945. He was awarded two decorations. In February 1945, already on the territory of East Prussia, Captain Solzhenitsyn was arrested on groundless political accusations and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. After serving it fully he was sent into exile, from which he returned in 1956. In 1957 he was fully rehabilitated since he had committed no offence.

Report of a speech by the editor-in-chief of Pravda, M. V. Zimyanin, at the House of the Press in Leningrad, 5 October 1967

Recently there has been a great deal of slander in the western press against several of our writers whose works have played into the hands of our enemies. The campaign by the western press in defence of Tarsis ended only when he went to the West, where it became evident that he was not in his right mind.

At the moment, Solzhenitsyn occupies an important place in the propaganda of capitalist governments. He too is a psychologically unbalanced person, a schizophrenic. Formerly he was a prisoner and justly or unjustly was subsequently subjected to repression. Now he takes his revenge against the government through his literary work. The only topic he is able to write about is life in a concentration camp. This topic has become an obsession with him. Solzhenitsyn's works are aimed at the Soviet regime in which he finds only sores and cancerous tumours. He doesn't see anything positive in our society.

I have occasion to read unpublished works in the course of my duties and among them I read Solzhenitsyn's play *The Feast of the Conqueror*. The play is about repressions against those returning from the front. It is very genuine anti-Soviet literature. In the old days, people were even put into prison for works of this kind. Obviously we cannot publish his works. Solzhenitsyn's demand that we do so cannot be met. If he writes stories which correspond to the interests of our society, then his works will be published. He will not be deprived of his bread and butter. Solzhenitsyn is a teacher of physics; let him teach. He very much likes to make public speeches and often appears before various audiences to read his works. He has been given such opportunities. He considers himself a writer of genius.

Among the other names which come up quite often in the western press, one must not forget Evtushenko and Voznesensky. We have beautiful poetry and a great many poets who write wonderful poems.

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But in the West they basically recognise only these two because they find passages in their works worth using in their propaganda. Of course, we do not consider the works of these poets to be anti-Soviet like those of Solzhenitsyn. They write good patriotic works, too. They are not that young any longer, although everyone thinks of them as being young; their works, however, lack the necessary political maturity. That is why they sometimes play into the hands of our enemies. I know them and have spoken with them about this. But they too consider themselves geniuses.

Take Evtushenko. Recently, at a closed meeting, Pavlov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, criticised him. So Evtushenko replied in words which were four times more powerful, ten times more powerful. He made fun of him in a poem.[1] In this way he branded him forever.

Then there is the tale of Voznesensky. Last year he went to the USA; he read his poetry there in front of large audiences. He had a great success and also profited financially. He was getting ready to go on tour of American cities again this year. His trip was already arranged; it was publicised in the USA and his visa was reserved at the American Embassy. Then the war in the Middle East broke out. Our relations with the USA deteriorated. The board of administration of the Writers' Union clearly hinted to Voznesensky that it would be better for him not to go to the USA at this time. Simultaneously, the administration told the American Embassy that the poet was ill.

What did Voznesensky do? I came to the office on Monday morning and glanced through my mail. There was a letter from Voznesensky accusing the Writers' Union. I telephoned him at home. I was told that he had left and that his destination was unknown. I telephoned the Central Committee. They said that they too had received a letter from Voznesensky and that they also telephoned him at home but could not locate him. One day went by, then another. No Voznesensky. Then suddenly I learn that the BBC has broadcast Voznesensky's letter to *Pravda.* He appeared only a week later. Apparently he was sitting it out at a dacha on the outskirts of Moscow. I invited him to come to see me. He denied having given the letter to western journalists.

I told him that he might get off with a reprimand the first time, but if he ever did it again, he would be ground to dust. I myself would see to it that not a trace of him remained.

Some thought that we should have published his letter and given him an answer. But why make this sordid story a topic of general discussion?

Letter from the Secretary of the Soviet Writers Union to A. I. Solzhenitsyn

On 22 September [1967] the Secretariat of the Soviet Writers Union discussed your letters. These discussions gave you the opportunity to learn about the attitude of the Soviet literary community towards you

[1] The poem in question is entitled 'Letter to Esenin'. In it Evtushenko describes what present-day Soviet youth really thinks about the Komsomol. Evtushenko read this poem at a meeting of young people at which Sergei Pavlov was present.

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and towards your literary activities. At that time no resolution was adopted. It was expected that you would think the discussion over and would draw the appropriate conclusions. The Secretariat would like to know what decision you have reached.

K. VORONKOV

Reply from A. I. Solzhenitsyn

I cannot understand the following points in your letter No. 3142 of 25 November 1967:

1. Does the Secretariat intend to protect me from a three years old, uninterrupted campaign of slander against me in my country (it would be too kind to call it unfriendly)? (New facts: on 5 October 1967, in the Press House in Leningrad, the chief editor of *Pravda*, Zimianin, repeated in the presence of a large audience the tired lie about my having been a prisoner of war, and he also used the hackneyed method employed against awkward people, that I am a schizophrenic, while the lecturers of the MGK, referring to my camp sentence—an obsessive idea—have put forward new mendacious versions about it, alleging that I was trying to knock together a defeatist or terrorist organisation in the army, an oversight of the part of the Military Board of the Supreme Court which is difficult to understand.)

2. What measures were taken by the Secretariat to end the illegal prohibition on the use of my published works in the libraries, and the instructions issued by the censorship that my name must not be mentioned in reviews? (In *Questions of Literature* this has been done even in the translation of a . . . Japanese article. In the University of Perm sanctions were applied against a group of students who tried to discuss my published works at a scholarly symposium.)

3. Does the Secretariat want to avert the danger of my book *The Cancer Ward* being published abroad, or is it indifferent to this? Are any steps being taken to publish excerpts from this novel in the *Literary Gazette*, and of the whole novel in *Novy Mir*?

4. Does the Secretariat intend to ask the Government to join the international copyright convention? This would provide our authors with the means to protect their works from illegal foreign editions and from disgusting commercial rivalries.

5. During the last six months since I wrote my letter to the [Writers] Congress, has the distribution of the illegal edition of excerpts from my archives been stopped and has this edition been destroyed?

6. What measures have been taken by the Secretariat to get my archives and my novel *In the first circle* returned to me, apart from having given public assurances (by the Secretary Ozerov, for instance) that they have already been returned?

7. Has the Secretariat accepted or rejected the proposal of K. Simonov to publish a collection of my writings?

8. Why have I not yet received the verbatim report of the meeting of the Secretariat on 22 September so that I may study it?

I would be very grateful for clarification on these points.

A. SOLZHENITSYN

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When the delayed December 1967 issue of Novy Mir *finally appeared (on 6 February 1968), the expected first instalment of Solzhenitsyn's* The Cancer Ward *was not in it. The decision to exclude it was apparently taken at high level before Christmas, against bitter opposition. This was another blow to the Soviet intellectual community. They have shown their anxiety about the restrictions and persecution in a series of letters addressed to the Soviet authorities in connection with the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial. These include a letter dated 18 January 1968 and signed by the sons of Vera Panova, Boris and Yuri Vakhtin, a letter dated 27 January 1968 and signed by 52 scientists and writers, and a letter signed by 24 writers (including Konstantin Paustovsky, Yuri Kazakov, Tazil Iskanderov and Vasili Aksyonov). Relatives and supporters of the imprisoned men, including Alexander Ginzburg's mother, and friends bearing such famous names as Pavel Litvinov, Peter Yakir, and Antonov Ovseyenko, were prevented from seeing the foreign press correspondents and warned to stop their campaign. Some of them lost their jobs, others were victimised in other ways (Alexander Esenin-Volpin, son of the poet, has been put into a mental home again). But, judging by the voluminous documentary evidence reaching the West, the Soviet intellectuals have not allowed themselves to be intimidated.*

Letter from Pavel M. Litvinov to the Soviet press and to the French and Italian Communist dailies, l'Humanité and Unita

I regard it as my duty to make public the following:

On 26 September 1967, I was summoned by the Committee of State Security (KGB) to appear before Gostev, an official of the KGB. Another officer of the KGB, who did not give his name, was present during our conversation.

After this talk was over, I wrote it down immediately and as fully as I could remember. I vouch for the accuracy of the substance of what was said between the representative of the KGB and me.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have knowledge that you, together with a group of other people, intend to reproduce and distribute the minutes of the recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and others. We warn you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.

I: Irrespective of my intentions, I cannot understand what the criminal responsibility for such an action might be.

Gostev: The court will decide that, and we wish only to warn you that if such a record should be spread through Moscow or other cities or appears abroad, you will be held responsible for this.

I: I know the laws well and I cannot imagine what particular law would be transgressed by the composition of such a document.

Gostev: There is such an article, 190-I Take the criminal code and read it.

I: I know this article very well and can recite it from memory. It deals with slanderous fabrications which would discredit the Soviet social system and regime. What kind of slander could there be in recording the hearing of a case before a Soviet court?

Gostev: Well, your notes will be a biased distortion of facts and a

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slander of the court's actions, and that would be proved by the agency competent to handle such cases.

I: How can you possibly know this? Instead of starting a new case, you yourself should publish the record of this criminal trial and in this way kill the rumours circulating in Moscow.

Gostev: And why do we need to publish it? It is an ordinary criminal case of disturbance of the peace.

I: If so, it is all the more important to give information about it, to let all the people see that it is really an ordinary case.

Gostev: *Vechernyaya Moskva* [a Moscow newspaper] of 4 September 1967, gives all the information about the case. All that has to be known about the trial is in there.

I: In the first place, there is too little information. The reader who had heard nothing previously about this case simply would not understand what it is all about. In the second place, it is false and slanderous. Rather, the editor of *Vechernaya Moskva* or the person who gave such information should be charged with slander.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, the news report is absolutely correct. Remember that.

I: It says there that Bukovsky pleaded guilty. Yet I, who was interested in this case, know perfectly well that he did not plead guilty.

Gostev: What does it matter whether he pleaded guilty or not? The court found him guilty. Consequently, he is guilty.

I: I am not talking now about the court's decision; nor did the newspaper have it in mind. And confession of guilt by the defendant represents a completely independent judicial concept. In general, it would be a good idea to tell more about Bukovsky; for example, how he was arrested while reciting poetry on Mayakovsky Square, brought to the police station and beaten up.

Gostev: This is not true. It could not be.

I: His mother said so.

Gostev: Who cares what she said?

I: She did not tell it to me—I do not know her—but to the court, and nobody interrupted her or accused her of slander.

Gostev: She should rather have told you how she was summoned and warned about the conduct of her son. We can summon your parents, too. And in general, Pavel Mikhailovich, have in mind: *Vechernyaya Moskva* has printed all that the Soviet people should know about this case and this information is completely true and we warn you that if not only you, but your friends or anybody makes this record, you specifically will be held responsible for it. You understand very well that such a record can be used by our ideological enemies, especially on the eve of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

I: But I do not know of any law that would prohibit the dissemination of a non-secret document only because it might be misused by somebody. Much critical material from Soviet newspapers might also be misused by somebody.

Gostev: It should be clear to you what we are talking about. We are only warning you, and the court will prove the guilt.

I: It will prove it, I have no doubt. The trial of Bukovsky makes

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that clear. And how about my friend Alexander Ginzburg? Is he imprisoned for the same kind of actions that you are warning me about?

Gostev: Well, you will learn what he did when he is put on trial. He will be acquitted if he is innocent. Could you possibly think that now, in the 50th year of Soviet power, a Soviet court would make a wrong decision?

I: Then why was Bukovsky's trial closed to the public?

Gostev: It was not.

I: Yet it was impossible to get in.

Gostev: Those who had to get in got in. There were representatives of the public and all seats in the hall were taken. We did not intend to rent an auditorium because of this case.

I: In other words, the public nature of legal proceedings was violated.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have no intention of arguing with you. We simply warn you. Just imagine if people would learn that the grandson of the great diplomat Litvinov is busy with such doings, this would be a blot on his memory.

I: Well, I do not think he would blame me. Can I go?

Gostev: Please. The best thing for you to do now would be to go home and destroy all that you've collected.

I know that a similar kind of conversation was conducted with Alexander Ginzburg two months before his arrest.

I am asking you to publish this letter so that in case of my arrest the public would be informed about the circumstances which preceded it.

P. M. LITVINOV

Moscow
3 October 1967

Assistant in the Faculty of Physics in Moscow, Institute of Precision Chemical Technology

Bukovsky's Plea before the Moscow City Court, 1 September 1967 (excerpts)

In preparation for this trial, I anticipated that the proceedings would completely reveal all the motives for the actions charged, and would deal with the legal analysis of the case. The court has done nothing of the kind. It engaged in character defamation—whether we are good or bad is irrelevant to the case.

I expected the prosecution to present a detailed analysis of the 'disturbance' which we made on the square: who hit whom, who stepped on who's foot. And this did not follow either. The prosecutor in his speech says: 'As I see it, the danger of this crime lies in its insolence'.

But I have here before me the text of the Soviet Constitution: 'In accordance with the interests of the workers and with the aim of strengthening the Socialist system the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law . . . the right of street processions and demonstrations'. Why is such an article included? For May Day and October demonstrations? But it is not necessary to include such an article for demonstrations that the government organises—it is clear that no one will disperse these demonstrations.

We do not need freedom 'pro' if there is no freedom 'anti'. We

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know that protest demonstrations are powerful weapons in the hands of the workers; this is an inalienable right in all democratic states. In Madrid, there was a trial of the participants of a May Day demonstration. They were tried under a new law recently passed in Spain that provides imprisonment from one and a half to three years for participation in demonstrations. I see a disturbing identity between fascist Spanish and Soviet legislation.

Judge: Defendant, you are comparing things that cannot be compared: the actions of the rulers of Spain and those of the Soviet state. In court, the comparison of Soviet policy with the politics of foreign bourgeois states is intolerable. Stay closer to the substance of the indictment. I object to the abusiveness of your words.

Bukovsky: You do not have the right to interrupt me. I have not departed from the essence of my case.

In our country, the organs of state security play a police role. What democracy can there be to speak of when we are being watched? Let them catch spies! Why are we being questioned about our acquaintances, about what we were doing two or three years ago and such things? I recognise the important role of the organs of the KGB in the fight for state security. But what is their business in this case? There were no external enemies involved here.

Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, this is of interest to us—keep closer to the indictment. What significance does everything you are saying essentially have to do with the resolution of your case?

Bukovsky: I have already said that you have no right to interrupt me. The significance is quite simple: there have been breaches of the law in the conduct of the investigation, and it is my duty to speak out about them, so now I am speaking out.

We demonstrated in the defence of legality. It is incomprehensible why the office whose responsibility it is to safeguard the citizens' rights sanctions such actions by the Druzhinniki [civilian auxiliary police] and the KGB. We did not come out against laws. We protested against an unconstitutional decree. Was this really an anti-Soviet demand.

Isn't the constitution the basic law of our country? I shall read the full text of Clause 125:

'In accordance with the workers' interests and with the aim of strengthening the Socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: A. Freedom of speech; B. Freedom of the press; C. Freedom of gatherings and meetings; D. Freedom of processions and demonstrations on the street. These rights of the citizens are secured by making available to workers and their organisations printing facilities, supplies of paper, public buildings, streets . . .'

Yes, streets, Citizen Prosecutor!

'. . . means of communication and other material conditions, necessary for their realisation.'

Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, we are lawyers here, and all those present in the courtroom have also been through grammar school.

Bukovsky: You are interrupting me again.

Judge: I declare a five-minute recess.

Bukovsky: I did not ask for one. I will soon end my final statement.

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You are destroying the continuity of my final statement.

(The judge declares a recess.)

Judge (after the recess): Defendant Bukovsky, continue your last speech, but I warn you that if you continue to criticise the laws and the activities of the KGB instead of giving an explanation about the case at hand, I will have to interrupt you.

Bukovsky: We are accused of criticising the laws. This gives me the right and the foundation for raising these fundamental critical questions in my final statement. But there is also another aspect. The question of honesty and civic integrity. You are judges. You are supposed to embody these qualities. If you actually embody honesty and integrity, you will make the only possible sentence in this case —a verdict of 'Not Guilty'. I understand that that is very difficult.

Prosecutor: I direct the attention of the court to the fact that the accused is abusing the right to a final statement. He criticises the laws, discredits the activities of the organs of the KGB, he is beginning to insult you. A new criminal act is being perpetrated here. As a representative of the prosecution, I must stop this and I call upon you to require the defendant to talk only about the substance of the charges against him. Otherwise one may listen without end to speeches here with all kinds of criticism of the laws and of the government.

Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, you have heard the prosecutor's remarks. I will permit you to speak only on the substance of the indictment.

Bukovsky (to the prosecutor): You accuse us of trying, by our slogans, to discredit the KGB, but the KGB has discredited itself to such a degree that we have nothing to add. (to the court) I shall speak about the charges. But what the prosecutor would like to hear from me, he won't hear. There is no criminal act in our case. I absolutely do not repent for organising this demonstration. I find that it accomplished what it had to accomplish, and when I am free again, I shall again organise demonstrations, of course with complete observance of the law, as before. I have finished my statement.

Appeal to world opinion from P. M. Litvinov and Larisa Daniel on the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial

The judicial trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova which is taking place at present in the Moscow city court is being carried out in violation of the most important principles of Soviet law. The judge and the prosecutor, with the participation of a special kind of audience, have turned the trial into a wild mockery of three of the accused—Galanskov, Ginzburg and Lashkova—and of the witnesses unthinkable in the twentieth century.

The case took on the character of the well-known 'witch trials' on its second day, when Galanskov and Ginzburg—in spite of a year of preliminary incarceration, in spite of pressure from the court—refused to accept the groundless accusations made against them by Dobrovolsky and sought to prove their own innocence. Evidence by witnesses in favour of Galanskov and Ginzburg infuriated the court even more.

The judge and the prosecutor throughout the trial have been helping

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Dobrovolsky to introduce false evidence against Galanskov and Ginzburg. The defence lawyers are constantly forbidden to ask questions, and the witnesses are not being allowed to give evidence which unmasks the provocative role of Dobrovolsky in this case.

Judge Mironov has not once stopped the prosecutor. But he is allowing people who represent the defence to say only that which fits in with the programme already prepared by the KGB investigation. Whenever any participant in the trial departs from the rehearsed spectacle the judge cries 'Your question is out of order', 'This has no relation to the case', 'I will not allow you to speak.' These exclamations have been directed at the accused (apart from Dobrovolsky), at their lawyers and the witnesses.

The witnesses leave the court after their examination, or rather they are pushed out of the court, in a depressed state, almost in hysterics.

Witness Yelena Basilova was not allowed to make a statement to the court. She wanted to record how the KGB had persecuted her mentally sick husband, whose evidence, given during the investigation when he was in a certifiable state, plays an important part in the prosecution case. Basilova was driven out of the court while the judge shouted and the audience howled, drowning her words.

P. Grigorenko [the former Soviet Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko] submitted a request that he be examined as a witness because he could explain the origin of the money found on Dobrovolsky. According to Dobrovolsky, Galanskov gave him this money. Grigorenko's request was turned down on the pretext that he is allegedly mentally ill. This is not true.

Witness Aida Topeshkina was not allowed to make a statement to the court in which she wanted to give facts showing the falsity of Dobrovolsky's evidence. Topeshkina, an expectant mother, was physically ejected from the courtroom while the audience howled at her.

The 'commandant of the court', KGB Colonel Tsirkunenko, did not allow witness L. Katz back into the court after a recess and told her: 'If you had given other evidence you could have stayed.'

None of the witnesses has been allowed to stay in the court after giving evidence, although they are obliged to stay under Soviet law. Appeals by the witnesses on the basis of Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure went unheeded, and the judge said sharply to witness V. Vinogradova: 'You can just leave the court under Article 283.'

The courtroom is filled with specially selected people, officials of the KGB and volunteer militia, who give the appearance of an open public trial. These people make a noise, laugh, and insult the accused and the witnesses. Judge Mironov has made no attempt to prevent these violations of order. Not one of the blatant offenders has been ejected from the hall.

In this tense atmosphere there can be no pretence that the trial is objective, that there is any justice or legality about it. The sentence was decided from the very start.

We appeal to world public opinion, and in the first place to Soviet public opinion. We appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive and who has sufficient courage.

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Demand public condemnation of this shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating it. Demand the release of the accused from arrest. Demand a new trial with the observance of all legal norms and with the presence of international observers.

Citizens of our country, this trial is a stain on the honour of our state and on the conscience of every one of us. You yourselves elected this court and these judges. Demand that they be deprived of the posts which they have abused.

Today it is not only the fate of the three accused which is in danger—their trial is no better than the celebrated trials of the 1930s which involved us in so much shame and so much blood that we have still not recovered from them.

We pass this appeal to the western progressive press and ask for it to be published and broadcast by radio as soon as possible—we are not sending this request to Soviet newspapers because that is hopeless.

Signed: LARISA BOGORAZ DANIEL
PAVEL LITVINOV

Moscow, 12 January 1968.

Letter to the Supreme Court of the USSR

In the last two years a number of political trials have taken place in Moscow and Leningrad, beginning with the well-known affair of Sinyavsky and Daniel and ending so far with the trial of Ginzburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolsky, and Lashkova. All these court cases have taken place in an abnormal atmosphere of secrecy, and have been accompanied by an astonishing and confusing press clamour which makes it clear to an attentive observer that in the course of the preliminary investigations and later in the course of the court proceedings, there were serious abuses of Soviet law and of the constitutional norms, not to mention the repulsive moral atmosphere of these trials.

We lost our father during the period of the Stalinist mass persecutions. He was rehabilitated posthumously. We cannot accept the thought that this horror which our country and our people lived through in those terrible times of lawlessness and bestiality should be repeated, even on a smaller scale. Our fatherland, to which we have devoted our lives, has endured infinite suffering in wars, revolutions, and in the mutual extermination of its citizens. One of the worst sufferings was the lawlessness which undermined the spiritual and physical strength of our society. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the new lawlessness. If we did our lives and our work would lose all meaning and would be reduced to a simple biological existence.

We demand a re-examination of the court cases of Sinyavsky and Daniel, of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova, of the case of Bukovsky, that of Ogurtsov and others. We demand an open and public re-examination which will throw light on the methods used in the investigation, on the character of these cases. We demand that the inquiry should be made in the full light of day and in the glare of publicity. We have the right to demand this in virtue of the very essence

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of our Constitution, of our ideas about our civil rights and our human dignity, of our desire to see our fatherland clean and beautiful—in big as in small things.

B. B. Vakhtin
Yu. B. Vakhtin

18 January 1968

Letter to the Presidium of the Consultative Meeting of the Communist Parties in Budapest

In the last few years several political trials have taken place in our country. Their essential significance consists in the fact that people were tried there for their beliefs in violation of their basic civic rights. That is precisely why these trials have seen such serious abuses of legal rights, the most important abuse being the absence of open trials.

Public opinion does not wish to tolerate such lawlessness any longer; it has caused indignation and protest which mounted from trial to trial. A great number of individual and collective letters were sent to the judicial, government, and party institutions, including the central committee of the CPSU. These letters remained unanswered. However, those who were most active in their protests received a reply in the form of notices terminating their employment, summonses to the KGB with the threat of arrest, and, finally, the most shocking form of punishment, compulsory confinement in a mental asylum. These illegal and inhuman acts cannot have any positive result. On the contrary, they increase tension and give rise to further indignation. We consider it our duty to draw attention to the fact that there are in prisons and concentration camps many thousands of political prisoners about whom almost no one knows. They find themselves in the inhuman conditions of compulsory labour on a semi-starvation diet, left completely to the arbitrary power of the administration. After the termination of their sentences they are subject to extra-legal, and often illegal, persecution: restrictions as to where they can live and administrative supervision, measures which put a free man into the position of an exile.

We would also like to draw your attention to the discrimination against minorities and to the political persecution of people struggling for equal national rights, which manifests itself very clearly in the case of the Crimean Tatars.

You know that many communists in foreign countries and in our own country have often expressed their critical views about the political persecutions of recent years. We ask the participants of the consultative meeting to assess fully the danger which results from the complete disregard of human rights in our country.

Alexei Kostorin (Party member since 1916), Larisa Bogoraz Daniel, Pavel Litvinov, Zamira Asanova (one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatars), Pyotr Yakir, Victor Krasin, Ilya Gabay, Boris Shragin, Anatole Levitin, Yuli Kim, Yuri Glazov, Pyotr Grigorenko.

24 February 1968

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

DIAMAT REVISITED

Alasdair MacIntyre

'DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM' IS AMONG orthodox communists almost a synonym for 'Marxism'. The works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have been sieved and homogenised into a single unvarying porridge. Such homogenisation can be used to pulp a variety of ingredients. Stalin can be taken out and replaced by Trotsky or not replaced at all; Bukharin may be pulped into the general mass or not; but what remains constant is the notion of a well-integrated, all-inclusive system of thought. Such homogenisation has been resisted by many Marxists as well as by some critics. At one extreme Kolakowski has treated Marxism as only a methodology. Lukacs long ago insisted on the incompatibility of some of Engels's positions with those of Marx; and Korsch and Lukacs from rather different starting-points both argued that the truth of historical materialism is logically independent of the truth of dialectical materialism. Naturally enough, to insist on the different and perhaps incompatible strands in Marxist thought has always involved a commitment on the history of Marxism and an answer to the questions of how much Marx took from Hegel, how far he turned his back upon Hegel, what his debt was to Saint Simon and so on. So much industry has been expended upon these and related topics that one might have supposed it impossible at this date to write a new and original book. Dr Jordan has shown in the most striking way that this supposition is false. Inevitably, however, the price of originality is contentiousness, and if I respond to Dr Jordan's impressive book [1] by being contentious it will scarcely be surprising.

Dr Jordan's argument falls into three parts. He begins with an exposition of a claim for the originality of *Herr Eugen Dührings Umwalzung der Wissenschaft*, better known as *Anti-Dühring*, but in a way that is relatively unfamiliar. It has been common, for example, to assert that an Hegelian Marx was misunderstood and misinterpreted by an Engels who had taken in too much of Victorian materialism. Dr Jordan claims rather that a non-Hegelian or even anti-Hegelian Marx was misunderstood and misrepresented by an Hegelian Engels. 'Hegelian positivism' is the apt title which Dr Jordan borrows from Dr F. A. Haye to give to Engels's doctrine, after his careful examination of the relationship of the views of both Marx and Engels to those of Saint Simon.

Secondly, Dr Jordan examines the development of Engels's system by Plekhanov, by Lenin, and by Stalin. What endures throughout this development is the notion of a hierarchy of laws, governing the behaviour of matter in motion and of all those properties—including mental ones—which emerge from matter in motion. Of these the so-called laws of dialectics are the highest and all other laws occur lower

[1] *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism*, by Z. A. Jordan, Macmillan, 1967, 60s.

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in the scale. But neither Engels nor Plekhanov, who invented the expression 'dialectical materialism', nor even Lenin argued that the doctrines of historical materialism could be deduced from those of dialectical materialism. This formal integration of Marx's theory of history into Engels's physical cosmology was the distinctive philosophical thesis advanced by Stalin. Nonetheless Plekhanov and Lenin had both paved the way, especially by their epistemological contentions. Finally, in the third part of his book Dr Jordan turns from historical exposition to independent philosophical criticism and examines the character of the relationship which does hold between dialectical and historical materialism. He argues that the two *are* logically independent doctrines, and stresses to advantage the different strains in Marxism which orthodox communist commentators have so often and so wilfully homogenised.

DR JORDAN WRITES LUCIDLY and skilfully, although with a certain repetitiousness. A shorter book could perhaps have served his purposes better. Furthermore his method of argument is one that carries less conviction than it might have done. He is excellent at taking to pieces the authors of whom he writes; his pen is at its best when it is used either as a scalpel for dissection or as a cleaver for dismembering. But taking an author to pieces is always only part of the work of criticism, even of philosophical criticism. To put him together again and to understand the whole as a whole is also necessary. To see an author's work with an historical imagination which enables one to connect text and context will often enable the critic to correct impressions derived from looking at each part of an author's work in isolation. It is this imagination which appears to be absent from Dr Jordan's writing, and it is in the interests of this imagination that I wish to question several of his conclusions.

The first concerns the relation of Marx's views to those of Engels. Dr Jordan believes that it is not only conceivable but the case that Marx took little or no interest in the contents of *Anti-Dühring*, and also that Marx would have had no reason to believe that anything said in a book by Engels might be taken to be his view also. Engels's own explicit attribution of the greater part of the ideas of *Anti-Dühring* to Marx he ascribes to Engels's modesty. But in the preface of 1885 Engels tells us that he read the whole manuscript to Marx. Does Dr Jordan seriously imagine that Marx would have allowed Engels to proceed with publishing anything to which he did not fundamentally assent (above all in a book for which he himself had written a short part of the section on economics)? To suppose that he would runs counter to everything that we know of the relationship of Marx to Engels. Here is one point where neglect of historical context leads to a conclusion that is wild.

Consider next the question of how far Marx himself remained an Hegelian. Marx's own explicit utterances on this matter are, as Dr Jordan notes, not very enlightening. But Dr Jordan is able to see the rift between Marx and Hegel as wider than it is because he insists upon a distinction between a metaphysical concept of estrangement to be found in Hegel (and retained by Marx only in the 1844 Mss) and the

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empirical sociological concept of alienation found in *The German Ideology* and later writings. In fact, however, this distinction between the 'metaphysical' and the 'empirical sociological' is precisely one that both Hegel and Marx reject. The best exposition of this is in Dr Heiss's as yet untranslated work on Hegel, Marx, and Kierkegaard, *Die Grossen Dialektiker des 19. Jahrhunderts*, where Heiss contends rightly that on the materialist interpretation of history Marx only asserted what Hegel had already acknowledged. Dr Jordan quotes Heiss, but accuses him of failing to see that 'unlike Marx, Hegel deduced social and economic reality from ideas and not the other way round'. Here, however, Dr. Jordan is himself in the wrong. Neither Hegel nor Marx believed that the relation between ideas and social economic reality was a deductive one. Nor is there any necessary incompatibility between the Hegelian contention as to the priority of the Idea, which need amount to no more than the contention that there is a rational pattern in historical development, and the Marxist contention as to the secondary importance of ideas, which amounts to the contention that the explicit articulation of theories and philosophies has only a subordinate role in the working out of that pattern. Of course both Hegel and Marx can be and have been interpreted in such a way as to inflate Hegel metaphysically and to deflate Marx into a mere positivist sociology; but when this is done the transition from Hegel's use of the notion of estrangement or alienation to Marx's becomes unintelligible. Indeed, those who perform this latter deflation tend to argue—falsely—that Marx abandoned the concept of alienation.

Thirdly, there are a host of subsidiary questions to be raised about particular interpretations advanced or assumed by Dr Jordan. Out of these I select two. The first concerns his treatment of Lenin's thought. Lenin has perhaps suffered more than any other writer from the general communist tendency to homogenise the history of Marxism, and it is a great pity that his critics should not challenge his adulators on this point. Dr Jordan, for example, fails to notice the inconsistency between *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and the later *Philosophical Notebooks*. He devotes a section to stressing Lenin's view of the distinction between materialism and idealism as the most important single philosophical distinction in the former work; he never refers to the declarations in the *Notebooks* that 'Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism', or that 'It is impossible fully to grasp Marx's *Capital* . . . if you have not studied through and understood the *whole* of Hegel's *Logic*'.

Again, although Dr Jordan of course recognises how much Marx was influenced by a wide variety of philosophical predecessors, he is apt to underestimate this influence on later Marxists. In particular Spinoza was from Plekhanov onwards a powerful influence on the monism of dialectical materialists. The treatment of Spinoza as a materialist by Soviet philosophers may throw more light on what can be meant by 'materialism' than it does on Spinoza, but in the debate between the followers of A. M. Deborin and the mechanistic school in the 1920s, Spinoza's was a crucial influence. Dr Jordan curiously refers only to the political aspects of this debate and seems to assign to it no philosophical importance.

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Most important of all, perhaps, there is the question to which Dr Jordan addresses himself in the third part of his book, that of the relationship of dialectical to historical materialism. The most extreme view on this point was that taken by Karl Korsch, who did not believe that Marx was committed to any general philosophy of history. A little less extreme is Lukacs's contention that Marx's philosophy of history is independent of Engels's dialectical materialism, and indeed that the former is true, the latter false. What Korsch and Lukacs both ignored, and what Dr Jordan follows them in ignoring, is that historical materialism, as Marx propounded it, clearly implies a theory of knowledge, and one at odds with the theory implied by Marx's own early naturalism and even with that implied by the *Theses on Feuerbach*. For if consciousness is to be explained in terms of being, then some causal relationship between what are called in *The German Ideology* material circumstances and consciousness must exist. Hence some kind of epistemological materialism at least does seem to be presupposed by historical materialism. This of course leaves unsettled Dr Jordan's point that Engels's statement of the laws of dialectics, apart from being exceptionally muddled, neither entails nor is entailed by historical materialism. But it does, I suspect, give us a clue to some of Lenin's inconsistent preoccupations.

Finally there is the question of Dr Jordan's own standpoint. One of the most irritating habits of many Marxist writers is that of supposing that a disputed question has been settled because the views of Marx, Engels, or Lenin can be cited on one side. Dr Jordan never of course quite descends to the level of this tired scholasticism. But he does give the impression of believing that not only have all the major questions in the philosophy of science been settled, but that it was Sir Karl Popper who settled them. So Popper tends to be cited rather than argued for. It is perhaps unfair first to complain of the length at which Dr. Jordan writes and then to ask for more. But his own position is never stated fully enough for it to be clear in what perspective he finally regards Marxist philosophy. He occasionally writes—in his closing sentences, for example—as though dialectical materialism could be revised and purged of its confusions, so that it might be presented as at least a possible philosophical position; at other times he appears to think it irredeemably erroneous.

LENIN AND 1917

Leonard Schapiro

THE DEVICE OF CONSTRUCTING a short introduction to a major historical event around the part played in it by a leading figure is not new. It is an excellent one, high-lighting as it does the thoughts and actions of one great figure against the background of his influence and achievement. A series of this nature already exists, and contains some excellent volumes. Unfortunately, the volume on Lenin in the earlier series is not distinguished for its excellence so much as for its fidelity to the official Communist Party line of the day, which is now discredited even

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in the Soviet Union. There was therefore every reason for a new essay of this kind to be offered to the public (by a different publisher and author). In spite of the numerous books on and around the Russian Revolution which have appeared in connection with the half-century of 1917, Dr Shukman's is quite unique.* It is the most accurate, balanced, lucid, well-documented, readable, and useful introduction to the Russian Revolution for the student or general reader available in English.

Dr Shukman does not claim to have written a biography of Lenin. His aim has been to depict the salient features of the man and of the party which he built up, and 'its activities against the general background of change in Russia'. He has succeeded admirably. Lenin and the Bolsheviks do not therefore appear as they do in hagiographical writings as the most important factors in Russian political life after 1903. They are restored to proportion precisely by showing the reader how it came about that a comparatively unimportant revolutionary movement, one among many others, succeeded through a combination of factors—not least the genius and determination of its leader, Lenin—in seizing power for itself in November 1917. Dr Shukman need not expect to please all his readers. He will not please those who see the victory of Bolshevism as the working out of the eternal historical law with Lenin as an almost accidental element in the process—a view which even Trotsky (who knew the facts) found it more difficult to maintain than some later historians. Dr Shukman will not delight that large school of critics who regard the number of Russian sputniks circulating in space in 1967 as proof of Lenin's infallibility in 1917. Nor again will this book find favour with those who see Lenin as a power-drunk paranoiac. But it should be a satisfaction to any author that he has not written to please a transient fashion, but to elucidate the facts. A good historian does not seek to denigrate Lenin: he understands why it was that the Bolsheviks became obsessed with what Bertrand Russell called their 'impatient philosophy', and rightly sees the causes of this in Russian society and its rulers before the revolution. But he likewise is fully aware of the potentialities of Russian political development which the Bolshevik victory destroyed, or at all events retarded for generations.

In short, when one recalls much of the emotional rubbish which has come through the printing presses, the microphone, and the television screen of late, Dr Shukman's little book is like a drink of cold water after chocolate creams. Of course Lenin was a great revolutionary. But there is nothing remarkable about the subjugation of an ignorant, demoralised, and gullible mass and the subsequent destruction of all the values for which the Russian revolutionary movement stood. I hasten to add that Dr Shukman says nothing so stark as this: his strict aim is to give facts and not to pass judgment. The reader is left to judge the facts for himself. But he can be confident that the facts offered to him are based on a detailed study of all available sources, as will be apparent to any reader who knows these sources. It will be less apparent to those readers whose knowledge of the Russian revolutionary movement is based on a series of legends repeated by a succession of indifferent secondary accounts. For such readers some of Dr Shukman's

* Harold Shukman, **Lenin and the Russian Revolution.** Batsford, 1967. 224 pp. 35/-.

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statements will come as a surprise: for example, the observation (on p. 43) on Lenin in 1893, when he came to St Petersburg from Samara, that 'While his Marxist orthodoxy was already recognised, his zeal as a revolutionary of an earlier tradition, unrelated to the socialism of Marx's western Europe, gave him his stamp'. A large volume could be written on this simple, but little recognised, truth.

It is because this book is so good and accurate and provides so excellent an introduction for the beginner, and in no spirit of carping criticism, that I now append a list of its very few blemishes. I hope this book will be used by many generations of students: but when a second edition appears there are a few small matters that could be improved. In some instances a word or two of additional clarification seem to me essential for the beginner, for whom this book is, after all, intended. Thus, the difference in calendar remains unexplained. And so, since Dr Shukman uses New Style throughout, a photograph on p. 96 remains labelled 'February', although the dramatic incident which it depicts took place on 10 March New Style. The provisions of the Fundamental Laws need a little elucidation if the reader is to follow the story—in particular Article 87 is mentioned (on pp. 113 and 120) but nowhere explained; nor is the fact that the Ministry was not responsible to the Duma, which was, after all, the main complaint of the Kadets against the Fundamental Laws.

There are also a few minor slips to be corrected. The *Okhrana* was not 'set up' in 1881 (p. 16), but its powers were considerably strengthened. The meaning of *Cherny Peredel* is debatable (the *narodniki* used it in the sense of distribution of land to the 'dark' ('black') poor peasants, Dahl gives quite a different meaning), but it cannot mean 'redistribution of the black earth' (p. 29). The movement 'to the people' was in 1873–74, not 1872–73 (p. 30). Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia* deals with the development of capitalism in the *villages*, as well as with industrialisation (p. 46)—a *very* important fact in the making of Bolshevik doctrine. Shipov was not a member of the Zemstvo Constitutionalist group (p. 85). It was the Schmidt sisters' brother, not father, who had left his estate to the Social-Democratic Party (p. 127). It is hardly true to say that the Duma, on 12 March 1917, 'resolved to take matters into its own hands' (p. 154). Had it really done so the history of the world might have been very different. As it was, by their lack of resolution the bewildered Duma members left it to a few radical hotheads to turn themselves into a 'Provisional Committee', which, precisely because it lacked the legitimacy of the Duma's authority behind it, had to legitimate itself by a deal with the Petrograd Soviet.

These are all very small matters and are mentioned only out of a desire for perfectionism. Dr Shukman is to be warmly congratulated for performing a service which it is to be hoped will be increasingly recognised and welcomed by those who are beginning their studies of Bolshevism. His first full-length published work does great credit to a young scholar from whom much will be awaited in the future.

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RUSSIA IN ASIA

Ann Sheehy

ALTHOUGH MISS CONOLLY'S BOOK * OVERLAPS to some extent that of Professors Nove and Newth† in that both deal with the economic development of Central Asia under Soviet rule, both its scope and aims are different. Miss Conolly takes as her canvas the whole of the Soviet Union's vast Asian territories beyond the Urals, that is, the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Soviet Far East, and sets herself the task of depicting their economic resources, how these have been and are being developed, and their role in the Soviet economy. Beneath the forests and frozen wastes of the north and the inhospitable deserts of the south very valuable deposits of gold, diamonds, oil, natural gas, and various ferrous and non-ferrous metals have already been discovered, and there are almost certainly more still to be found. Although some of this wealth is situated in regions so remote and uncongenial that there would be little future in trying to exploit it. Miss Conolly shows that there is every prospect of Soviet Asia becoming one of the major industrial areas of the world. The area has the added political interest of a 4,500 km. common frontier with China, and the possibility of separatist tendencies developing in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

With a surefootedness that compels admiration, Miss Conolly threads her way through a mass of Soviet, Tsarist, and western sources. In particular her assiduous study of the local and metropolitan Soviet press and journals has enabled her to provide not only the dry but necessary facts and figures on the progress of industry and agriculture, but also the human side of the story—the grandiose plans, the enormous natural difficulties of climate, distance, and terrain, the incredible waste and incompetence, and the attempts of local officials to promote the interests of their own regions.

The work is divided into three parts. The first deals with the Tsarist period, and here Miss Conolly provides a useful corrective to Soviet assertions that virtually no industrial development took place beyond the Urals before the revolution. It is true that the achievements were small, but the future promised well for the sturdy, brash Siberians. The period between the revolution and the end of the second world war is covered by the second section. Bolshevik views on the need for a shift to the east to bring industry nearer to the sources of raw materials and enable the less developed regions of the country to catch up with the more advanced, were reflected in the five-year plans, but were difficult to realise in practice. Some manufacturing industries were established in Central Asia, but a bigger role in the development of the area was played by the Soviet Union's obsession with the idea of self-sufficiency in raw materials, some of which could be found only in her Asian territories, and by the wartime evacuation of industries from European Russia.

* Violet Conolly, **Beyond the Urals. Economic Developments in Soviet Asia.** OUP. London, 1967. 420 pp. 75/-.

† Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, **The Soviet Middle East: A Model for Development?** Allen & Unwin, London, 1967. 166 pp. 30/-.

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The third, and by far the longest, section of Miss Conolly's work is concerned with economic developments between 1945 and 1966, a period which saw, among other things, the ploughing up of the virgin lands of Kazakhstan and western Siberia, major hydro-electric developments (Bratsk, Nurek, and others), and very important finds of oil and natural gas in Mangyshlak, Tyumen oblast, and near Bukhara, of diamonds in Yakutia and gold in Uzbekistan, as well as the construction of the 800 km. Karakum canal. These topics are all described in the relevant subsections on individual industries, agriculture, and transport in the chapters devoted to each of the three main areas. As regards the Central Asian republics, Miss Conolly is particularly interesting on the criticism of Moscow's policies now being voiced by local officials, some of them Russians, their demands for more factories to process the raw materials they produce, and their arguments for consuming their own natural gas and hydro-electric power rather than exporting it to other parts of the country. Manpower is a major problem facing the Central Asian republics. On the one hand there is a shortage of trained personnel (Russians still play a disproportionate role, particularly in industry), and on the other the republics need more industry to mop up their surplus and rapidly-growing rural populations. Manpower is also a key problem in Siberia, the Far East and Kazakhstan, but here it is a question of a chronic shortage, now that most forced labour camps have been closed down and workers can abandon their jobs with impunity. Yet, as Miss Conolly shows, time and time again the authorities fail to provide the most elementary amenities for the workers, even in the most hostile environments.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has had its most marked effect in the Soviet Far East, along the disputed Amur frontier. Miss Conolly describes how plans to harness the Amur and develop the complementary raw material resources on either side of the river have been put into cold storage. However, the interesting possibility has now arisen that Japan may cooperate with the Soviet Union in the development of the Soviet Far East, which is severely handicapped at present by its great distance from the Urals and European Russia.

Finally, Miss Conolly concludes that, while Soviet Asia, thanks to the wealth and diversity of its natural resources, is already making a valuable contribution to the Soviet economy, its potential is very much greater, and she warns her readers against doubting that the Russians, for all their inefficiencies and failure to reach some of their planned targets, will eventually attain their objectives. She gives the results of her extensive research in a lively, trenchant style, displays sound judgment, never loses sight of the overall picture, and manages to convey to the reader the exciting possibilities of Soviet Asia. One can only regret that the book's price and length may limit its readership.

THE RELATIVELY SHORT BOOK by Professors Nove and Newth is a study of the Soviet record in the republics of Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Transcaucasia from the standpoint of economic and social development. All these republics are non-Slav, were annexed by Russia in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, and were backward before the

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revolution. Yet the most backward of them, namely the four republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, are now constantly held up to the developing countries by Soviet propagandists as models of progress. Are these republics examples of rapid economic development and, if so, how has it been achieved? It is these questions that Professors Nove and Newth set out to answer.

After dealing with the geographical and historical background and the political structure, they discuss industrialisation, the development of agriculture, the social services, finance, and standards of living. Finally they compare progress in the eight Soviet republics with that of their non-Soviet neighbours Turkey and Iran. The gist of these chapters is that progress in the Soviet republics in the fields of industrial development, health, and education has been remarkable (even though they have not yet caught up with the advanced areas of the Soviet Union), and far greater than in Turkey and Iran, and that this progress has been due to Russian capital and skills. Professors Nove and Newth argue that the eight republics cannot be said to be the victims of economic exploitation, since Moscow has altruistically established industrial plants in Transcaucasia and Central Asia when investment would have been more profitable elsewhere, that their peasants have fared better than Russian peasants because they produce valuable crops such as cotton, that the advances in health and education have to a large extent been financed by the Russians, and that there is no wage discrimination. On the other hand they point out that decisions on virtually every subject of importance are taken in Moscow by a Communist party whose governing bodies are essentially Russian. The possibility of the emergence of nationalist, anti-Russian movements in the future they leave open.

Professors Nove and Newth declare that their aim is to be objective and without bias, balancing the good and bad sides of the Soviet record. And indeed they have tried to do this, the section on education being particularly good in this respect. But on the whole there is no doubt that they have erred on the side of generosity to the Soviet regime. To some extent this seems to be due to an over-reliance on statistical sources, which conceal the inefficiency, muddle, and waste of much development in Central Asia and Kazakhstan at least, and also the shortcomings of schools and medical services, particularly in rural areas. From a number of factual errors one also gains the impression that the authors are not thoroughly acquainted with the area. But more important is their attitude to the nature of development in these republics. The amount of altruistic or uneconomic industrial development in Central Asia and Kazakhstan has, in fact, been relatively small, and their natural resources are somewhat greater than Professors Nove and Newth suggest (why, for instance, do they fail to mention Tajikistan's enormous hydro-electric potential?). Western capital was invested in Kazakh mineral resources even before the revolution, albeit to a very limited extent, and Moscow needed the minerals of Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya, if only to save foreign currency. Moreover one might have expected that by now an area which produces 100 per cent of the Soviet Union's raw cotton would produce more than 9·5 per cent of its cotton textiles. And here the old textile

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industries in European Russia have been favoured by being charged the same price for their raw material as textile mills in Central Asia next door to the cotton ginneries. It is true that the Central Asian peasant producing cotton fared better than the Russian peasant growing grain, but the authors do not make sufficiently clear that the Soviet government simply had to pay a comparatively high price for cotton to persuade the Central Asian peasant to grow it, and this was nothing to do with a fair world market price. Central Asian communists, with recent memories of famine, fought against being forced to grow virtually nothing but cotton, and even now Soviet articles appear for internal consumption explaining that the fact that Uzbekistan concentrates on growing cotton is part of the 'socialist division of labour in the USSR' and has nothing in common with colonial exploitation, which suggests that some people have their doubts on this matter.

But the major distortion in Professor Nove and Newth's assessment is the insufficient weight they give to the element of coercion. Yet surely this should be given due weight in the balance sheet. Yes, the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia are now relatively prosperous, thanks to Russian investment and skills and a political ideology which has promoted industrialisation, education, and health, but at the cost of constant coercion, the horrors of collectivisation and the purges, assaults on religion and national culture, a lack of democratic freedoms, and massive Russian immigration.

The shortcomings of the book would not matter so much were it not that Professor Nove's reputation will encourage readers to accept its arguments uncritically on an area with which very few are acquainted.

DR VAIDYANATH IS AN INDIAN SCHOLAR who had the good fortune to be able to spend some time in Soviet Central Asia when he was working on his doctoral thesis, which forms the basis of this book.* Although he was not given access to the bulk of primary sources, he was able to consult numerous published sources which are certainly not readily available, if available at all, outside the Soviet Union. By a painstaking, discriminating, and objective use of this and other material, Dr Vaidyanath has managed to piece together by far the most comprehensive account yet of the national delimitation of 1924 in Central Asia, by which part of northern Turkestan was transferred to the Kazakh republic and the remainder of Turkestan and the republics of Bukhara and Khorezm were reorganised to form what are now the Uzbek, Tajik, Kirgiz and Turkmen SSRs and the Karakalpak ASSR. Soviet writers claim that this delimitation was an essential part of their country's enlightened Leninist nationalities policy and provided the peoples of Central Asia with their own national statehood and the best possible conditions for their future prosperity. Opponents of the Soviet regime, on the other hand, have maintained that it was merely an exercise of the time-honoured principle of divide and rule as a reaction to local pan-Turkic tendencies.

* R. Vaidyanath, **The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics:** A Study in Soviet Nationalities Policy (1917–1936), People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1967.

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Dr Vaidyanath's book in fact covers much more than the delimitation. He describes the peoples of Central Asia, their conquest by Tsarist Russia, the Revolution and the activities of the Turkestan Commission as well as constitutional developments up to 1936; but it is his account of the delimitation itself and the events leading up to it that is of the greatest interest. To what extent did it correspond to the needs and desires of the native peoples?

Undoubtedly national antagonisms existed between some of the six major peoples inhabiting the area, and it is Dr. Vaidyanath's opinion that there were significant ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences between them which made it difficult to apply a uniform administration. But the most prominent of the small politically-conscious native elite of Turkestan, who were strongly affected by pan-Turkic ideas both before and in the years immediately following the Revolution, considered that the population of Turkestan was remarkably homogeneous and that any division into Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh and other national groups was artificial and they agitated for a single Turkic republic. From the very beginning Moscow scotched such pan-Turkic tendencies, but it was not until 1924 that the Soviet government felt that its position in the area was strong enough to undertake a radical reorganisation of the existing political entities.

The detailed step-by-step account of the delimitation discussions in 1924 given by Dr Vaidyanath is particularly interesting. That the delimitation would take place was obviously a foregone conclusion, but many divergent views were expressed, and even those who declared their wholehearted support tried to secure as much territory as possible for their own future republics. Most interesting of all, a large number of leading native communists wanted the creation of a Central Asian Federation to embrace the Kazakh republic as well, thus showing that the old pan-Turkic ideas were far from dead. Moscow dismissed the Central Asian Federation as premature.

Dr Vaidyanath concludes that there were many sound administrative reasons for the national delimitation, which also satisfied the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the peoples of Central Asia. At the same time the Soviet government hoped it would prevent any pan-Turkic manifestations in the future, its anxiety on this score being shown clearly by its refusal to establish the Central Asian Federation.

As regards pan-Turkism, it is somewhat surprising that Dr Vaidyanath fails to mention the leading Tatar communist, Sultan-Galiyev, whose advocacy of a great national Turkic state got him into trouble with Stalin in 1923, an event which almost certainly precipitated the decision to go ahead with the national delimitation in Central Asia. One could also wish that he had been more explicit on the question of national consciousness. Any national consciousness the Jadids tried to stimulate before the Revolution was surely a Turkic one rather than, say, Uzbek or Tajik, and can one talk of the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the local peoples while at the same time describing the almost complete indifference of the peasant masses during the propaganda campaign in favour of the delimitation? There are some passages, too, where Dr Vaidyanath seems to have accepted the Soviet version of events too readily, e.g. in alleging that the Tsarist authorities deliberately

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split up the different national groups. But all in all his work is a very valuable contribution to the study of Soviet Central Asia, and one looks forward to his second volume which is under preparation.

THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM

From the archives of Angelo Tasca

Gino Bianco

THE Communist International considered the split at Leghorn in 1921, and the consequent founding of the Italian Communist Party a complete success. But Karl Radek, one of its most eminent representatives, only a few days after the event wrote that it was 'an illusion to believe that there was a communist party in Italy'. This admission did not, of course, prevent him from writing three long articles saying just the opposite, nor from criticising Paul Levi and Clara Zetkin, who had openly expressed several reservations about the Leghorn congress.[1]

Nearly fifty years have passed since then, but according to Umberto Terracini an historical investigation of the responsibilities and role of the Communist International in the events that led to the formation of the Italian Communist Party would be 'desirable but rash'.[2] Why rash?

The political orientation of the new party was, in fact, a monotonous continuation of all that was inconclusive in the old Maximalism and 'infantile extremism'. Not only was it incapable of carrying out a revolution, it was also incapable of distinguishing its principal enemy. Furthermore, barely a year later it was the Communist International itself—with its request (opposed, with the exception of Tasca and the so-called right wing, by the majority of the party) for union with the socialists—which acknowledged the error of the 1921 split and challenged its legitimacy and necessity.

The documents collected by Angelo Tasca during his career as a communist leader and published in the *Annali Feltrinelli 1966*—together with communist Senator Giuseppe Berti's ample introduction (the most informative, intelligent, and objective account yet written by a communist about the first ten years of the Italian party)—are not to the liking of Giorgio Amendola. In an article about the Tasca volume,[3] Amendola patiently outlines the sins and errors committed by anyone who collects and saves documents, letters, and so on, and cautiously advances the idea that, in this care of Tasca's to preserve an archive (a care shared by such *petits bourgeois* as Babeuf, Buonarotti, Marx,

[1] See the report by Paul Levi presented to the Comintern Executive, and, for the controversy with Radek, the report to the German Communist Party, in *The Comintern: Historical Highlights*, ed. Branko Lazitch and M. Drachkovitch (New York 1966).

[2] *Rinascita*, 24 February 1966.

[3] *Rinascita*, 3 March 1967.

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Engels, Proudhon, Herzen, and others), there already existed the kernel of betrayal and evil. But because of that 'cunning of reason' (whose existence an historian and Marxist like Giorgio Amendola would not deny), even the subtle perfidy of a stubborn document saver like Tasca may be valuable. In fact it is thanks to Tasca's collection, as to those of Humbert-Droz and Trotsky, that we have so many important revelations of the process of Stalinisation in the Communist International and the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

What were the distinguishing features of the PCI in those first years? First, the fact that it emerged when the initial impact of the revolutionary movement in Europe had been spent and when the ideological and political premises on which it was founded had already become anachronistic; second, that because of the repeated and vigorous interference of the Communist International the Italian party underwent a transformation of political orientation and organisational structure; and third, that it took an active part in anti-fascist activity and was persecuted.

The Tasca volume, together with Berti's introduction and notes, clears away many myths, misrepresentations, omissions and lies current in communist historiography, and it illuminates many obscure points concerning the first decade of the PCI's history. It gives us a clear view of the processes at work in that party and of the complex political evolution of Gramsci and the *Ordine Nuovo* group. What emerges very clearly is the disruptive and corrupting role played by the Communist International and, more specifically, by its Russian leadership. It becomes clear that not only Bordiga but also Gramsci and the entire *Ordine Nuovo* group considered a fascist or military dictatorship impossible. And it also emerges that the entire party, except for Tasca, wanted the destruction of the socialist movement and its tradition (and that the leader of the attack on the Socialist Party was Gramsci, as he himself acknowledged at the PCI congress of 1922).

The policy of the 'united front' energetically advocated by the International after its third congress (June 1921) was opposed by the majority of the Italian party, who also opposed the fourteen points set out by the fourth Communist International congress in December 1922, concerning united action by socialists and communists. The PSI (Italian Socialist Party) was not absorbed, although one group, the Maximalists, went over to the PCI. The attempts to create a united front had little importance and went no farther than mere agitation. Nevertheless, it was these two problems that were decisive in the emergence of the Gramsci leadership. Between 1923 and 1924, the Central Committee acquired a new political orientation, based essentially on the problem of the relationship with the International over unification with the Maximalists and the united front tactics. It was in those years that Gramsci, under pressure from the International, took up a position against Bordiga,[4] and it was above all through the Bolshevisation of the party, that is to say through the use of authoritarian and bureaucratic methods, that a new political orientation, and more specifically, a more

[4] As can be seen from his correspondence with Gramsci in 1923 and 1924, Togliatti was very close to Bordiga and agreed to be a member of the new executive, as the Comintern wished, only after reiterated urgings from Gramsci.

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pliable political line, was imposed on the party. Certainly, Gramsci's evaluation of fascism was less schematic than preceding ones, his analysis of forces less mechanical and rigid. But since the Gramsci line had no genuine political result, its greater flexibility carried it no further than agitation and propaganda. Neither in 1924 nor later did the communists consider an attempt at insurrection possible. And as the crisis worsened Gramsci wrote that what was involved was not a struggle for power but a 'preparatory transitional phase in the struggle for power, a phase, in short, of agitation, propaganda, and organisation'[5] to win over the majority of the working class. Nor was insurrection considered as a possibility on the eve of the passing of the 'exceptional laws'.[6] On the contrary, the proposal of the right wing (Tasca, Graziadei) for an alliance with the socialists and the forces of liberal democracy against fascism was condemned as a 'dangerous opportunist deviation'.

The struggle against the Bordiga majority in the party was 'Bolshevised'. 'Bolshevisation', decided on at the fifth Comintern congress in 1924, meant the end of any form of democracy within the Russian party and the International, and authorised the systematic interference of the Russian leadership in the internal affairs of the national sections. The result of the subsequent purges and splits was 'the total domestication' to use the words of Ignazio Silone, 'of what was genuinely communist in the national sections, and their annexation as instruments for the defence of the USSR'.

Aside from disagreement over the tactics of the united front, a workers' government, and the organisation of cells, Bordiga's resistance to Bolshevisation was based on his expectation that it would lead to a bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian party and the International. It is true that Bordiga's attitude committed the party to excessive rigidity and passivity, detaching it from the realities of the Italian situation, but his judgment of the degeneration of the International and of the Russian party was correct. He was mistaken, however, in the belief—shared by all the left opposition groups—that a struggle within the communist organisations would promote, as they said, a 'regeneration'. Bolshevisation implied the purging of all minorities and since the International supported the new Italian leadership the result was assured, even against the majority of the party. Gramsci's group argued that opposition to the International would result—as Togliatti wrote to Gramsci in May 1923—in 'being outside the International, depriving oneself of its powerful material and moral support, and being reduced to a tiny group held together by bonds that were almost entirely personal, doomed, if not to total dispersion, to losing any real or immediate practical influence on the development of the political struggle in Italy'.[7] Fidelity to the International and to Russia was considered an essential element of the political consciousness of the party and its militants. It was an unexamined fidelity, that is, it was not exposed to free criticism

[5] A. Gramsci, 'La situazione politica italiana e i compiti del nostro partito' (speech to the central committee), in *Stato Operaio*, 21 August 1924.

[6] The 'exceptional laws' were promulgated in November 1926 after attempts on the life of Mussolini; they suppressed freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.

[7] *Annali Feltrinelli*, 1960, p. 411.

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or to a confrontation with reality. Russia and the Comintern 'represented' the revolution and history. Little was known about the Comintern's activities, or about the internal developments of Soviet society. The Comintern's directives were abstract and instrumentalist, dictated by manoeuvres and intrigues. Nevertheless, opposition to the Comintern—Gramsci explained—would mean opposing 'the majority of the international proletariat and specifically the Russian proletariat which made the revolution'. He continued: 'I am convinced that the major force holding the party together is the prestige and idealism of the International, and not the bonds created by the specific actions of our party.' He realised that the conflicts within the Russian party and the International were not of an ideological nature, but it is doubtful whether he understood their relationship to the problems of the Soviet society.

Beginning in the autumn of 1924 Bordiga was abandoned by some of his closest collaborators, and the central committee's attitude to the remaining oppositionists became harsher. By the time of the Lyon congress (1926), the PCI was fully Bolshevised and reduced to discipline. The so-called 'right' did not present their own resolutions, but certain amendments for which they were spokesman were rejected because 'they reveal a tendency to conceive the solution of the crisis of bourgeois society outside the revolution'. In the documents and publications of the party Marxism-Leninism was reduced to a pretext for empty schemes, but the certainty of being part of history and having a doctrine 'capable of explaining and changing the world' could still provide abstract mythological results on the intellectual plane and provide a foundation for political action. And in the struggle on two fronts—against fascism and against social-democracy—the party wanted action. But the reasoning behind the plans for action, and the plans themselves, were, as the official party historian, Paolo Spriano, admits, 'changed, complicated, or deformed because of the orientation of the International'.[8] The ambiguity of concept and language in communist documents allows changes of direction, modifications, and even sharp reversals without any apparent interruption, but to the initiated, as Berti says, 'the balancing acts of the Italian communist leaders in those years were a pathetic sight'.

The expulsions, divisions, and conflicts in the PCI all had their origin in the internal regime of the communist organisations. 'The questions of the internal regime,' wrote Tasca in 1928, 'cannot be separated from the questions of the political line. Corruption . . . everywhere has reached such a degree that it has become the dominant political problem today. Without a just solution of this problem, none of the other political problems facing the Communist International can be solved.' But it was no longer possible to question the methods of the leaders of the Russian Communist Party and the Comintern or to oppose the personal despotism of Stalin, which asserted itself by intrigue, violence, and distortion of facts. Anyone who tried would soon find himself in an indefensible position.

The Tasca volume contains some important documents on the

[8] See *Unità*, 19 January 1965. Paolo Spriano has recently published the first volume of a history of the Italian Communist Party, *Da Bordiga a Gramsci* (Milan, 1967).

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Russian domination of the Comintern, on the ever more authoritarian and hierarchical character the Comintern was assuming as power was more and more concentrated in Russian hands, on the growth of Stalin's personal despotism and on the disastrous behaviour of the communist international in Germany. It was the policy in Germany that provided the occasion for Tasca's final rupture with the PCI and for the final battle to prevent complete Stalinisation. This is the central event covered by the documents in this volume, and it is described in a dramatic crescendo in the correspondence between Tasca and the party's Foreign Affairs bureau.

From personal conviction, and out of solidarity with the attitude taken earlier by Togliatti, Tasca sided with Bukharin, Humbert Droz, and Clara Zetkin. Close as he was to the positions of Bukharin and Humbert Droz, Togliatti had until then applied 'flexible resistance' to the methods of the Stalinist leaders. In 1926 he did not forward the famous Gramsci letter (which, since it was a politbureau document approved by the party's Central Committee, he should have done), which, although expressing solidarity with Stalin against the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition, vigorously condemned the means by which the Stalinist majority conducted the struggle within the party.[9] But in 1927 he refused, along with Silone, to vote for a resolution condemning Trotskyists without considering and discussing their case.[10] He also opposed the Comintern's policy of splitting the trade unions. Finally, addressing the sixth Comintern congress, he alluded to the 'unprincipled struggle that was being carried on in the dark', and, together with Humbert Droz and Tasca, he criticised the organisational methods and political orientation of the German party leaders.

In a letter of 17 December 1928 to Tasca, sent in the name of the Italian party, Togliatti wrote: 'As for your position, we are generally in agreement with it. It may be that had we been in Moscow instead of you, we might have formulated certain things in a different way, but in substance we approve the line you have followed until now.' He added that 'from this criticism we must proceed to a criticism of the internal regime of the parties and of the International in general . . . the question of individuals is secondary, but by lopping off heads we remain headless'.

But what was the internal regime of the Comintern? 'In our writings', Tasca wrote to the PCI secretariat, 'we often find the expression "general staff of the revolution". The central office of the Comintern surely does not merit such a description. . . . Almost all its members act from the most widely varying motives, with the result that the dominant factor is not concern with the general interests of our movement. There is a group of *routiniers* whose ears are cocked to hear what is decided "over there" and capitalise on it; Bela Kun, Kolarov, Smeral, Kuusinen. Among these there are differences in personal worth, one is more intelligent, one is less daring; but that does not finally affect

[9] This letter was written by Gramsci in October 1926. The only existing copy is in the Tasca papers. It was republished by Berti in *Annali Feltrinelli 1966*, p. 312.

[10] Silone's testimonial, published in *Uscita di Sicurezza* (Vallecchi, 1965) was first published in *Comunita*, Sept.-Oct. 1949. Togliatti in *L'Unita*, 6 January 1950, acknowledged its truth.

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their attitude. Then there is the group of "provincials", whose motto is: leave us in peace in our country, and for the rest do as you like. . . . The political secretariat is a mixed bag held together by the most varied reasons and organically incapable of carrying out any legitimate political work. If the Russian delegation functioned as the real centre of the Comintern then we'd have one. But that is not the way things are, although all the important matters pass through their hands. In the politbureau of the Russian party all questions are considered from an "internal" point of view, in the worst sense of the word. In this case light cannot come from the East. The one who directs or ought to direct the Comintern [Bukharin] is in disagreement with the majority of the politbureau, and that further complicates the system. Meanwhile the parties feel the reactions of these events.' [11] With the rupture between Stalin and Bukharin, the crisis became more acute. At the presidium of the Comintern on 19 December 1928 Stalin, Kuusinen, Molotov, and Ulbricht denounced the right wing in the German party and attacked Humbert Droz and Tasca, accusing them of challenging all the decisions of the sixth congress. Stalin ended his speech by saying that the presence in the Comintern of people like Brandler and Thalheimer would not be tolerated much longer.

When Togliatti understood what was at stake and the inevitability of Stalin's victory, he discarded his scruples. He too denounced the right wing in the Russian party and the so-called 'conciliators' in the German party. (One of the charges against the 'conciliators' was that they made a false and opportunist distinction between the democratic bourgeois state and the fascist government.) Following him, the PCI attacked the socialists and asserted the existence of an immediate revolutionary crisis, 'in which the task of the party becomes that of arousing the masses to direct insurrection without any intermediate phase'. In July 1929 the Comintern Executive, meeting after the expulsion of Bukharin, criticised the PCI leadership (a veritable 'political lynching', according to Berti) for its tolerance of the right within the party. Togliatti subjected himself to a humiliating self-criticism, and welcomed the 'lesson in Bolshevism' given to the Italian party. In September 1929 the Central Committee of the Italian party sanctioned Tasca's expulsion,[12] and this was followed by the expulsion of many other prominent members, including Tresso, Ravazzoli, Leonetti, Silone, and Bordiga. Gramsci did not share the views of the Comintern and the PCI central committee, but he was in prison in Turi.

[11] In a letter to Trotsky, November 1928, Andreas Nin wrote from Moscow: 'Complete confusion here at the Comintern. Nothing is done. Everyone is waiting for the results of the struggle between Stalin and the right. Demoralisation is complete. The majority of the Presidium is of course with Stalin, because it is certain that he will win. Only Tasca and Humbert Droz are unconditionally with Bukharin. Tasca is supported by the central committee of his party, while Humbert Droz is completely alone.'

[12] Tasca concluded his defence at that meeting of the Central Committee: 'In every disagreement the dilemma of being for or against the International is raised. Why? Why is one considered against the International if one collaborates with it in examining the situation more profoundly to correct certain errors? These methods that have been called "ideological terror" are beastly also because they lead to the easiest criterion—to be always with the majority.' *Annali Feltrinelli 1966*, p. 673.

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The anti-fascist group assembled around *Giustizia e Libertà* in Paris evaluated the events acutely (March 1930): 'Bordiga and Tasca expelled. Gramsci in prison. But what is more important, we have seen the rapid destruction of the political positions that these men represented, and which were the fruit of the experience of the Italian Communist Party. Having eliminated all the intrinsic resources of the Italian Communist Party, the Russian leadership has managed to instal itself without meeting resistance.'

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND EASTERN EUROPE

Melvin Croan

NOWADAYS FEW SPECIALISTS on the Soviet Union consider the model of 'totalitarian dictatorship' as wholly adequate for the proper study of their subject. At least as originally developed and expounded by American political science, the 'totalitarian' model no longer seems capable of fully comprehending the many complexities of Soviet political life. What is true for the Soviet Union seems to apply even more to the government and politics of the communist states of eastern Europe. Among other things, an unmistakable reassertion of social forces in the east European countries suggests that despite the best attempts and worst excesses of Stalinism in the area, society was never really 'atomised'. Then, too, the process of national differentiation now undeniably at work throughout the communist world directs attention to the emergence of distinctive institutional arrangements and unique political patterns within individual communist states. All told, a fresh approach to the study of the European communist states is long overdue. No doubt an overall descriptive theory of their political systems, which in so many respects now defy the 'totalitarianism' school of analysis, would clearly be eminently desirable as well.

It must be accounted a signal virtue of Ghita Ionescu's book * that, after paying passing—and entirely justified—tribute to the utility of the totalitarian model at an earlier stage of comparative political studies, he explicitly rejects it as inappropriate for his own study. But how then to approach the politics of the European communist states? By concentrating on the 'role and nature of opposition in these one-party states' is Ionescu's answer, formulated at its simplest and clearest. But how to approach the phenomenon of political opposition, distinguish it from manifestations of dissent, and relate the evidence in each instance to social forces, political processes, and, last but not least, the institutional viability of the east European regimes? It is at this crucial matrix of the analysis that Mr Ionescu overwhelms even the most favourably disposed reader of his book with no end of confusion.

To begin with, despite his avowed intention of distinguishing between dissent and opposition, he repeatedly fails to do so. Drawing on specific

* Ghita Ionescu, **The Politics of the European Communist States.** New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 303 pp. $2.50 (paperback).

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examples and cases from various east European countries in an undiscriminating manner, Mr Ionescu tends to disregard the vagaries of politics in particular countries and to distort the actualities of political life throughout the whole region. In part this may be because he often relies on certain highly undiscriminating western accounts and secondary sources to illustrate his argument. (His dependence on Martin Jänicke's *Der dritte Weg*, a recapitulation in detail of every last manifestation of deviation from official norms in East Germany, with some highly dubious conclusions about the supposed existence of a powerful 'third force' there, constitutes only the most egregious case in point.) Whatever the explanation, the failure to distinguish between quite different political phenomena seriously weakens the analysis from the very outset. Unfortunately, the description of the 'aggregation and institutionalisation' of dissent—Mr Ionescu's book is shot through with such social science jargon, frequently employed in an imprecise and thus unavoidably confusing manner—therefore remains largely unpersuasive.

In his eagerness to uncover 'checks' on the Apparat-states (Ionescu's term, and a good one at that), he fails to pause long enough to reflect on the proper definition of one crucial term; viz., the concept 'check' itself. One outstanding political scientist, C. J. Friedrich, treated the underlying analytical issue some years ago. In his path-breaking study on *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, Professor Friedrich emphasised the necessity of *regularised* restraints for a viable constitutional order. He further pointed out that neither chance checks nor temporary limitations on the exercise of power could ever really substitute for regularised restraints. These points remain as pertinent today as when they were first formulated. Alas, it is precisely the absence of regularised restraints that still stamps the institutional structures and political practices of the east European communist states. As a consequence, responsibility (in the sense of any accountability on the part of those who run the Apparat-states) is still notable by its very absence. Moreover, it still remains far from certain that dissent (never mind opposition) can actually result in the modification of official policies, much less their replacement by alternative policies. Indeed, the very question of the scope to be permitted for critical expression constitutes an immediately pressing and quite fundamental problem for all the east European communist states. This is so even for the most reform-minded of them, as Leonard Schapiro's critical discussion in a recent issue of *Government and Opposition* of Kardelj's interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution should make abundantly clear.

THERE IS NOTHING QUITE as immediately infectious yet ultimately more dangerous than unexamined optimism in political analysis. Yet it is precisely such optimism that seems to underlie Mr Ionescu's treatment of the east European political scene. Indeed, it explicitly informs his concluding discussion of two 'irreversible trends' ostensibly at work throughout east Europe today. These trends are identified as, first, 'the increase of pluralisation' within individual countries, and, second, 'the tendency of the European communist states to become more European and less communist'. In the first instance, the point may

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be considered well taken. But the deductions concerning 'aggregation and institutionalisation' are, to say the very least, premature, and there is little to guarantee that his optimism may not be disproved. As for the second 'trend', it is far from entirely clear just what 'becoming more European and less communist' really means. If it means less oriented towards the Soviet Union and more nationalist, there can be little room for serious quarrel, except, of course, that it scarcely follows that the east European regimes in question need necessarily come to enjoy a more civilised, i.e. a more effectively constitutionalised, political life. If the history of these countries is at all relevant, their 'becoming more European', at a time when nationalism is resurgent throughout the continent as a whole, might help foster traditional proclivities towards authoritarian nationalist regimes at home rather than facilitate an internal transformation in the direction of constitutional democratic political life.

Unfortunately, Mr Ionescu's approach provides little scope for considerations of history. In this reviewer's opinion, any political science which detaches itself from history is doomed at the outset to futility and at the end to failure. Judging by his neglect of east European history—even the history of the post-war communist period—Mr Ionescu obviously would not concur in this judgment. Yet it is precisely the sense of being suspended in time and space conveyed by his attempt at a structural-functional analysis of east European politics that renders his study unconvincing and, in the final analysis, unrealistic. Politics in the European communist states has not followed any unilinear pattern of progression. Rather, patterns have been cyclical. Furthermore, the cycles of relaxation and repression have varied from country to country with no necessary symmetry between individual countries at any particular point in time. This simple yet important point somehow eludes Mr Ionescu's presentation. One asks whether it might not have been otherwise and regretfully concludes, probably not. Given the three-part presentation of 'the framework and network of power', 'the plural checks', and 'the manifestation of dissent', there is little room for those subtleties, accidents, and ironies of history that regularly mock even the most cogently elaborated determinist schemes of the social sciences. In other words, the basic structure of the whole study serves only to blur rather than to illuminate both differences between countries and developments over time.

HUNGARY, 1919

George Gomori

ONE OF THE IRONIES OF OUR AGE is the fact that the best and most reliable histories of the ruling communist parties are commissioned and written in the West. The Hoover Institution of Stanford University will qualify for the gratitude of future historians (whether communist or not) for bringing out the first comprehensive study of Bela Kun and the dramatic story of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919.* At this point such a

* Rudolf L. Tokes, **Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic.** Published for the Hoover Institution by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, and Pall Mall Press, London. 1967.

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study could have been written only by someone whose command of Hungarian is good (most of the relevant new material is available only in Hungarian and Russian), who is familiar with Marxist-Leninist theory and communist practice but detached enough to investigate not-too-distant history without bias. The author of this study, a young Hungarian-American historian, meets all these conditions.

Mr Tokes begins his well-documented study with an examination of the Hungarian socialist movement before and during the first world war. It was a movement based on trade unionism, strongly influenced by the writings of contemporary German and Austrian socialist leaders such as Bebel and Kautsky; its orientation was almost exclusively urban and anti-agrarian. The first Hungarian Bolsheviks were recruited from young dissidents from the Socialist Party, leftist intellectuals cherishing chiliastic expectations, and Hungarian prisoners-of-war in Russia. As to Bela Kun, his political career began when in 1917—then still as a POW—he offered his services to the Tomsk city Soviet. Soon afterwards this previously unknown journalist was entrusted with the task of organising a Bolshevik take-over in Hungary, and was sent home with considerable funds and Lenin's personal blessing in his pocket. Mr Tokes points out that according to recently published documents, of all the national groups supporting the Bolsheviks in the initial consolidation of their power, Hungarians 'played a role far out of proportion to their numbers', and that next to Germany, Hungary was considered by the Soviet leaders the 'weakest link' in the chain of imperialism.

In the event, the Bolshevik take-over occurred only a few months after Kun's return but in highly un-Leninist circumstances. It was the hard-pressed social-democrats who, when faced with a totally unacceptable ultimatum from the Allies in March 1919, chose the lesser evil—a merger with the communists and the proclamation of a Hungarian Soviet Republic. At the time there were approximately 5,000 communists and nearly one million trade unionists (socialist supporters) in Hungary; short of an ultra-leftist terror, Kun and his comrades could not hope to impose their will upon the socialists. Yet it would be unfair to blame only the latter for the mistakes and the downfall of the Soviet Republic 133 days after its establishment. No doubt they were partly responsible for the regime's disastrous agrarian policy (large estates were not distributed amongst the peasants but nationalised), but without their organisational network the Hungarian Red Army might never have come into being, and the Soviet Republic would have collapsed much earlier.

Bela Kun had considerable talents as an organiser and orator, but left on his own he was incapable of taking the right decisions in economic or military matters of the utmost importance. He believed in the arrival of Soviet military aid which never materialised; he modelled his tactics on false analogies with the Russian situation, and was mainly responsible for two major tactical blunders concerning the Entente which made the downfall of the regime inevitable (Smuts mission, Clemenceau note). As the author remarks, Kun had 'undisputed control only over one instrument of dubious power—the wireless station where he cabled SOS messages to Moscow'. He was clearly too small for the historical role he assumed.

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The events of 1919 and 1956 have shown that a communist-dominated regime has no chance of maintaining power in Hungary without the help of Russian arms or far-reaching concessions to the non-communist majority. This conclusion is indirectly corroborated by Sandor Nogradi's book on the post-war period of communist rule in Hungary, published in Budapest in 1966.[1] His political reminiscences, though stylistically mediocre and politically orthodox, created a stir in Hungary and were sold out in a matter of days, because it was the first book to deal openly with certain unsavoury aspects of the Rakosi regime, and because the author himself was a high-ranking communist official serving first under Rakosi, then under Kadar. While the book reflects the uneasiness of the party bureaucracy, itself threatened by the unscrupulous methods used by Rakosi and his colleagues even against the most conformist party members, it does not add much to our understanding of the period. On the other hand, Nogradi condemns Imre Nagy's 'petty-bourgeois idealism' and 'the supreme act of treason' manifested in his declaration of Hungarian neutrality; nor is he able to assess or explain the events of 1956 in any other but strictly dogmatic terms. His memoirs can be read as an ill-disguised apology for the present *status quo*; with their minor admissions, major distortions or omissions, they are symptomatic of a certain kind of communist bureaucratic mentality that has left its imprint on the first ten years of the Kadar regime.

LENIN

Harold Shukman

IF, AS LENIN THOUGHT, the essence of dialectics consists in the splitting of the whole and the understanding of its contradictory parts, then this collection of twelve essays on aspects of Lenin would appear to be a triumph of dialectical labour.* Each chapter represents an attempt to illuminate the interplay of personality, tactical aims, and ideology manifested in twelve different fields of Lenin's activity. Too much information about Lenin exists for him to be a simple subject, and twelve authors labouring in twelve different fields would suggest a diversity of interpretation that must defy new insight and create more vagueness. In this case the opposite is true, and what emerges is an Essential Lenin, variously attired but unmistakably the one and only. One common conclusion may be drawn at the outset: whatever the area of thought engaging his mind at a particular time, he was always really thinking of only one thing, and that was—translated into the socially acceptable norm of his day—Revolution.

Of his personality it is clear that the weak resolve which he tirelessly berated in others was in fact his own, and when he felt himself let down, it was the publication of his own infirmity which aroused him to his exhibitions of fury, as though to deny that he had anything to do with such weakness. Lenin protested too much.

[1] Nogradi Sandor, **Uj tortenet kezdodott.**

* **Lenin. The Man, the Theorist, the Leader.** A reappraisal. Edited by Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway. Pall Mall, London, 1967. 317 pp. 45/-.

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Lenin dedicated some twenty years to the theory and practice of revolution and the last six years of his life to the application of a lifetime's thinking about establishing socialism in Russia. How well suited was he to the role he had taken? Leonard Schapiro is not enthusiastic. Far greater flexibility was needed in a leader at that time than Lenin would allow in himself. He saw it as a dangerous characteristic in conflict with his notion of 'firm resolve'. His personal failings aside, how well grounded is the view that Lenin succeeded in founding a new type of society, the dream of generations of socialists? Professor Schapiro points out that here, too, the promise outweighed the achievement and the illusion the reality. Lenin's innovation was his technique of government, that is, the manipulation of a facade of democratic institutions from a party centre.

John Keep devotes his chapter to this central aspect of Lenin's theory and practice, and he provides a clear analysis of Lenin the tactician. A master juggler of concepts, Lenin was convinced that he alone knew the correct answers to life's problems, or where to find them. This arrogance of intellect was a failing he came to regret at the end of his life. But it was too late, for the evidence was clear that omniscience had already been transformed from the hallmark of the Bolshevik leader into the warrant of the Communist Party. Lenin's greatest failure, then, lay in self-deception. Believing himself ardently to be the most articulate and dynamic exponent of Marxism, he in fact placed the pursuit and seizure of power higher on his list of priorities than is compatible with the real purposes of a socialist party. He devalued the ethical aims of the movement, concealing the implications of his methods under a blanket negation of the bourgeois morality of the society which all social-democrats were sworn to overthrow. The result of this nihilism was to deprive the Bolsheviks of any moral standards.

The conspiratorial underground created an atmosphere of two conflicting poles of attraction: one represented the unattainable fantasies of control and omnipotence, the other, its obverse, fears of impotence and incompetence. Dr Keep demonstrates that the disastrous consequences of such thinking in a party which succeeds in seizing power are revealed in the continuing chasm that yawns between Soviet reality and its official image, which the party dare not relinquish.

George Katkov, writing on Lenin as philosopher, discerns in the *Philosophical Notebooks* the 'workings of an extremely powerful human intelligence', though he is inclined also to suspect that Lenin's philosophical ideas reveal the early symptoms of the disease of the central nervous system which eventually killed him. Commenting on Lenin's dogged and obscurantist insistence on the theory of reflection as the only permissible explanation of consciousness, Dr Katkov suggests that it may have to do with Lenin's greater need to protect the theory of dialectics against the corrosive criticism it was undergoing. 'The claim of dialectics to be the supreme law of science appeared ridiculous even at that time'. But it was a claim to which Lenin felt bound, and the thought of relinquishing it aroused in him fears of insanity, which he even expressed.

This view is reinforced, though from a different standpoint, by Mr J. C. Rees, writing on Lenin and Marxism, when he says that Lenin

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was not bothered by the obvious incompatibility of the dialectics with science. Dialectics 'provided the justification for [Lenin's] revolutionary urge'. On Lenin's use of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective', Mr Rees shows he was not consistent. But he utters a warning against the danger of suggesting that Lenin moulded Marxist theory to suit his own purposes. We might, however, put it otherwise: while Lenin was intellectually a Marxist, emotionally he put action before theory, and while it would indeed be naïve to say that he anxiously sought out formulae for action in his Marx (or Engels), and then executed them, pure or rearranged as he saw fit, we can perhaps say with justice that he paraphrased Napoleon: *on s'engage et puis on voit ce qu'en a dit Marx.*

In a thoroughly researched piece on Lenin and the peasants, Harry Willetts claims that if Lenin had died in 1900 we should still have to study his valuable work on agrarian relations in Russia after the emancipation of 1861. Even so we are reminded that, as with every other aspect of his thinking, the 'evolution of Lenin's attitude to the peasant can be seen as a series of tactical responses to a changing political situation', and his purpose in studying this aspect of economic life was always polemical, organisational. Nor did his acute appreciation of the peasant's problems free him from a rigid anti-peasant attitude of mind. Mr Willetts concludes that the peasant would inevitably have had to foot the bill for the completion of Russia's modernisation, as he had for its beginnings. Had he lived, 'Lenin might have hesitated, even at the end of the twenties to present the bill in full: but who can doubt that he would have stepped up the instalments?'

On Lenin and the law, Ivo Lapenna argues cogently that the Soviet system was structured to operate without law, in the legal sense, and that the law exists to serve as either a docile instrument or a mighty weapon, depending on circumstances, but always in the hands of the party. It was surely not 'in spite of' but, as Lapenna says, *because* of his negative attitude to law and lawyers that Lenin took the great personal interest he did in the shaping of the Soviet legal system. If anything in his bourgeois past haunted him with feelings of shame, it must be that period of his life when he was professionally engaged in the advocacy of middle-class privilege and property.

Of Lenin's nationalities policy Mary Holdsworth writes that it had always been precarious, and had always generated dissension in his own ranks. And because he hung onto his views regardless of the lack of support, he found himself after 1917 stuck with attitudes entirely unsuited to the tasks facing him. Mrs Holdsworth suggests that the insecurity underlying his firm resolve may explain his great caution in dealing with the underdeveloped nationalities of the Empire. The high quality of research and interpretation evident throughout this collection ensures it a position of preeminence among the related literature published during the jubilee year.

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DEFINITIVE TRANSLATION?

Victor S. Frank

'THE RUSSIAN LIBRARY—SAYS THE BLURB—presents masterpieces of singular spiritual energy and freshly penetrating style characteristic of the renaissance of Russian literature during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The series includes the works of both the giants and their most noted contemporaries, all in new and definitive translations. . . .'

'Definitive translations': a big claim. Let us examine it. *The Russian Library* (General Editor, Mr Robert Payne), published by the Washington Square Press, New York, is a new venture.[1] Given the rapid expansion of Russian studies in the West, given the growing interest in modern Russian literature, an initiative of this kind is prima facie highly praiseworthy. Since the purpose of the series is to provide the English-reading public with adequate English versions of the originals, the reputation of the series stands and falls with the quality of translation and, to a lesser degree, with the quality of interpretation. In this respect the works under review show rather disturbing symptoms.

Let me start by according praise where praise is due. The translations of Olesha's and Pilnyak's works are excellent. They faithfully reproduce the distinctive flavours of the originals. Olesha's astringent prose, Kafkaesque in its dreamlike precision and limpidity, comes out beautifully. So does Pilnyak's hectic, dishevelled style.

It is the translation of Pasternak's 1922 verse cycle that causes the gravest misgivings. (By the way, Mr Flayderman, the translator, calls the cycle *Sister My Life*; *Sister Mine, Life* would make more sense. But let that pass.) The translator set himself a well nigh insoluble task—the poetic re-creation of one of the most complex verse cycles in modern Russian literature. He says in his note that he sacrificed rhyme and other poetic devices 'in order to remain true to meaning'. But it is precisely in the semantic field that his translation fails quite lamentably. I regret to say that Mr Flayderman's apparent ignorance of Russian idioms and vocabulary is so abysmal that again and again he either distorts the meaning of the original or turns Pasternak's poems into gibberish.

Here are a few—very few!— examples:

[1] The three books reviewed here are (1) Yuri Olyesha, *Love, and Other Stories*, translated and with an introduction by Robert Payne. (2) *Sister My Life*, by Boris Pasternak, translated by Phillip C. Flayderman. (3) *The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon, and Other Stories*, by Boris Pilnyak, translated by Beatrice Scott, introduction by Robert Payne. Each at $4.95.

Two other titles advertised as being in print, are Chekhov's *Journey to Sakhalin* and Mayakovsky's *Complete Plays*. Those under preparation are Akhmatova's *Selected Poems*, Gogol's *Correspondence With Friends*, Mandelshtam's *Selected Poems*, Rozanov's *Apocalypse of Our Time* and anthologies of Georgian poetry and Russian poetry. Not all translations are new. Mr Payne's translation of Olyesha's *Envy* was published first in 1936, while Mr. Peter Russell's translations of Mandelshtam's poems appeared in London several years ago.

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In *Ennui* (pp. 8–9)[2] the words, *I snyatsya Gangu* (And Ganges dreams of them; literally, And they [appear in a] dream to Ganges) are turned upside down by Mr Flayderman: They dream of Ganges.

When Marina Tsvetaeva in 1923 reviewed Pasternak's *Sister Mine, Life*, she concluded her review by quoting two lines: *I vdrug zapakhlo vypiskoy iz tysyachi bolnits* (All of a sudden it smells as if one had been discharged from a thousand hospitals). Tsvetaeva saw in these lines the best expression of the joyful, life-giving quality of Pasternak's verse. Mr Flayderman misunderstands the key-word *vypiska* and translates: All of a sudden it smells like a *prescription* from a thousand hospitals (pp. 22–23).

A Specimen contains the lines, *Bylye gody za poyas odin takoy zatknet* (One single year [i.e. the year 1917] will lick the past years hands down). Mr Flayderman's translation reads: Only few outsmart the time's ravages. In *The Definition of Poetry* (pp.58–59) Mr Flayderman confuses two near-homophones, *sadok* (fish-pond) and *sadik* (a little garden) and destroys the metaphor.

In *Mein Liebchen, was willst du noch mehr?* (pp. 80–81), the verb *stryastis*, to happen suddenly, is translated as to shake away. The poem *To Helen* (pp. 125–127) admittedly syntactically one of the most difficult in the cycle, the poem in which Pasternak makes full use of his poetic telegraphese, has been utterly destroyed in translation. In fact, it is a representative sample of Mr Flayderman's linguistic equipment. It opens with the stanza:

Ya i nepechatnym	I would not shrink even
Slovom ne pobrezgoval by,	From an unprintable word.
Da na kom iskat nam?	But against whom does one lay the claim?
Ne na kom i ne s kogo nam.	[There is] no one [to claim from].

Mr Flayderman, however, translates:

I would not take umbrage
Over an unprinted word.
Where can one search?
Nowhere, no one.

Mr Flayderman confuses *nepechatny* (unprintable) with *nenapechatanny* (unprinted). Nor does he know that *iskat na kom* does not mean search for somebody, but to lay a claim against somebody.

Further down we find the stanza:

Dumal—Troi b vek ey,	I thought her fit for Troy's age,
Gorkikh gub izgib tseluya:	When I kissed the curve of [her] bitter lips.
Byli divny veki	[Her] eyelids were a marvel,
Tsarstvennye, gipsovye.	Regal, [pale as] plaster-of-Paris.

[2] Most usefully, the Russian original is printed in the book opposite the translation; page references in this review refer therefore to the Russian and to the English text, the Russian coming first.

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Mr Flayderman translates: I thought Troy had had its day in the twisted kisses of her bitter lips. Ah, those were centuries of marvel, imperial, plaster-of-Paris times!

What he has done, of course, was to misunderstand the syntactic quirk in the first line and to confuse *vek* (age) with *veko* (eyelid). Elsewhere he mistakes *tropiki* (tropics) for *tropinki* (pathways), *podrobny* (detailed) for *podobny* (alike), *neprikayanny* (homeless) for *nepokayanny* (unrepentant)—naturally with disastrous results for that very meaning which he claims to cherish so much. In short, Mr Flayderman's verse translation has neither rhyme nor reason.

Frankly, it is astonishing that in our day and age, when the number of westerners at home in Russian is growing every day, when Russian is taught—and taught well—in scores of universities, translations such as this one are allowed to appear in print.

But then there are strange howlers in the other two volumes too. Thus, the blurb of Pilnyak's *Tale* informs us that the author 'graduated from the Academy of Modern Languages and attended the University of Kolomma [sic] and the Moscow Institute of Commerce'. What is one to make of this cryptic remark? What sort of an 'Academy of Modern Languages' did Pilnyak attend *before* going up to the University of 'Kolomma'—presumably, Kolomna. Kolomna, by the way, is a sleepy little town not far from Moscow: neither before nor after the revolution did it boast a university.

Again, in his introduction to Olesha's *Envy*, Mr Robert Payne himself makes several disconcerting assertions. Thus, in describing Olesha's beginnings as a writer (p. xi), he says that he 'became an obscure journalist on an obscure railwaymen's magazine called *Gudok*', and that 'he seemed to himself and to others to be just one more of those provincial journalists whose names would never be heard in the capital'.

True, Olesha did work on the *Gudok*. *Gudok*, however, was not an obscure magazine, but a widely-read Moscow daily which, being the organ of the influential Railwaymen's Union, possessed an importance transcending that of an ordinary trade union paper. By chance or by luck its contributors in the early twenties included such brilliant men (apart from Olesha himself) as Valentin Kataev, Ilya Ilf, Mikhail Bulgakov, and Evgeny Petrov. Olesha was not a 'provincial journalist', but was well known in Moscow long before the publication of *Envy*.

On p. xii Mr Payne discusses the comparatively liberal atmosphere of the twenties and makes another astonishing remark: 'Most of the members of the Politburo were themselves writers who respected literary freedom'. Apparently this passage refers to the year of the publication of *Envy*. Well, in 1927 the Politburo's composition was: Bukharin, Voroshilov, Rudzutak, Kalinin, Molotov, Rykov, Stalin, and Tomsky. Of these eight characters only one, Bukharin, might possibly have been described as a writer. The rest were semi-literate *apparatchiki*.

Mr Payne thinks (p. xiii) that the name of the main hero in *Envy*, Kavalerov, implies 'that there is something of the cavalier, the knight-errant about him'. But *kavaler* in modern Russian has lost the old

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connotation of knighthood and has become the equivalent of the vulgar modern English 'gent'.

It is a great pity that a new venture setting out to furnish the public with 'new and definitive' translations of Russian master works turns out to be defective, both as far as translation (at least, of one word out of three) and as interpretation is concerned.

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